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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis discusses issues affecting contemporary nuisance law from an historical 
standpoint. It is recognised that there is a considerable volume of literature relating to the 
nineteenth century antecedents of the law today. Yet nuisance is a most ancient tort, dating 
back almost a thousand years, and likewise the environmental problems it addresses date 
back to antiquity. Thus there is scope for a deeper historical analysis of this area of the 
common law which looks beyond industrialisation and the revolutionary nuisances of that 
period to the developments in the law applicable to environmental nuisances of feudal and 
post-feudal agrarian times. That is the aim of this thesis. It examines the lessons scholars and 
practitioners can learn by revisiting the origins of the law, and by critically reflecting on key 
evolutionary milestones which have shaped the law up to the present day.  
Four specific areas of current debate regarding nuisance doctrine are the focus of attention. 
Standing is one, concerning who has the right to sue in private nuisance. What types of injury 
are remediable with private nuisance is another, with particular reference to the question of 
the actionability of personal injury. The relationship between private nuisance and negligence 
is another, with reference to the issue of ‘reasonableness’ within private nuisance. The 
remedy of an injunction is the fourth area. Throughout the discussion of each of these issues 
the discussion follows a common pattern, beginning with identification of a leading late 
twentieth or early twenty-first century case which is the subject of debate and exploring the 
law at issue from an historical perspective, including the ‘original position’ in medieval case 
law. 
Nuisance law is currently encountering difficulties which not only prevent it from having a 
stable doctrinal identity in relation to other torts (and in relation to ‘its own’ history), but 
which also cast doubt on its scope for it continuing to provide worthwhile environmental 
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protection in a modern age characterised by the emergence and proliferation of environmental 
regulatory bodies. It is not argued that the solution to nuisance law’s problems lies in 
returning to an original position and re-applying it to changing political realities. Nonetheless, 
it is argued that there is a ‘simple form’ of the law to discover from within a millennia of case 
law, and it is in many – but not all – respects different from the law as it now stands (or is 
thought to stand). Many judges and scholars have misunderstood and even to some extent 
misused history and this has contributed to the difficulties the law is faced with today. 
This research advocates that when the tort is considered from a historical perspective – where 
we can find its simplest form - there is scope for its traditional ‘green credentials’ to again be 
realised. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter 1  Introduction………………………………………………………………….8 
 
1. Thesis Hypothesis……….………………………………………………………..8 
 
2. Thesis Objectives………………………………………………………………..10 
3.   Context of this research………………………………………………………….13 
4.   Methodology…………………………………………………………………….20 
5.   Overview of this research………………………………………………………..25 
 
Chapter 2 Standing………...………………………………………………………...…41 
 
1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………...41 
2.   The Quandary of Inconsistency of Historical Opinion…………………………..50 
3.   Examining the History Utilised by Lord Goff in Hunter………………………...54 
4.   Seisin and Right: Possession or Title?...................................................................59 
5.   Policy and Novel Disseisin: ‘Feudal’ or ‘Anti-Feudal’?.......................................69 
6.   Nascent ‘Standing’………………………………………………………………72 
7.   The Effects of Novel Disseisin on Seisin………………………………………..78 
8.   Nascent ‘Ownership’…………………………………………………………….84 
9.   A Summary of Lord Goff’s Use of Medieval History…………………………..86 
10. The Development of Case – The Impact of Social Evolution…………………...91 
11. Analysing Lord Goff’s Historical Reasoning……………………………………94 
 a) Newark’s Analysis…………………………………………………...95 
 b) The Supporting Trilogy………………………………………………96 
 c) Malone v Laskey…………………………………………………….100 
12. Conclusions……………………………………………………………………  104 
6 
 
 
Chapter 3 Actionability and Bodily Security……………………………………….109 
 
1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………109 
2.   The Significance of Bodily Security within Nuisance Theory………………...115 
3.   The Actionability of Comfort and Enjoyment in Early Modern Law…………126 
4.   The Modern Measure of Actionability………………………………………...132 
5.   The Case for Injury to the Person……………………………………………...138 
6.   The Need for a Supreme Court Re-evaluation of Bodily Security…………….143 
7.   The Private/Public Nuisance Paradigm………………………………………...151 
8.   Conclusions…………………………………………………………………… 158 
 
Chapter 4 The Nature of Liability – The Nuisance/Negligence Paradigm………...163 
 
1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………….163 
2.   The Evolutionary Path of Liability……………………………………………..169 
 a)  The Evolution of Liability and the Emergence of Negligence………….169 
 b)  Social Background to New Liabilities…………………………………..175 
3.   Reasonable User Scrutinised…………………………….……………………..181 
a) The Development of the Test……………………………………………181 
b) The role of ‘Reasonable’ in the Twentieth-Century and Beyond……….187 
  4.   The Legacy of Lord Westbury’s Physical Damage Construct…………………192 
 5.   Conclusions…………………………………………………………………….199 
 
Chapter 5 Injunctions…………………………………………………………………202 
 
1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………….202 
7 
 
2.   The Development of Injunctions: From Equity to Common Law……………..204 
3.   Injunctions in the Nineteenth Century…………………………………………213 
4.   Technological Innovative Through Discretionary Judicial Intervention………222 
5.   Miller v Jackson: Anyone for Cricket?................................................................224 
6.   Kennaway v Thompson: the Shelfer Principles Restored……………………....227 
7.   National Security the Ultimate Public Interest?..................................................233 
8.   Coventry v Lawrence – affirmation of a judge’s discretion to award or withhold 
an injunction…………………………………………………………………….…..237 
9.   Beyond Prohibitory Injunctions – Preventing Nuisance…….………………….240 
10. Conclusions……………………………………………………………………..243 
 
Chapter 6 Conclusion………………………………………………………………....245 
 
Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………259 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
                  
 Modern Common Law Nuisance from a Historical Perspective 
     Introduction 
1. Thesis Hypothesis 
 
This research examines modern private nuisance law in England and Wales from a historical 
perspective with the main broad research objective to contribute to a deeper understanding of 
common law private nuisance and its potential to protect the natural environment. The 
concern throughout is with how the letter of the law has evolved, and how the evolutionary 
steps the law has taken over the epochs have impacted on the scope for understanding private 
nuisance’s so called ‘green’ credentials in a modern setting. Nuisance law has evolved from 
its origins in medieval times, as indeed have environmental challenges arising from societal 
developments; some of which have transcended the ages. During common law nuisance’s 
evolution it has consistently remedied environmental harms and, as such, is a precursor to the 
emergence of what is termed today as ‘environmental law’.1 Whilst it is logical that nuisance 
continues to play a part in protecting individual environmental rights (and public health), as it 
is fixed in its ancestry, private nuisance has become decidedly underutilised, in part, because 
modern developments in the law have challenged its very existence.
2
 The purpose of the 
thesis is to explore the relationship between changes in law and engagement of the law with 
the task of providing individuals with a remedy for environment-type harm.  
Specifically, the hypothesis that is explored is that modern developments in nuisance law 
have broadly weakened the capacity of the law to adequately remedy pollution of the natural 
environment, as it affects individuals in occupation of land. This hypothesis addresses the 
                                                 
1
 J Steele, Tort Law: Text, Cases and Materials (OUP 2007), 670. 
2
 C Gearty, ‘The Place of Private Nuisance in a Modern Law of Torts’ [1989] 48(2) CLJ 214, 216. 
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strands of modern nuisance law scholarship (as identified throughout the thesis), which are 
critical of recent developments in the common law in this field on the basis that they weaken 
the tort’s contribution to environmental protection. Modern commentary in this field rarely 
engages in a holistic historical overview despite the ancient origins of the law. What is 
distinctive about the hypothesis of this thesis is that it takes a deeper historical perspective by 
looking beyond the nineteenth century period where much of the historical attention has been 
centred. Whilst historical investigations of nuisance law are by no means a novel idea, for 
historical claims pervade adjudication and scholarly commentary in this field, they rarely 
venture beyond the nineteenth century, and thus many jurists have based their observations 
without the benefit of its ancestry. Accordingly formative junctures across the epochs are 
overlooked arguably generating confusion about its purpose and scope in a modern setting. 
We go back to the medieval origins of the law, as well as the subsequent milestones in the 
law’s development leading up to, including, and going beyond the Industrial Revolution. By 
situating the concerns of some modern commentators regarding recent development of the 
law into a wider historical context I offer a fresh – albeit historical - perspective on such 
matters.  
The idea of deeply examining nuisance law in the vast setting of environmental problems is 
an ambitious one. That is why the focus is on a selection of the current controversies 
surrounding today’s doctrine in an environmental setting. The selected topics comprise: 
standing to sue in nuisance (Chapter 2); which injuries are remediable in nuisance (Chapter 
3); the nature of liability in nuisance (chapter 4); and injunctive relief (Chapter 5). The 
justification for this focus is that it is self-evident that who can sue, in respect of what 
injuries, on what basis in terms of liability, and with what remedy, provide the core 
architecture of private nuisance. 
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It will be immediately apparent that these are not the only areas of controversy in relation to 
nuisance law’s ‘environmental credentials’, but it is necessary to be selective in order to gain 
a meaningfully appreciation of the evolution of the law in these important doctrinal spheres in 
the limited space available. Thus, little attention is given to, amongst others, the relationship 
between administrative controls and private nuisance (for reasons explained later in this 
section of the chapter) and the potential for the European Convention on Human Rights, 
through Article 8 and other provisions, to better orient the law around environmental 
protection. There are, of course, a number of other aspects of private nuisance that a fully 
exhaustive study would need to cover, for instance the role of malice has deep historical 
implications for the tort but are outside of the remit of both the thesis hypothesis and thesis 
objectives.  
Furthermore, in focusing on private nuisance, it should not be taken as being suggested that 
other torts play no part in the remedying of harm relating to the environment as it affects 
private individuals. Public nuisance is of importance in an environmental setting, as 
illustrated for example by the Corby Group Litigation and, most recently, Bodo v Shell 
Nigeria.
3
  Negligence clearly has a part to play, as do breaches of statutory duty sounding in 
tort. Trespass is also a facet of the common law of relevance to the environment, and even 
specialist torts such as occupier’s liability cannot be dismissed as entirely marginal to a 
comprehensive understanding of modern tort in an environmental setting. But nevertheless 
the focus in this thesis is on private nuisance, as a reflection of the many scholars who see 
this as an important – and perhaps even the most important – tort in the context of protecting 
the natural environment.  
2. Research Objectives 
                                                 
3
 Corby Litigation Claimants v Corby Borough Council [2008] EWCA Civ 463; Bodo Community v Shell 
Petroleum Development Co of Nigeria Ltd [2014] EWHC 1973 (TCC); [2014] EWHC 2170 (TCC). 
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It follows from the above statement of the hypothesis that the primary research objective is to 
evaluate the contention in some of the leading literature that nuisance law has developed 
along regressive lines in recent decades; in other words, the contention is that despite 
attempts to develop the law in modern decisions, that nuisance has missed opportunities to 
continue on a prior path of broadly adequate protection of interests in land affected by 
environmental harm. If this is the case, recent attempts to move the law forward have in 
reality taken a step back in relation to the level of environmental control nuisance has 
bestowed for centuries. When the four areas of nuisance law are examined individually from 
a historical perspective, is it true that early law is demonstrated to be at least as robust as that 
of the present on these points? Are there differences between the areas under scrutiny such 
that generalisation is difficult? 
A key secondary research objective is to reflect on how history can be better used to assess 
present day law. This has many elements. One is to elucidate and defend the idea of 
elucidating, a formative nuisance doctrine – what I term the ‘simple form’ of nuisance - with 
which to compare, and against which to evaluate, today’s doctrine in the selected core areas. 
In identifying the simple form the aim is to provide a standard against which to identify shifts 
in the law over history and, crucially, to be able to evaluate them. In searching for this simple 
form, whilst attention will (of course) be given to the history of the law, it will not be 
assumed that it is at the very beginning of the law’s evolution that the ‘simple form’ is to be 
found. It may well be the case that the simple form - as I understand it - was present from the 
outset (as indeed I argue it to be), but the thesis is open minded about when this simple form 
emerged. Certainly, simple does not equate to ‘original’. 
A further aspect of this objective is the idea that nuisance law has a transparent essence; that 
it is essentially one thing (and not the other) which can be identified as its ‘true essence’. The 
simple form argument is part of this essence, but the essential aspect is the inherently 
12 
 
evolutionary character of the law. The law has ‘witnessed’ major societal changes, broadly 
explained below, to which the law has to some extent responded, whilst maintaining its 
simple form. In other words, in positing the analytical and normative ‘device’ of a simple 
form, the thesis permits – indeed recognises – that the law evolves according to societal 
needs. In identifying the simple form and its essence a perception of intrinsic simplicity 
comes to the fore in the realm of nuisance law, despite modern perceptions of a tort 
‘immersed in undefined uncertainty’.4 This thesis takes the proposition that that simplicity 
has been visibly lost within our period of living memory owing to misuses of nuisance’s rich 
history that first structured the law.  In consideration that it has been asserted that the 
common law – particularly nuisance - is at its best when it is simple it is pertinent to elucidate 
whether simplicity is possible drawing on the abundance of historical materials.
5
 
Putting these ideas of simple form and evolutionary essence (true essence) together, the 
objective is further to identify a specific historical juncture – a point zero as it were - where 
the simple form can be said to have matured in a coherent early modern form of law. There is 
a number of irreconcilable differences between the medieval ‘forms of actions’ and the 
actions of the early modern period, not least because they were constrained by aspects of the 
feudal legal framework. The medieval writs became obsolete when they were fully 
supplanted by actions on the case following the decision in Cantrell v Church in 1601.
6
 This 
is the juncture in history that is posited to represent the ‘point zero’ for modern nuisance law. 
In essence, the usurpation of the older forms of action by actions on the case embodies the 
culmination of judicial activity – that commenced in the fourteenth-century – which reacted 
to changing societal mores as feudalism declined.  
                                                 
4
 As per Erle CJ’s judgment in Brand v Hammersmith Railway (1867) LR 2 QB 223, 247. Quoted by Professor 
FH Newark in ‘The Boundaries of Nuisance’ (1949) 65 LQR 480, 480. 
5
 Barr and others v Biffa Waste Services Ltd [2009] EWHC 1033 [799] (Carnwath LJ). 
6
 (1601) B & M 588; Cro Eliz 845; 74 ER 1007. 
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In identifying that the simple form and true essence of nuisance were preserved by judges 
(after Cantrell) - when all others have faded into obscurity - the final research objective 
becomes apparent: to demonstrate that a proper use of historical sources can be positively 
helpful in developing the law of nuisance in the future. By identifying the elements that are 
constant throughout we have a point of reference from which to determine the nature of 
nuisance law and – perhaps – to address the current maligned form of the tort in future 
judgments. Implicit in the notion of the better use of history in informing modern law is the 
risk that history will nevertheless be misused. Part of the objective in justifying my historical 
analysis is to delineate acceptable and unacceptable uses of history. It is with some reluctance 
and respect for scholarship that the possibility that certain uses of nuisance law history in 
recent times involve a misuse of history is entertained, but it is not possible to ‘pull punches’.  
An inescapable part of my concern with identifying an appropriatly specific way of using 
historical analysis is that there are occasions when history has not been used appropriately, 
with damaging implications that I examine.  
3. Context of this research 
The main context of this research is the current uncertainty about the place of common law 
solutions to environmental problems in a modern age when Parliament has enacted a body of 
regulatory law for the purpose of environmental protection. It can be suggested that there is 
an inclination within the judiciary to develop the tort of private nuisance with reference to the 
need to avoid the risk of ‘undesirable’ inconsistencies with legislative measures to ‘effect 
environmental protection’.7 But on the other hand, present-day legal mechanisms are quite 
widely perceived to have not only consistently failed to solve enduring environmental 
                                                 
7
 Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather [1994] 2 AC 264(Lord Goff) [305]. 
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problems, they have been deemed, by contrast, to escalate matters.
8
  In the meantime people 
have become more informed and are progressively mindful of the effects of unwelcome 
environmentally harmful activities. After recognising the failings of legislation many 
instinctively turn to the courts for a remedy to protect themselves, their property and their 
environment. When viewed from that perspective private nuisance is the natural choice of 
affected citizens, but scholarly and judicial opinion here is quite polarised. Whereas Lord 
Goff believes a ‘well-informed and carefully structured legislation’ achieves adequate 
environmental protection (thus the development of common law principles is neither 
desirable nor needed), at the other end of the spectrum, Jenny Steele, Donald McGillivray 
and John Wightman, and Maria Lee, amongst others, see a role for private nuisance as 
‘unofficial’ environmental law capable and indeed necessary for members of the public who 
cannot get justice through regulatory law; the type Lord Goff expressly reveres for one reason 
or another.
9
   
 
This thesis is concerned primarily with issues relating to the environment that the common 
law - through nuisance - has protected over the course of nearly a thousand years. A 
pragmatic philosophical approach is taken which regards nuisance law chiefly as an 
instrument or tool for environmental protection.  Whilst this means there is an instrumentalist 
approach to the research that argues private nuisance is, in essence, an environmental tort, it 
does not work critically within the framework of the traditional economic efficiency model 
adopted by some to analyse the practical purpose of the tort, rather it examines the 
                                                 
8
 P Higgins, Eradicating Ecocide: Laws and Governance to Prevent the Destruction of our Planet (Shepheard-
Walwyn 2010) 131. 
9
 Cambridge (7) [305]. See generally J Steele, ‘Private law and the environment: nuisance in context’ (1995) 
15(2) Legal Studies 236, M Lee, ‘What is Private Nuisance?’ (2003) LQR 298; and D McGillivray and J 
Wightman, ‘Private Rights, Public Interests and the Environment’ in T Hayward and J O’Neill ed. Justice, 
Property and the Environment: Social and Legal Perspectives (Ashgate 1997). 
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evolutionary path of nuisance law to reflect on its proven and potential environmental 
efficacy.  
 
Pigou, McLaren, Brenner, Calebresi and Melamed, and Ogus and Richardson all argue to a 
degree that government regulation often restricts economic growth. When it does they argue 
that state regulation acts as the antithesis to the growth economy. Accordingly private 
nuisance can represent an attractive alternative to state regulation, which perhaps explains 
why the tort has ‘enjoyed’ a significant amount of attention from the economist. Despite 
economists sometimes preferring common law regulation over government control, this 
research has a clear ambit to move away from such analysis and looks beyond its role as a 
market-oriented alternative to regulation. The simple form is not an economic form; it is 
more about ethical or moral values concerning good neighbourly relations, or in other words, 
a compromise between neighbours famously encapsulated by Baron Bramwell in Bamford  v 
Turnley.
10
  
 
That ethical character is given the fullest articulation in relation to private nuisance in the 
work of James Penner. According to Penner, the morality of the law here is to do with what it 
means to be a ‘good neighbour’.11 A good neighbour recognizes reciprocity among 
proprietors of a neighbourhood. The law is about remedying a situation in which one 
proprietor demands too much of another (giving too little in return). A ‘demanding 
                                                 
10
 (1862) 3 B & S 66. See generally AC Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (Macmillian 1932); R Coase, ‘The 
Problem of Social Cost’, 3 (1960) JLE 1-44; RA Posner Economic Analysis of Law (Little, Brown 1986); JF 
Brenner, ‘Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution’, (1974) 3 LS 403; G Calebresi and AD Melamed, 
‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85(6) Harv Law Rev 
1089; and AI Ogus and GM Richardson, ‘Economics and the Environment: A Study in Private Nuisance’ (1977) 
36 CLJ 284, 297. 
11
 J Penner, ‘Nuisance, Neighbourliness and Environmental Protection’, in Lowry and Edmunds (ed), 
Environmental Protection and the Common Law (2000). For the clearest judicial endorsement of this, see Lord 
Millett: ‘The governing principle is good neighbourliness, and this involves reciprocity. A landowner must show 
the same consideration for his neighbour as he would expect his neighbour to show for him’ (in Southwark LBC 
v Mills [2001] AC 1, 20). 
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neighbour’ may argue that they have the public interest on their side, for they were involved 
in useful enterprises which they operated with reasonable care and which can be argued as 
important ingredients of the economy. But the courts base (pace Penner) their decision on the 
morality of relations between the neighbours independent of the wider public interest, whilst 
what was held to matter most as regards reasonableness was the extent of the injury 
complained of (not the conduct underpinning it).
12
 
 
A further context of this research is the now extensive literature on the common law process 
and the creative role played by the judiciary.
13
 Whilst it is not possible to make the common 
law process a focus of this study in the space available, it is an important part of the context 
of this research that judges are increasingly seen as occupying an active and creative part in 
the law making process, rather than passive functionaries in a more mechanistic process of 
applying precedent in the past. Some legal realists have in the past advanced the premise that 
judges have simply ‘found’ the necessary law to decide a particular case.14 Other legal 
realists have gone as far as to propose that the process of judicial reasoning can be influenced 
by what the judge had for breakfast.
15
  Whilst such notions may have gone too far, Justice 
Kirby recognised that judges are required to: 
 
Face up to the fact that they make choices and therefore must be alert to the need for differentiation between the 
considerations which may permissibly affect the choice and those which are irrelevant, prejudiced and otherwise 
inadmissible.
16
 
 
                                                 
12
 ibid 40 (‘no one should suffer unreasonable interference in his use and possession of land, however 
meritorious or in keeping with the goals of public policy the defendant’s activities might otherwise be.’) 
13
 M Kirby, ‘Judging: Reflections on the Moment of Decision’ (Charles Stuart University 1998), 10. 
14
 W Rehnquist, ‘Remarks on the Process of Judging’ (1992) 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 263, 263-4 
15
 W Rehnquist, ibid. For discussions on mood and its influence on decision-making see JP Forgas, ‘Sad and 
Guilty? Affecting Influences on the Explanation of Conflict in Close Relationships’ (1994) 66 Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 56-68, 56; JP Forgas, ‘On Being Happy and Mistaken: Mood Effects on the 
Fundamental Attribution Error’ (1998) 75(2) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 318-331. 
16
 M Kirby (13) 11. 
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Some of the judicial ‘choices’ involve references to history. In a general setting, Learned 
Hand comments judges must uphold their authority by shrouding themselves ‘in the majesty 
of an overshadowing past’17  but at the same time they must take heed of dominant trends of 
the time. The thesis engages with the risk that the past will be distorted by the need to make 
decisions that fit well with the present, for example by changing the past so that it is able to 
confer authority on the rules thought desirable today. 
 
What stands out in twentieth-century cases (as elaborated on in relevant chapters of the 
thesis) is that judges have had to contend with the rise of negligence – a judicial construct in 
the same way that nuisance law is, except that negligence has less of a deep rooted history. 
Judges appear to be concerned with ensuring that nuisance law and negligence retain a sense 
of their ‘original’ autonomy, yet work coherently together. Whilst this is by no means an 
impossible undertaking, the risk in deciding the autonomous areas relative to each other is 
that the ideas underpinning one ‘infect’ the other, and that the conceptual independence of 
both torts is compromised. This is central to my concern with a simple form of nuisance, 
which can be ‘defended’ (I hope to show) against abrogation as a result of the hegemony of 
the newer tort of negligence. 
 
During the process of judicial reasoning and decision-making judges need to consider 
relevant policy factors, what sources may be used to derive those factors and whether they 
should be acknowledged in the judgment. Often – as is the case in the decisions discussed 
within this thesis (it is argued) – the fact that ‘policy’ has influenced the reasoning and 
decision-making process is, in the main, extant from official judgments. We can only infer 
                                                 
17
 J Hand , ‘Mr Justice Cardozo’ in The Spirit of Liberty (Vintage Books 1959) 98 (at 99). 
18 
 
that the decision was one of policy and we are thus none the wiser regarding what sources 
have influenced that decision.  
 
It is suggested that the decisions taken by the judges in the twentieth-century were a response 
to dealing with uncertainty and taking steps towards modernising nuisance law in line with 
modern developments in the law of torts and societal changes. This important role that judges 
undertake can nonetheless be unreliable if a requisite knowledge of the past is lacking. This 
research considers the most prolific example of this is the adoption of negligence principles. 
In adopting negligence judges were creating the law by taking the choice to advance the law 
in respect of what they believed the law is.
18
 But comparatively fledgling negligence 
principles are conceptually independent from nuisance doctrines which have developed over 
more than eight centuries. A pertinent line of investigation ensues whether borrowing 
conceptually independent principles is a matter of developing the law or in actuality changing 
the law. For example, traditionally, nuisance law has dealt with the outcomes of activities 
rather than conduct; thus adopting doctrines concerning conduct (of the reasonable man) is a 
cross-infection of principles that has notably proven problematic, and has received justifiable 
(I argue) criticism. 
 
Given the concern with elucidating a simple, autonomous tort of private nuisance, the 
decision to exclude consideration of the interface between nuisance and regulation requires 
defending. Surely it is part of the ‘dynamics of legal change’ that adjacent common law areas 
have the potential to be affected not only by ‘one another’ – to co-evolve - but by ‘external’ 
ones, notably regulatory laws. Maria Lee above others has argued that liability in private 
nuisance should take into account relevant decisions by government regulators, albeit not on 
                                                 
18
 M Kirby (13) 2. 
19 
 
some generalised basis of regulatory pre-emption of private rights familiar in the US, but on a 
case by case basis.
19
 By contrast, Ben Pontin has argued that regulatory decisions should be 
treated as entirely separate from nuisance liability, except where Parliament dictates 
otherwise.
20
 
 
In terms of case law, the court in Gillingham Borough Council v Medway (Chatham) Dock 
Ltd
21
 held  that administrative consent – or at least planning consent -  is capable of altering 
the ‘character of the neighbourhood’ within which interference with amenity is assessed. 
Throughout the writing of the thesis this decision had been referred to with approval by the 
appellate courts, and indeed it enjoyed some support within the academic commentary.  
 
My original justification for excluding close attention to this topic was twofold. On the one 
hand, the conceptual justification that it would be difficult to learn much of relevance from 
nuisance law’s early history, as is the thrust of the thesis to do. That is because town planning 
and environmental protection legislation is a modern phenomenon; there is no medieval 
Gillingham. On the other hand, a pragmatic justification is based on this being too big an 
issue to be easily dealt with in the space of a chapter, within the limits of a doctoral thesis. 
The relationship with negligence is one thing, but it is a further, major step ‘outside’ common 
law to address regulatory law. 
 
Since writing up, the Supreme Court in Coventry v Lawrence
22
 has ruled that Gillingham was 
wrongly decided and that nuisance law and regulatory law are largely autonomous and one 
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does not affect the other. It is undeniable that it would have been interesting to have explored 
the development of the ruling and discussed the autonomy thesis not only in relation to 
negligence but ‘outside’ regulation, but at least Coventry has gone some way to vindicating 
the inside/outside dichotomy, and it is hoped that this justifies drawing the line where I have. 
I do however address the issue in connection with the chapter on remedies. 
 
4. Methodology 
 
This is predominantly a classic doctrinal project as it is principally library based relying upon 
primary and secondary sources and engaging in academic commentary. It has been necessary 
to examine and reflect upon case law from reported nuisance actions that both pre and post-
date the modern law reporting system. The assistance of modern advances with technology 
including the advent of the internet and electronic resources has palpably changed the 
boundaries of what can be defined as a library based project. As all resources and materials 
are located in various law libraries (with some in the libraries of adjacent disciplines) only the 
method of obtaining some resources has changed from the classic doctrinal research 
approach. In addition some materials, owing to their age and often value, are only available in 
restricted forms from specific libraries (sometimes electronically). All resources have been 
utilised for the same purpose: to identify what the law is at any given time, and how this has 
changed.  
 
Iconic historical literature by Maitland is considered but it is not defensible to rely on 
Maitland, writing in the 1900s, uncritically, without reference to the argument on the 
meaning of seisin of Jouon des Longrais, La Conception Anglaise de la Saisine (1924). Jouon 
des Longrais had a direct influence on esteemed legal historians such as Plucknett and Thorne 
21 
 
(and hence, indirectly, on Milsom). Woodbine's polemic in the notes to his edition of Glanvill 
is also important. However any analysis concerning novel disseisin and the assize of nuisance 
requires engagement with the current state of the enormous academic literature on this topic 
that started in the 1970s. Contributions by Sutherland, Loengard, Milsom, Palmer, Oldham 
and Baker provide proper reference to the literature of the debate. That historical analysis is 
applied to the case law and considered in terms of more recent commentary by leading 
nuisance scholars including Steele, Pontin, Lee, Gearty, and Murphy and also extends to 
leading scholars in cross-disciplinary fields. 
 
It is important to be clear about the specific – and to some extent unusual or distinctive - uses 
of historical material in this thesis, and the limits of the use of historical method here. The 
approach to history in this thesis is distinctive in that it aims to connect two quite discrete 
scholarly approaches to nuisance law. On the one hand, there is what can be described as the 
purely historical approach, consisting of scholarship reflecting on what law was at a given 
point of time, without attention (or even interest in) the law today.
23
 On the other hand, there 
is present-oriented literature which makes passing reference to historical claims about the 
present in relation to the past, without looking deeply at primary historical sources, and often 
without looking at all at secondary historical sources. I am attempting to bridge what is a gap 
in the scholarship in that regard. It is important to make it clear that this thesis does not 
engage with traditional historical method.  
 
This thesis does not enter into source criticism,
24
 for instance internal criticism (which 
assesses the credibility of sources). In acquiescence that few documents are accepted as 
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completely reliable, it follows that each individual document must go through a process to 
establish credibility. Accordingly it is impractical to engage in such a process for the myriad 
of nuisance sources; instead the general credibility – and thus opinion - of esteemed authors 
is considered rather than weighing up each piece of evidence individually.
25
 In addition, the 
method of synthesis, where individual pieces of information are assessed in context then 
hypotheses established through a distinct process of historical reasoning, is not used here.
26
 
Elements of synthesis, for instance, establishing ‘arguments to the best explanation’27 are 
outside the remit of this thesis which, of course, has limitations in the space available. 
McCullagh summarises that ‘if the scope and strength of an explanation are very great, so 
that it explains a large number and variety of facts, many more than any competing 
explanation, then it is likely to be true’.28  The aim of this thesis is not to create such 
arguments, rather to use, and compare, those already established by legal historians in the 
existing literature to consider my hypothesis.  
 
A further issue which requires explanation and justification is the place of social (including 
environmental) history in this thesis. To say that the thesis is classically doctrinal is not to 
dismiss entirely the relevance of social context. At many points it is essential to situate the 
law in its social context to understand the meaning of the law, and that is something that 
nuisance law historians have made palpably clear.
29
 There is very little I need to add to what 
historians have already said about the social context of early modern, and indeed more 
modern, nuisance law. That is something best left to legal historians and historians using 
traditional historical method. Certainly, I do not attempt an original exposition of feudal 
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politics, or feudal and post-feudal land tenure. However, as none of the historians of nuisance 
law look squarely at the environmental context of the law, this is one area where I do make 
an original claim of sorts. This is that there are ‘modern’ environmental problems that really 
are identical to ancient ones, and that there is a measure of continuity between the problems 
being tackled by nuisance law today and those at its origins (and all points in between).  Even 
here, though, it would be wrong to describe the methodology as socio-legal or sociological, 
or inter-disciplinary and anything that puts distance between doctrinal methods. This is 
because the evidence of environmental problems common throughout history is contained in 
nuisance law reports themselves.  
 
What, then, of the place of inter-disciplinary methodologies (sociology of law; socio-legal 
studies etc), and the use of empirical methodology? An advantage of legal history is the 
flexibility it offers academics to see the many countenances of law rather than having to 
depict the nature of law as being all one thing or all another.
30
 Therefore a historical analysis 
of nuisance law is desirable for that reason; arguably a comprehensive analysis of nuisance 
law is incomplete without a comprehensive account of its historical development, which is, of 
course, a main contribution of this thesis (see below). The work of legal historians has 
enriched jurisprudential scholarship but it has forced theorists and legal philosophers to often 
consider social milieus as a significant feature of law.
31
  
 
We could say that the society ‘shapes’ law, or law ‘influences’ society, or that law and 
society are ‘mutually constitutive’ giving an organised existence to one another. Still, despite 
legal historians demonstrating that such propositions are undoubtedly true in some sense, 
accuracy and/or certainty about the exact nature of, reasons for, or processes by which one 
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has an impact on the other are generally elusive.
32
 Indeed research into law and society are 
markedly dogged by introspection, dislocation and uncertainty.
33
 As such propositions about 
law and society are at times so elusive it is questionable whether anything can, or should, be 
said about the causal relationship between law and society.
34
  The method of assessing the 
impact of society and law on one another can be placed under the term ‘evolutionary 
functionalism’35 where legal history invites or demands distinct and demonstrable claims 
about causal relationships. But this has serious conceptual limitations, particularly in the case 
of law and society.
36
  
 
Black letter law implies a mechanistic analysis of legal rules in abstraction from the social 
problems out of which they emerged thus the distinction between doctrinal and black letter 
law must be realised in the context of this research. The research has social legal elements as 
it engages - albeit broadly - with social changes over an eight century period. Hence a 
doctrinal analysis of this sort cannot be extant from considerations regarding the relationship 
between law and society, setting it aside from strict black letter research. There is an element 
of both a historical and contemporary analysis of the social, economic and political factors 
leading to the development of the law and legal process present within this thesis but it does 
not take ‘sociology of law’ or ‘socio-legal’ approaches to the letter of nuisance law and how 
it has evolved. It is only necessary to acknowledge, for instance, that the law had to adapt to 
the decline of feudalism, the demographic catastrophe of the ‘Black Death’, the shift from 
predominantly agrarian to urban society, the advent of industrialisation and so on, rather than 
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give an account of social history through a study of the law or to attempt to understand law as 
a social phenomenon. 
 
The sociology of law is traditionally concerned with ‘social engineering through the existing 
legal order’ rather than ‘explaining that order or transcending it by critique’.37 Sociology of 
law methodology does not readily fit the doctrinal approach taken in this thesis. Sociology of 
law extends from mainstream sociology and proposes to go beyond the lawyer’s focus on 
legal rules and legal doctrine by remaining exogenous to the existing legal system. This 
means that the focus of study is not concerned with the legal system, per se, rather to 
understand the nature of society through the study of law. Accordingly sociology of the law 
constructs a theoretical understanding of the legal system ‘in terms of the wider social 
structures’.38 Whilst this means that the emergence, articulations and purpose of the law, legal 
prescriptions and legal definitions are treated ‘as problematic and worthy of study’39 the 
focus of this research is, in the main, a substantive analysis of nuisance doctrine, thus not 
exogenous to the legal system. That said the ‘elementary commitment’ of sociologists of the 
law to further an understanding of law in terms of the wider social order has broad 
connotations within this thesis but does not encompass the methodological emphasis; the 
doctrinal study of law here only provides glimpses of the nature of society over the epochs 
and does not challenge the existing social or legal historical literature.  
 
5.  Overview of this research 
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Chapter 2 takes its starting point from Lord Goff’s claim in Hunter regarding his ‘basic 
position’40 on standing – based on extremely fragile historical grounds41 - that there is a 
requirement for occupiers of land to have a proprietary interest (in that land) to sue in private 
nuisance. This claim is made on the assumption that there was a need to show title to realty in 
the assize of novel disseisin - the action from which nuisance is generally considered to 
originate. This denotes that mere possession of land is not enough to have standing thus 
spouses, de facto partners or children that occupy property as a home are excluded from the 
tort. High court activity during the latter half of the twentieth-century, right up to the Court of 
Appeal decision in Hunter, suggested a less austere stance to standing should prevail that 
debatably better reflects the fabric of modern households: according to Lord Cooke 
occupation as home seemed to be the requisite benchmark for standing.
42
   
 
This topic, it is argued, lends itself well to using a historical perspective to examine modern 
private nuisance law in England and Wales. Such justification is not apparent when, at first, 
using Maitland and Milsom as examples, the difficulty of finding academic consensus 
regarding the feudal legal framework is explored. Justification for using a historical 
perspective to examine the modern tort arises when it is acknowledged we need to look at the 
vicissitudes of Case (representing the introduction of the modern epoch) as a template for 
modern nuisance law. A predicament exists because the structure, purpose and even the 
origins of novel disseisin is uncertain: commentary is bursting with inconsistencies of opinion 
from esteemed legal historians thus utilising the action as a basis to structure the modern law 
is examined. We are left in the unfortunate position where we cannot say categorically which 
school of thought concerning the Assize is right – we can only speculate. The research 
investigates the best available compromise using materials and commentary from Glanvill to 
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Bracton then through to Blackstone, Maitland and then finally Palmer. Using a number of 
additional respected commentators within the investigation, this chapter engages with in 
excess of eight-centuries of first-hand accounts, based on the relevant case law, and resultant 
scholarly historical opinion.  
 
It is suggested that looking to assize of novel disseisin, as Lord Goff does in Hunter, 
represents a step too far in the evolution of nuisance law. It is a juncture in time that is 
beyond ancestral recollection and a period open to incessant conjecture. In addition the 
structure of the writ system was guarded in the sense that it masked the facts behind the case 
and the social interplays that drove claimants to litigation in the first place. More recent 
historical philosophy contends that the development of property law relates explicitly to 
social phenomena.
43
 A rigorous examination of the meaning of property suggests that the 
position was complex but it would seem ‘title’ in the sense of a ‘proprietary right’ served no 
practical purpose for a significant period under the Assize. It is contentious, to say the least, 
to assert ‘property’ related to anything more than a relationship between tenant and lord 
based on profound mutual obligations: to conceptualise that relationship as nascent 
ownership has little, if any, support. The origins of ‘property’ divulge that the law is not 
merely a reflection of society and social customs (hidden behind the writs) but rather an 
interaction between mores and law.
44
 Without an investigation into the manner in which 
societal needs drove legal change we are left with an incomplete picture of the legal history. 
In a tort that is often accused (or celebrated) as being protean in nature ignoring the societal 
nexus to legal development is a crucial omission thus it will be seen that adopting the assize 
of novel disseisin as the template for the modern law is questionable on a number of levels. 
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Lord Goff’s ‘historical’ claim hence embodies, albeit inadvertently, the rationalisation for 
investigating the past. Caution nonetheless must be exercised when ascribing modern 
perceptions on historical settings as there is a high risk of affording anachronistic meanings 
for the benefit of a modern audience. Considering the binding impact that an unsound 
historical claim can have on the common law, Lord Goff’s assertion regarding a need to show 
title to realty today is based on his historical interpretation reveals, ironically, there is a need 
for a fresh look at perceived juridical historical foundations based on modern findings. Put 
differently, Lord Cooke’s concern with modernising the law could be redefined as a concern 
with revisiting aspects of the law’s past. In that sense this chapter sets the tone for the thesis 
holistically.  
    
Chapter 3 takes as its starting point the public nuisance case of Corby v Corby,
45
 insofar as it 
addressed private nuisance. In Corby the Court of Appeal stepped off the relevant issues to 
maintain, without binding authority, that personal injury was excluded from the domain of 
private nuisance, whilst at the same time maintaining its actionability in the public 
nuisance.
46
 Focusing on the specific issue of personal injury in private nuisance this chapter 
considers actionability in the modern tort from a historical perspective. It is patent that 
‘bodily security’ has played an enduring part in nuisance law analysis over the centuries thus 
it is necessary to inquire whether various dicta - extraneous to private nuisance actions – has 
for all intents and purposes excluded ‘personal injury’ from the tort. The issue of injury to the 
person as a consequence of interference to the amenity (or economic) value of land has yet to 
be decided by the Supreme Court (or, for that matter, previously in the House of Lords). 
Despite Newark’s choice words (‘bodily security’) that distinguish ‘personal injury’ - in the 
sense of negligence - from an injury associated with proprietary rights, a ‘developing school 
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of thought’ has come to the fore which doubts the place of this type of injury as  an actionable 
private nuisance.
47
  
 
Again, this argument has been stimulated by Newark’s article and subsequent comments 
made by Lord Goff in Hunter.
48
 Justification for the exclusion of personal injury relies on the 
premises that there is a pure form of the tort that protects only the use and enjoyment of land 
and that private nuisance is solely a tort to land. Historically both these notions are debatable. 
First it is possible that early actionability suggests something different to the claimed ‘pure 
form’ of nuisance because, initially, nuisance (under novel disseisin) was utilitarian in that it 
protected rights in land in a practical sense. Those practical safeguards were associated with 
protecting the free tenement guaranteed by the seigniorial relationship between lord and 
tenant rather than comfort and enjoyment, which the assize of nuisance later protected 
(Bracton, Milsom, Loengard, Holdsworth and Murphy). But, of course, the natural 
development of nuisance law – according to societal needs (its essence) – betrays the pure 
form of the tort. Second, from early on there is evidence that the lord’s acceptance 
represented ‘security under law’ which naturally protected the tenant’s physical well-being 
by right. Later in the sixteenth to seventeenth-centuries health (extending to mental health) 
and physical well-being were intrinsic to the development of nuisance in Case: certainly, by 
Aldred’s Case they were entrenched as necessities of habitation and thus actionable.49 At this 
crucial, formative time to modern nuisance law - even into the eighteenth century - the 
sensory perceptions of the people shaped cultural and practical responses including legal 
development which the case law visibly reflects.
50
 In the nineteenth-century judges spoke of 
guarding the ‘comfort of physical existence’ on property as being essential to the theory of 
                                                 
47
 Newark (41) 481. 
48
 Hunter (23) [687-8] and [692].  
49
 77 ER 816; (1610) 9 Co. Rep. 57; B & M 599. 
50
 Emily Cockayne, Hubbub: Filth, Noise & Stench in England 1600-1770 (Yale University Press 2007). 
30 
 
nuisance.
51
 There is, for these reasons, little historical support for a pure form of the tort as 
advocated by Newark. 
 
It is argued that the historical evidence suggests the evolutionary path of nuisance law 
inherently safeguarded physical security first as a right of the seigniorial relationship then as 
a necessity of habitation. As such not only has nuisance law traditionally regarded bodily 
security as a protected interest, there is arguably no historical justification for its exclusion. 
But the problem has far deeper doctrinal undertones for the tort. From at least the time of 
Bracton a judicial balancing exercise concerning conflicting users of land evolved. The end 
product of that substantial juridical evolution - that surmounted the writ system, the assizes 
and actions on the case - was the reasonable user test. The reasonable user test has, of course, 
been used ever since to establish whether an alleged interference transcends the threshold 
necessary to give rise to an action in nuisance.
52
 The delicate matter of actionability was 
hence fashioned over a period of centuries around the manner in which humans utilised and 
exploited their land. That was until the judiciary elected to make the test redundant in a 
number of private nuisance actions where instead they adopted a stance of assessing the type 
of harm to ascertain actionability (which is revisited in chapter four).
53
  
 
Doctrinally assessing the type of harm in such a manner is subversive of private nuisance law 
and is reminiscent of the language (and doctrine) of negligence.
54
 It is in such circumstances 
that physical damage to the person (and land) that need to focus on fault-based conduct has 
become relevant, thus attracting a negligence analysis. Surprisingly, types of physical damage 
have undergone close scrutiny and their removal as protected interests has been suggested. In 
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essence a highly nuanced test to assess actionability that developed over centuries (including 
the distinction between amenity and physical damage in Tipping) has been abandoned in 
favour of the fashionable tort of negligence and thus mutated into a matter of liability first, 
when never before has liability been a prerequisite of the reasonable user test.
55
 The change 
of judicial tack that focuses now on the type of injury (or ‘actionable heads’) rather than 
reasonable user – in a neighbourhood context - has facilitated the assimilation of the new tort 
of negligence into the old tort of private nuisance. In turn, this has enabled ‘actionable heads’ 
to be removed, in a judicial sleight of hand. Unfortunately the incompatibility of nuisance 
doctrines from negligence language has inevitably created confusion throughout the law of 
nuisance and for aspects of negligence doctrines. 
 
The final stages of the inquiry in this chapter reveals the case law that has been utilised to 
exclude ‘bodily security’ from private nuisance have either concerned liability under the rule 
of Rylands v Fletcher or public nuisance. Indeed the entire case for removing the ‘head’ as an 
actionable injury has been based on facts outside the relevant domain using Newark’s 
comments as historical support. Despite the ruling of Rylands v Fletcher happening as late as 
1868 it was not until well into the twentieth-century that a series of Rylands cases began the 
slow divorce of ‘personal injury’ from private nuisance. It is unnervingly sardonic in that 
respect as the strongest proponents for the exclusion of ‘personal injury’ supposedly rely on 
historical evidence to reinforce notions of their school of thought; the research included in 
this chapter begs the question whether such support is veracious enough to withstand any 
form of rigorous historical scrutiny. But, owing to the fact that personal injury is maintained 
in public nuisance, a more modern question is posed regarding whether the name of the 
action has not merely been changed? A theoretical and definitional problem exists where 
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pollution affects a number of households. In cases, for instance, Corby and Barr v Biffa
56
 it is 
legitimate to question whether the nuisance is anything more than a ‘private nuisance’ 
dressed up to fit the ‘public nuisance’ mould. It would seem that despite the attempts of 
Newark the boundaries will remain blurred. In conclusion it is posited that there is adequate 
academic opinion to suggest a prerequisite does not exist for land - or its amenity - to also be 
affected for injury to the person to be actionable. 
 
Chapter 4 takes the starting point of Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather.
57
 It is 
somewhat thematic that Lord Goff’s comments in leading private nuisance actions cause 
controversy at the core of the historical development of private nuisance as seen in recent 
times. On this occasion his reasoning has had a significant impact on the matter of liability. In 
fact Cambridge Water is significant for it heralded the introduction of the language of 
negligence proper. Lord Goff declared that negligent conduct is a relevant consideration in 
the context of nuisance, which would have ramifications in a tort where liability has been 
traditionally strict; his lordship confirmed the introduction of what is argued in the chapter to 
be the historically alien concept of reasonable foreseeability, based on the notion of the 
hypothetical reasonable man.
58
  
 
Links are made with Chapter 3 as the decision in Cambridge has created doctrinal confusion 
by an unnecessary blurring of the boundaries that has proven problematic on various levels 
for both torts. The reasonable user test, for instance, has never been a prerequisite for 
establishing liability per se; rather it was a means of ascertaining whether an activity is 
deemed actionable, if so, it would then incur strict liability: since Cambridge it can be 
asserted that the strict liability element of the tort has been removed and the reasonable user 
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test altered. This chapter argues that the fundamental doctrine of reasonable user needs to 
adapt when a negligence type analysis regarding reasonable conduct is adopted to ascertain 
liability, further evidencing an unsatisfactory cross-infection of principles. When the extent 
of the cross-infection of negligence into the entire tort of nuisance is considered the logic 
behind Lord Goff’s reasoning is difficult to fathom. We can argue – as Lord Cooke in Hunter 
suggested – that his judgments are policy driven, perhaps, to find neatness and symmetry or 
that he simply does not have an adequate awareness of the history on which he places so 
much onus in his decisions. Regardless of whether one, both or even neither those arguments 
are correct, if he truly intended to take private nuisance back to its foundations the historical 
investigation in this thesis certainly raises doubts regarding Lord Goff’s reasoning.  
 
It is the limited circumstances in which a negligence analysis is conceivably required in 
nuisance - arguably this is restricted to physical damage not created by the defendant – that it 
is evidential nuisance could equally be treated in negligence. Such reasoning is thus 
questioned. For instance, in the case of Smith v Littlewoods,
59
 where fire started by 
trespassers caused physical damage to property, Lord Goff palpably could not differentiate 
between negligence and nuisance. In Goldman v Hargrave,
60
 a case that has proven 
problematic to nuisance, where fire caused physical damage to property by an act of God, the 
facts attracted a negligence analysis but were ultimately considered to be under the remit of 
private nuisance: Smith was clearly considered as a case of negligence. This chapter therefore 
addresses the conceivably unnecessary negligence analysis of nuisance outside what was a 
decision by Lord Wright to make an exception – in exceptional circumstances - for those 
defendants that have had an action thrust upon them for no fault of their own.
61
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Traditionally there had been a stringent separation maintained by the courts with respect to 
the distinction between nuisance and trespass, and thus it is curious (and to an historian 
confusing) for modern day courts to disregard distinctions that brought about the emergence 
of negligence as separate tort. This research makes a case that misunderstanding the deep 
rooted historical aspects of nuisance law that make it disparate from the emergence of tort of 
negligence explains a number of problems, and to a significant extent, owing to a clear 
conceptual independence. Once we look at the development of negligence from a historical 
perspective, its emergence as a separate tort reveals negligence type liability is incompatible 
with the imposition of strict liability because elements of the enquiry to ascertain liability are 
fundamentally different.   
 
Again, the chapter investigates the impact of societal change on the development of private 
nuisance. An insight into Palmer’s work on The Black Death provides strong foundations 
regarding why liability had to evolve owing to demographic catastrophe – society had to be 
coerced to fulfil their obligations and the law developed to accommodate that necessity. It is 
patent from the research that the development of liability was influenced heavily by societal 
interplays with the common law which further affirms the conceptual independence of 
nuisance from negligence. The distinction between ‘reasonableness’ in the sense of 
carelessness is explored (i.e. the negligence aspect presented in Cambridge Water), and 
reasonableness as it applies to the consequences of acts, careless or otherwise (as it is 
traditionally understood within the paradigm of private nuisance law). Reasonable user is 
scrutinised by investigating the development of the test before considering the term 
‘reasonable’ in the twentieth-century and its possible ramifications for the future considering 
the blurring of its meaning in the context of nuisance. 
 
35 
 
History is utilised slightly differently in this chapter than from the others, in that it explores 
the significance of Tipping as a legally binding precedent which the House of Lords 
overlooked in Cambridge. The ratio of Tipping is that someone who causes physical damage 
to the property of a neighbour is ‘strictly’ liable. That is to say, it is explicit in that authority 
that a defendant is liable not withstanding that they have exercised reasonable care in relation 
to the activity that is the subject of the nuisance complaint. By contrast, in Cambridge, a 
defendant who has not been careless (and who has not reasonably foreseen injury) is not 
liable. The House of Lords had the power to overrule Tipping in Cambridge (under the 
Practice Direction of 1966
62
), but overruling a binding authority – of course - requires a 
special procedure. That procedure was not followed in Cambridge and thus it is doubtful that 
the reasonable foreseeability rule is good law here: certainly Tipping was not overruled. All 
that can be said is that Tipping left open a ‘non-strict’ liability rule for amenity nuisance, 
which was an obiter aspect of the case (the case only concerned physical damage). 
 
Chapter 5 deals with injunctions and takes the starting point of Watson v Croft
63
 and the 
award of the injunction by the High Court in Coventry v Lawrence
64
 based on it. The decision 
in Croft seemingly affirmed two issues; first defendants in private nuisance are likely to face 
an injunction to stop activities that infringe their neighbours’ proprietary rights; and second, 
principles concerning awarding damages in lieu of an injunction are well settled law in line 
with the late nineteenth-century case of Shelfer v City of London Electric Company.
65
 From 
the outset it is clear that the matter of statutory defence is not a focus of the research as we 
are concerned here with situations where it is ‘left to the common law to provide an 
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answer’.66 The Supreme Court in Coventry has endorsed the primacy of an injunction and the 
limited relevance of regulation, but with some caveats that are examined. 
 
Unusually, in the scheme of what is topical in this thesis, injunctions have not continuously 
figured throughout its evolutionary path. Despite injunctions being introduced in the 
fourteenth-century as an instrument of control or coercion, their development as a specific 
remedy for environmental protection in the tort is relatively late owing to difficulties 
associated with their procurement and the fact that only damages were available in actions on 
the case for nuisance – thus private nuisance - until the nineteenth-century. In spite of that 
fact, it is important to investigate their development from an early medieval concept as one of 
the legal innovations required to coerce citizens in order to preserve traditional society after 
the Black Death had desolated the population of England and Wales. It is that development 
that cemented the foundations of injunctive relief in equity as a discretionary remedy. The 
research then follows the development of injunctions from Equity to the law courts that 
responded to a specific injustice that had become endemic in nuisance law by the end of the 
eighteenth-century. Claimants typically faced a potential infinite barrage of actions from 
activities already deemed unlawful by the courts because there was no provision to force 
defendants to cease, for instance, polluting their neighbour. Wealthy individuals (and the 
emerging corporations) had free reign to pollute which paved the way for a series of statutory 
amendments, which came to a head in the nineteenth-century, to bring the injunction into the 
realm of law from chancery. 
 
There is some debate (discussed in the chapter) as to how far, if at all, the ‘strict’ approach in 
Shelfer, as applied in Croft and Coventry, is justified and indeed what the current approach is 
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after so many opinions were expressed on this point by the Supreme Court in Coventry. Lord 
Sumption in Coventry called for abandonment of Shelfer and to some extent a reverse 
presumption in favour of granting equitable damages instead of an injunction., and thus for a 
departure from the nineteenth century position.
67
 However, that did not commend itself to 
most justices of the Supreme Court, with Lord Mance emphasising the importance of 
injunctions where interference with the right to enjoyment of a home is being remedied. Lord 
Mance’s view is argued to fit best with the paradigm developed in my thesis. 
 
Chapter 6, the concluding chapter, reflects on these specific studies in the use of history as a 
whole. First, the issue of an ‘essence’ is addressed. Does the law have an essence that can be 
discerned in some original position historically? Or, posed differently, is there a point in the 
deep history of nuisance theory that can be used as a starting point for a linear depiction of its 
history? Seemingly nuisance’s past clearly reveals a story of evolution, change, and 
adaptation (albeit that there is a recognisable identity to the law throughout) that raises doubts 
whether there is a ‘point zero’. Arguably if there is a juncture to which the genesis of the 
modern law of private nuisance can be attributed it is after the decision of Cantrell v 
Church
68
 when the assize of nuisance and quod permittat prosternere became for all intents 
and purposes obsolete. It was then that the judges began to structure the modern law in 
actions on the case for nuisance.  
 
Second, the manner in which the law’s ‘pasts’ (in the plural) have been utilised is considered. 
It is concluded that the past is manipulated to suit the ‘policy’ of today’s courts, which is to 
limit private nuisance and to leave space for established regulatory laws and their expansion  
and the hegemonic tort of negligence. A succinct example of policy manipulation in practice 
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is the House of Lords decision to overturn the Court of Appeal in Hunter. This example is 
best illustrated by the McGillivray and Wightman piece that was written and published in the 
intermediary period when the appeal in that case was on going.
69
 The piece (chapter) is 
unique in that it was able to investigate standing in private nuisance in light of an alternative 
reality concerning how the law once stood (in the modern history). Although we, as 
academics, may make contentions of what the law would be like if a specific aspect of that 
law was to change it is somewhat different to approach such a change when it has actually 
occurred – it would seem the reality of a living example changes one’s outlook. McGillivray 
and Wightman were able to take stock of the temporary situation. This research determines in 
light of their contentions that interests in land seen as emanating from a collective right of 
occupation rather than an individualistic proprietary interest changes the nexus between 
humans and land and the manner in which the tort is utilised in the role of environmental 
protection. 
 
It is also concluded this research reveals that private nuisance is in a precarious position, 
perhaps the worst it has ever experienced in its long existence. Access to justice issues aside, 
the cross-infection of the language of negligence, that began through a small number of cases 
debatably better suited to negligence (Smith), has been shown to affect the tort at a doctrinal 
and structural level and represents the biggest threat to the future of private nuisance - not 
only regarding its efficacy as an environmental tort – but as an individual legal entity. If the 
problems addressed in this thesis are reviewed with a strong, accurate historical grounding 
and the issue of the cross-infection of the language of negligence ameliorated then the 
situation would be entirely different. The law of nuisance could be regarded in its simplest 
doctrinal form. 
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If the right to sue better reflects the modern fabric of households to an occupancy-based 
stance that is more ecocentric it can transcend - perchance redefine - ‘interests’ in land from 
an economically centred perception. Actionability is, perhaps, best viewed from both a 
historical and modern perspective.  If we consider a very early period in the torts evolution, 
for instance the time of Bracton, comparing his almost infinite natural rights of seisin to 
Murphy’s modern description of what is actionable (‘any on-going or recurrent activity or 
state of affairs that causes substantial and unreasonable interference with a claimant’s land’70) 
it can be asserted that there is a simplicity regarding actionability that has been consistent 
almost entirely throughout, where the ‘type’ of harm is irrelevant and, instead, an inquiry 
concerning conflicting users of land has been decisive. The simplicity lies in the nature of 
compromise inherent in nuisance theory. Liability – of course – in its traditional sense is strict 
and simply imposed when a user of land is deemed unreasonable because the activity has 
transcended what their neighbour ought to be expected to endure.  
 
Palpably the simplicity in expecting to be awarded an injunction unless clearly defined 
exceptions (Shelfer) favour damages in lieu is self-evident. It is the search for simplicity in 
this research that has exposed a paradox. Why is it that the courts have affirmed the 
nineteenth-century position in relation to injunctions (where a simple set of principles based 
on a premise of fairness from within parliament and the courts can be followed), but not 
liability, actionability or standing? There is no easy answer. But searching for the 
straightforward from the massive lineage of nuisance law – with the exception of the most 
distant medieval genesis that is beyond our grasp – the most confusion has manifested in the 
last hundred or so years. Indeed, one could say my overall conclusion is that the courts have 
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not used history in a way that simplifies, or clarifies, the law. The use or misuse has muddied 
the waters. Nuisance deals with complex neighbourly disputes which is difficult enough 
without the added confusions of modernising an ancient tort by offering modern solutions 
that simply do not transcend the ancient/modern divide. There will always be difficulties 
using problematic historical analysis to shape the current law but we should be wise not to 
distort the old doctrines and meaning of nuisance law that have proven robust enough to 
stand the test of time; they are not about to yield for the sake of symmetry or neatness now 
any more than in the past. Attempts to force that upon the tort are ultimately the problem not 
the remedy. 
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Chapter 2    
      Standing 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In Chapter 1 the core architecture of private nuisance was identified as being who can sue, in 
respect of what injuries, on what basis in terms of liability, and with what remedy. In order to 
elucidate a formative nuisance doctrine – what I term the ‘simple form’ of nuisance - with 
which to compare, and against which to evaluate, today’s doctrine, this chapter focuses on 
who can sue in private nuisance taking a deep historical perspective. In identifying the simple 
form it is necessary to identify certain shifts in the law over history to expound the notion that 
the law has to some extent responded to major societal changes and thus the law evolves 
according to societal needs and mores. Whilst searching for this simple form, the issue of 
who can sue in private nuisance provides an illustration that it can be found at the very 
beginning of the law’s evolution. It is contended that the simple form and essence of private 
nuisance reveals a perception of intrinsic simplicity in the tort and that that simplicity has 
been visibly lost within our period of living memory owing to misuses of nuisance’s rich 
history that first structured the law. The issue of standing in contemporary terms provides us 
with model example of that contention. 
The contemporary law regarding who has the right to sue in private nuisance was asserted by 
the House of Lords in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd.
71
 Their Lordships held, by a majority 
(Lord Cooke of Thorndon dissenting), that in general only persons with exclusive possession 
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can sue.
72
  According to Lord Goff, that category of person includes freeholders, leasehold 
tenants, even licensees with exclusive possession, but excludes the spouses, de facto partners 
or children that occupy property as a home.
73
 The decision to style the modern land law 
principle of exclusive possession as being the qualification for who can sue was, for all 
intents and purposes, an attempt to re-establish an ancient relationship between land law and 
incipient tort principles that are echoes of the twelfth-century. 
The proprietary element within the action that is believed to be the template for modern 
private nuisance - the assize of novel disseisin (assisa novae disseisina
74
) - was somewhat 
disparate from today. From the outset we must recognise that ‘exclusive possession’ is a 
modern concept in nuisance terms and was not stated as the qualification for standing to sue 
in private nuisance until the end of the twentieth-century, in Hunter.
75
 The plea rolls indicate 
that assize of novel disseisin offered protection in the king’s court but to an extremely 
specific type of tenant: those who held a free tenure.
76
 Exclusive possession, a right that is 
good against the world, is a concept dressed up to impersonate complex ancient land law 
doctrines that only manifest a frivolous similarity to the feudal legal framework. Despite the 
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need for a tenant to be (seised) in demesne,
77
 which we may compare to being in actual 
possession today, a tenant only had a right against an individual - usually his lord – not the 
world.
78
  The need for free tenure was not an arbitrary refusal to protect property rights from 
those without exclusive possession, far from it; the tenure was part of an arrangement 
between lord and tenant: it was the relationship between them that demanded protection not 
title to property per se.
79
 The law of nuisance has long transcended the seigniorial 
requirements essential to holding land freely in a feudal domain and the assize of novel 
disseisin. 
The natural evolution of nuisance law away from feudalism seemingly runs parallel with 
societal changes over the centuries and thus queries whether such an austere standard as 
exclusive possession should be employed today. According to Professor Robert Palmer the 
chronicle of the development of property law ‘relates explicitly to social phenomena’.80 The 
genesis of property reveals that the law is not merely a reflection of society and social 
customs but rather an interaction between mores and law.
81
 He states, ‘law is after all 
bureaucratic force tightly focused on particular aspects of social relationships’.82 
Unfortunately rules of law that are distinct bureaucratic manifestations are applied strictly 
without regard to persons or social values.
83
 In consideration of an ever more informed public 
concerning environmental matters the decision in Hunter effectively weakens the efficacy of 
private nuisance, arguably denying environmental social justice. Lord Cooke recognised this 
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in his dissenting judgment
84
 and drew attention to the present day societal mores and 
necessities that require a more liberal benchmark to sue than exclusive possession: he 
advocated occupation of a property as a home.
85
  
An element essential to Lord Goff’s reasoning in Hunter rests in his acceptance that there 
was a requirement for a plaintiff to ‘show some title to realty’ in order to bring an action in 
novel disseisin. This formed part of his ‘basic position’86 and was seemingly founded on the 
contentions of Professor Newark in ‘The Boundaries of Nuisance’.87 There are authoritative 
legal historians who profess that originally it is mere conjecture that there was a need to show 
a title to realty in novel disseisin; seemingly being put in seisin by a lord was sufficient.
88
 
Essentially the modern idea of proving title is to view the feudal legal framework with eyes 
tainted by modern perceptions.
89
 We apply our own experiences but can only guess what the 
actors did and said at the time as they rarely, if at all, stated their assumptions or described 
the framework in which their lives were led.
90
 This notion is compounded, particularly at the 
time relevant to Lord Goff’s ‘basic position’, by the fact that the case reports were merely a 
statement of systemic writs extant of the facts and circumstances that instigated the actions in 
the first place. Both Milsom’s and Palmer’s social examinations of the legal feudal 
framework and the evolution of ‘property’ within it severely undermine his findings.91 
Whereas novel disseisin can be demarcated as a ‘real’ action - dealing with matters pertaining 
to property – it is understood to have been possessory92 rather than a proprietary in nature, or 
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in other words, it concerned protecting seisin of land (loosely termed as ‘possession’ of land) 
not title to property. In reality property right was the antithesis of the feudal framework where 
seigniorial feudal relationships dictated land-holding. It will be revealed that a number of 
commentators assert that this was indeed the case, despite novel disseisin later playing a 
proprietary role.
93
 This does not mean that the reestablishment of private nuisance as a tort 
based on land law should be challenged; it is broadly defensible to argue Hunter as a 
‘conservative positioning of private nuisance as a tort against property’94 however, as John 
Wightman contends: ‘the importance of Hunter is not that it opens vistas, but that it closes 
them’95 thus ignoring the traditional interaction between law and social mores.  
Importantly the decision by the Lords in Hunter has inhibited the role private nuisance can 
play in environmental protection because they have turned the common law away from 
attempts to develop an understanding of the relationship between individuals and land in 
terms other than proprietary interests. We may assert that novel disseisin actually functioned 
for the benefit of personal relationships:
96
 indeed, ‘personal relationships and the tenures 
dependant on them were essentially different from property rights’.97 While Lord Goff was 
right to state (using Newark’s contention) that private nuisance is ‘a tort directed against the 
plaintiff’s enjoyment of rights over land’ Newark’s statement - posited in 1949 - implies 
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meanings entirely different from the nature of ‘right’ in twelfth-century novel disseisin where 
‘the question of right could not be raised’.98 The medieval meaning of ‘right’ loosely equates 
to the modern perception of ‘title’ and should not be understood in the context Newark 
intended: title in the sense of ‘proprietary right’ served no contemporaneous practical purpose 
at the inception of the Assize.
99
  
It is clear that the key element used by the Lords to decide the outcome in Hunter was the 
fundamental character of nuisance but only Lord Goff expressly held that novel disseisin was 
the source. Lord Goff used its nascent character and joined the majority to use weak 
substantial arguments, which are easily surmountable, to put in place a kind of ‘category 
barrier’ that has proven difficult to surmount.100 Whilst it makes more sense to seek a 
juncture in legal history that better suits the origins of modern nuisance law, such as when 
Case fully supplanted the Assize (following the decision in Cantrell v Churche in 1601
101
), 
Lord Goff laid down a claim that must be examined. The feudal world needs some 
investigation to determine whether or not Lord Goff was correct to employ novel desseisin in 
order to help substantiate the need for exclusive possession to sue in private nuisance today.   
This chapter surveys a number of those principles that suggest the need to be cautious 
concerning the straightforward invocation of twelfth-century concepts in contemporary law. 
It must be acknowledged that it is dubious to rely upon the same doctrines that were 
superseded following many decades of judicial activity in the courts that ultimately was 
intended to move away from medieval legal constraints. The assizes of novel disseisin and 
nuisance and the quod permittat prosternere writ (and other forms of medieval action that 
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dealt with nuisance type situations
102
) became obsolete by the early seventeenth-century,
103
 
with the advent of Case. Accordingly, the reality of Lord Goff’s attempt to take the tort back 
to its foundations (without previously attaining a proper understanding on the legal medieval 
framework) was a position the courts had striven to abandon for centuries.  
Perhaps the reasoning behind Lord Goff’s predecessors attempts to consign proprietary and 
personal aspects ‘under the same legal heading’ in Case,104 thus creating the nexus between 
humans and land, were overlooked by his Lordship and the majority in Hunter. Judicial 
activity in the early modern era gave nuisance law the breathing space it required to develop 
free from certain outmoded and often problematic medieval land law constraints. 
Fundamentals aside for the moment, the modern judiciary has endeavoured to take the law 
back to its foundations – the same foundations their earlier counterparts sought to leave 
behind. The Lords in Hunter had, perhaps inadvertently, made an anachronistic connection 
between nascent nocumenta (nuisances) when ultimately the term ‘nuisance’ did not exist as 
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an ‘offense’105 and when our ancestors’ relationship with land - dominated by feudal 
subordination and profound obligations - was entirely disparate from contemporary living.
106
 
The early modern judicial activity included making nuisance more broadly available to 
subjects by disposing of the requirement to be seised of a free tenement (often mistaken for 
the modern term ‘freehold’107). In essence those judges had established a proprietary link to 
land beyond the earlier feudal constraints dictated by the seigniorial relationship. Property – 
the antithesis of feudal relations – and ownership had evolved since the advent of novel 
disseisin but nevertheless the early modern judges chose to liberalise locus standi in private 
nuisance to persons who were excluded protection under novel disseisin. Lord Goff’s 
proposition regarding the need to show title to realty, in truth, regresses the law several 
centuries to before the early modern period of history, even before the inception of novel 
disseisin, to the Compromise of 1153 between Duke Henry (later Henry II) and King 
Stephen.
108
 He consequently (and unwittingly) constructs an anachronistic argument about 
the nature of seisin and the assize to justify his stance on standing. Logically the historical 
foundations relevant to ascertaining modern standing rest in the period when actions on the 
case for nuisance developed (post-Cantrell v Churche). 
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Framework (8) 1143-4). 
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Whereas Lord Goff defines the keystone of standing as ‘exclusive possession’, it will be 
shown that there is very limited authority to support this notion.  Certainly, the small number 
of nineteenth and twentieth century cases cited by him fail to ground the judgment in Hunter 
in precedent. In particular, the majority (and prevailing) stance is based on a narrow 
interpretation of the ‘much-maligned’109 decision in Malone v Laskey110 in which it was held 
that standing is not afforded to ‘a person who has no interest in property [or] no right of 
occupation in the proper sense of the term’.111 Malone did not refer explicitly to exclusive 
possession as the proper meaning of a right of occupation, and thus the majority’s reasoning 
on this point is based on ‘mere’ inference. 
The remainder of this chapter begins with highlighting the problem of using medieval 
doctrines owing to an understandable lack of academic consensus then continues with a 
discussion on the use (and ‘mis-use’) of medieval history in Lord Goff’s so-called 
‘fundamental review’112 of common law authority. Then we engage in a reappraisal of Lord 
Goff’s decision by elaborating significant imperfections in certain specific evidence upon 
which he relies, including the academic authority of Professor Newark in ‘The Boundaries of 
Nuisance’113 and judicial authority in Malone v Laskey.114 In conclusion it is argued that the 
majority decision in Hunter is unsatisfactory and that the question of standing requires 
revisiting by judges. A fuller understanding of the ‘basic position’ historically supports the 
dissenting opinion of Lord Cooke who whilst accepting that private nuisance is concerned 
with land, nonetheless recognised the interaction between law and mores by delineating 
important social elements and established laws that require a more liberal stance to standing. 
He deemed in light of the unsatisfactory approach of disqualifying spouses and other family 
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members in modern conditions that substantial occupation, rather than proprietary right, is an 
adequate nexus between human and land for someone to have standing to sue in private 
nuisance. It is possible for the law to work within the land-based paradigm of the past yet, in 
spite of that, to continue to evolve in light of changing social realities and regarding what 
rights relative to land – particularly environmental rights - are to be protected.115 
2. The Quandary of Inconsistency of Historical Opinion 
 
The harsh reality is that a standout conclusive and authoritative account of the assize of novel 
disseisin does not exist, therefore, inevitably, the ability to provide a definitive account of 
specific elements of nuisance law from within the Assize is considerably limited. It is 
unrealistic to use an area of law - as Lord Goff did - where there is no consensus regarding its 
origins, purpose or how it functioned. This genuine non-consensus is demonstrated by the 
works of FW Maitland and SFC Milsom
116
 which is comprehensively broached by Palmer in 
his book review of Milsom’s ‘Legal Framework of English Feudalism’ that was, in part, a 
‘respectful’ polemic of Maitland.117 Their conflicting opinions best illustrate the 
insurmountable task of finding accord on the modern law of nuisance using novel disseisin as 
the template. Maitland ran out of time to complete his lifework and if read in isolation we 
miss important concepts, particularly philosophical, thus we get an incomplete picture of 
societal influence on the development of law as he did not contribute beyond the legal 
framework. Milsom on the other hand was concerned with the people, their ideas and the law 
                                                 
115
 See Lord Cooke [1997] 2 WLR 684, 711. C Gearty, ‘The Place of Private Nuisance in a Modern Law of 
Torts’ [1989] 48(2) CLJ 214. J Steele, Tort Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford, 2007), 670-2. Palpably 
these examples represent just a small number of academics and the judiciary commonly labeling private 
nuisance as the ‘environmental tort’. 
116
 Milsom described Maitland as an ‘extraordinary man’, who had laid ‘the foundation of all that we know 
about the history of the common law’ (See Milsom’s introduction to HEL, above note 28, lxxi). However, 
Milsom also stated Maitland was someone with whom he was destined to ‘argue for much of my life’ born out 
of an intellectual struggle with the legacy of Maitland and what he calls a ‘superhuman myth’ (SFC Milsom, 
‘Maitland’ (2001) CLJ, 60 (2), 265-270. Milsom also describes Maitland’s works as an ‘indestructible 
memorial’ in Framework, above note 8, 1). 
117
 See generally Palmer, ‘Framework’, above note 8. 
51 
 
in contemporary context thus the social mores were entwined within his conclusions. It is for 
that reason that Milsom’s account is seemingly more reliable but we should not accept either 
completely without the contributions of others such as Palmer, Thorne, Sutherland, Baker and 
Loengard.
118
  
Albeit outside the ambit of this chapter (being a subject that deserves a thesis in its own right 
to consolidate the issues), some attempts to define elements of novel disseisin have made 
crucial mistakes in the eyes of other legal historians regarding the assize’s original purpose119 
and the manner in which it functioned. This has occurred over a vast period of legal history 
subsequently such attempts have logically had adverse effects on the understanding the 
Assize has had on the modern law of nuisance. In fact on occasions ‘nuisance’ as an entity is 
given scant consideration by some of the most influential commentators of the Assize.
120
 This 
may be explained by the complexities of elucidating the elements of the assize itself without 
the added burden of explaining supplementary situations it had never been intended to deal 
with. Whichever school of thought one adopts there is no mention that dealing with harms to 
the free tenement was a formative component of novel disseisin: certainly the assize ‘came to 
be used in a wider range of circumstances than first envisaged’.121 
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It is suggested that activities ad nocumentum ad liberi tenementi sui (to the harm of his the 
free tenement) were one such variant not originally conceived when Henry II made his assize. 
In the late twelfth and early thirteenth-centuries a formal concept of nuisance did not exist; all 
that can be said for certain is an action existed for the protection of specific harms to free 
tenements (assize of novel disseisin for free tenements).
122
 Interferences that fell short of 
actual disseisin demanded a ‘constructive eviction’123 (constructive disseisin) to be created in 
order for novel disseisin to be utilised to redress nocumenta. The possessory action of the 
assize of novel disseisin (for nocumenta and common pasture) was thus moulded to guard 
against a small number of interferences with seisin that fell short of genuine disseisins.
124
 
The dilemma of there being no consensus on many issues regarding novel disseisin will 
become apparent within the next sections and support a central premise that Lord Goff’s 
decision to build a case to set the benchmark for standing on proprietary interests using the 
Assize as being flawed. There are two important challenges to his decision; first, despite his 
contention, the Assize was not symbolic of the ‘essence of nuisance’125 because what was 
actionable then evidently does not correlate with modern nuisance theory; second, the 
fundamental possessory character of novel disseisin was antithetical from proprietary interest 
in both medieval and modern terms. Ultimately contradictions regarding the framework of 
novel disseisin will have consequences on our perceived understanding of nuisance’s origins 
if we accept anachronistic and conceptually incongruent contentions.   
The disparate schools of thought of Maitland and Milsom regarding the Assize referred to 
below have in effect created divisions in the world of legal historians and accordingly 
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affected the development of the entire history of law; palpably this has enveloped the 
evolution of private nuisance despite the unfortunate reality that the theory of nuisance in 
embryonic terms was foreign to the Assize. Whilst often Milsom would accept Maitland’s 
premise on a matter he would readily reject his conclusion. These types of differences have 
ensured there is reservation regarding most theory concerning the development of novel 
disseisin and in turn the development of nuisance law is continuously capable of being 
engulfed by those disputes.
126
 Lord Goff’s adoption of the Assize to construct his ‘basic 
position’ for standing – without referring to the relevant historical debate – is a steadfast 
example. 
In reality the actual influence the Assize has had – or should have had -  on modern nuisance 
is to a large respect superficial, no matter how loud academic and judicial murmurings are to 
the contrary. The right to sue is a succinct example of how very different modern nuisance 
law is from its meagre beginnings as an appendage to the ancient assize. Novel disseisin’s 
medieval limitations kept in check by early land law dogmatism seemingly confused by 
seigniorial relationships and manorial customs concerning land and legal jurisdiction were 
patent and prevented a robust tort from emerging until in the advent of Case and the 
subsequent development of actions on the case for nuisance, when such medieval dogma had 
been superseded.  
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We must have an open mind regarding the accuracy of accepted beliefs, particularly when 
assumptions are the basis for judicial reasoning from eras where no academic consensus 
exists, and for good, obvious reasons. We must question the veracity of claims that would see 
novel disseisin as anything more than just a foundation from which the law of nuisance was 
cumbersomely built upon. The Assize itself was conceived in the deep past during the era of 
feudalism which was a remote period far greater than our ancestral recollection; arguably this 
stark reality explains the lack of consensus between extraordinary minds.  
3. Examining the History Utilised by Lord Goff in Hunter  
It is commonly accepted that the origins of the modern tort of private nuisance are ancient; a 
degree of consensus exists that it originated during a Council held in Clarendon in 1166 
(known as the Assize of Clarendon) but there is speculation regarding whether the document 
produced actually mentioned novel disseisin: the document has not survived.
127
 There is 
nevertheless general consensus that the assize of novel disseisin was an enactment made 
during the reign of Henry II but an exact dating is not possible;
128
 all that we can say for 
certain is King Henry ‘made his assize against disseisin’129 at some point between the end of 
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1155 and the beginning of 1166;
130
 there are contentions for a later date for the form of the 
procedure as described in Glanvill.
131
  
The issue of dating is the first illustration that investigating novel disseisin historically is 
extremely problematic thus utilising it as provenance for modern law should be an exercise 
performed with extreme caution. The fact that the enactment that established novel disseisin 
has been lost to time consigns us mainly to conjecture regarding the manner in which the 
action came into existence and denotes that the only truly effective means of gauging what 
the law entailed - in the absence of distinct evidence to the contrary - is to read the plea rolls 
that have survived in conjunction with Glanvill. Sadly, those plea rolls provide no certainty in 
relation to ‘what created a nuisance…or even what rights a landholder had in his own 
tenement’.132 Such ambiguities and the absence of a ‘definable wrong’ called ‘nuisance’133 
represent a difficult foundation for informing the present through the past. The substance of 
the law was hidden behind scant examinations of the facts in records that were obsessed with 
the procedure of the Writ System where only the final decision, ‘a blank verdict for one side 
or the other’ was seen beyond the writ.134 Writs were ‘practical pieces of machinery’ with a 
direct and rational relationship between the facts of an action and the mode of proof; early 
law-suits were concerned only with the procedure initiated by the original writ.
135
  
It can be asserted that generally the impression of the then contemporary law has been built 
on systematic interpretations of guarded cases where nascent nuisance law can only be 
understood to have protected practical rights over land that included its appurtenances, 
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(without such rights the notion of land-holding would have been sterile
136
). The 
circumstances surrounding each case are extant as is the social milieu that has been clearly 
visible in reports since the advent of Case, thus, arguably, the important issues concerning the 
reasons why actions were brought in the first place and the relationships between the parties 
are absent.
137
 These issues are invisible under regimented writs using the legal academics and 
lawyers’ traditional method of focusing purely on the law;138 Milsom and Palmer offer a 
more holistic viewpoint by examining the interaction between social mores and the law.
139
 
Janet Loengard’s thesis is a helpful contemporaneous analysis because it places the relevant 
plea rolls under the microscope with the result of portraying a principally concise insight 
regarding how nascent nuisance law functioned in daily life as a supplement to the assize of 
novel disseisin, prior to a time when the assize of nuisance, in name, existed.
140
 However, 
little of the formal structure of society is captured because she concentrates only on the legal 
sources. We can draw upon certain robust works that together offer a vivid - albeit often 
conflicting depiction - of scholarly opinion, much of which is discussed in this chapter, but 
again the important social milieu is rarely mentioned. Nevertheless, utilising these works we 
can be confident that the assize of novel disseisin provides, in part, the nascent origins of 
private nuisance; indeed it has been argued that it is where many ‘experiments were made in 
the sphere of what is now the law of nuisance’.141  
We can contend the entire story of nuisance law is missing without reference to the Assize; 
Loengard goes as far to say that to explain nuisance law without it would be to ‘present 
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nuisance like a cut flower, without its roots’.142 But, of course, without any succinct insight 
into the social structure that drove tenants to the courts the societal needs that have compelled 
this notoriously protean sphere of law are absent from our enquiry. Without the whole picture 
we cannot be certain as to why judges, lawyers and litigants turned their backs on the nascent 
nuisance mechanisms as nuisance law evolved. There would certainly have been a social 
impetus behind the conceptualisation of the law thus without an understanding of the 
structure of social-legal Angevin (Plantagenet) England in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries 
we miss the all-important detail that property law related explicitly to social phenomenon.
143
  
It may be suggested that if Lord Goff had a grasp of property and feudal relationships in 
Angevin England then he surely would have been more cautious regarding his forthright 
stance regarding nuisance and the need for a proprietary interest being based on novel 
disseisin. ‘Property was antithetical to twelfth-century feudal relationships’ – the concept of 
property only appeared around 1200;
144
 thus title is arguably merely an abstract modern 
concept assigned to nascent nuisance for the purposes of a contemporary understanding. In 
truth in possessory actions, such as novel disseisin, ‘discussion could not go behind the facts 
alleged by the claimants, behind the possession from which the story started’.145 The feudal 
relationship concerned ‘profound mutual obligations’ based on a seigniorial relationship 
following a grant of land by a lord to a man for his services (which could be merely an 
economic rent). Claims to land therefore were for ‘the benefit of a personal relationship’; 
those relationships and tenures that were at the mercy of them were fundamentally different 
to property rights.
146
 Property (title) was hence the antithesis of feudal relations as it 
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determined who could exercise power in society: the power of the lords would have been 
relinquished if title was apportioned to their tenants.
147
 
In a certain sense – as Lord Goff identified148 - novel disseisin defines the essence of early 
private nuisance which today plays a part in safeguarding the enjoyment of rights associated 
with landholding. It may represent the formative stage of where ‘a plaintiff’s enjoyment of 
rights over land’149 began but evidently that is where the nexus between modern nuisance and 
novel disseisin ends. It must be understood that novel disseisin was not the only action that 
dealt with nocumenta during the medieval era, it can be argued that the situation was such 
because nuisance, as a concept, has an inherent requirement to incorporate personal aspects 
of landholding under the heading of a property-based action. Accordingly medieval people 
and lawyers naturally sought avenues of redress for their grievances that were not protected 
under strict writs and limited actionable heads, indeed a more suitable means of redress than 
what already existed, under novel disseisin, was needed.
150
 The familiar pattern of people 
seeking redress, where on the face of things it does not exist, is a matter of history repeating 
itself as each century passes and thus explains - in part - the tort’s protean nature. 
Modern torts – thus the modern form of private nuisance – are an ‘offspring’ of ‘action on the 
case’ which started to develop during the latter part of the fourteenth-century.151 To reiterate; 
the historical issues relevant to the modern law in tort should more logically be centred on 
actions on the case for nuisance, particularly, in the context of this chapter, upon the more 
liberal stance concerning standing following Cantrell v Churche as the social mores and their 
consequences are visible. There were only two rudimentary legal concepts in the twelfth 
century: wrongs and obligations. Damages were sought for wrongs whereas obligations look 
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properly towards performance and ‘remedies for wrongs increasingly suppressed elemental 
ideas of obligation’.152 Both concepts, despite modern conceptions, are different: although the 
non-fulfilment of an obligation may be a wrong the two cannot conceptually conjoin. Thus 
nuisances (wrongs) do not fit - at a fundamental level - in an action that is designed to 
recognise an obligation as no wrong has been committed;
153
 to borrow Milsom’s words, ‘the 
fit is obvious, or it is wrong’. 154 The remaining sections on the Assize serve merely as a 
further explanation as to why medieval law is an unsatisfactory template to formulate modern 
doctrines, thus is a reassessment of Lord Goff’s ‘basic position’ is appropriate.  
4. Seisin and right: possession or title? 
The character of novel disseisin within the feudal framework is both intricate and highly 
contested; clearly the contrast between ‘seisin’ and ‘right’ is the subject of a very substantial 
debate.
155
 Seisin itself has been described as a ‘famous battleground’ and today the line 
between possession and ownership is difficult to place.
156
 Whilst that full debate is far 
beyond the concern of this chapter the concept of whether to be in seisin was to be in 
possession of land - thus seisin equating to enjoyment of property – or ownership in the sense 
of right (bestowing a title) is at the crux of Lord Goff’s decision to restrict standing in private 
nuisance to those with a proprietary interest good against the world. It therefore needs to be 
ascertained, as far as possible, whether seisin represented ‘protection that can be called 
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possessory’157 or a seigniorial relationship that was sufficient to bring an action in novel 
disseisin, or alternatively whether indeed a title (right) was required to be shown at all.  
The debate concerning seisin and right is entwined by complex feudal concepts influenced by 
Roman, and to a degree, Canon Law.
158
 Whilst the wider debate is no concern of this thesis, 
in the context of the Lords in Hunter accepting that there is a requirement to have a 
proprietary interest to sue in private nuisance - as being laid down in novel disseisin - the 
subject demands some attention. The historical evidence and academic commentary lends 
little support to Lord Goff’s decision. Bracton and abundant records of royal courts in the 
thirteenth-century have acquainted us with ‘seisin’ and ‘right’ which have been labelled ‘as 
abstract concepts’ and ‘untidy versions of possession and ownership’.159 Palpably to the 
modern audience the terms ‘seisin’ and ‘right’ are more aptly described, and better 
understood, as ‘possession’ and ‘ownership’ which can survive as proprietary rights good 
against the world in rem (real actions).
160
 Unfortunately that modern perception of 
‘ownership’ does not reveal the proprietary peculiarities of English medieval land law hidden 
within the possessory remedies;
161
 property rights that are ‘good against the world’ do not 
best suit the medieval template, they fit Roman language. The biggest difficulty in our 
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modern eyes viewing medieval land law is the confusion caused by the Roman influence of 
possession and ownership; on the one hand we have possessio that represents possession, on 
the other proprietas (or dominium) which connotes a type of ownership.
 
 
Through a modern lens we unwittingly imagine a transformation of elementary seigniorial 
legal ideas in the new assize and assume that during the unintended and unforeseen transfer 
in jurisdiction
162
 from baronial courts to the royal courts that the disputes - and the terms in 
which they were conducted in the baronial courts - transformed directly to the Assize 
unaltered but Milsom professed that the royal courts were made to work by their own rules.
163
 
Novel disseisin was modelled on seisin and right which characterised different proceedings 
arguably because the terms could be ‘taken as translations or equivalents to the Roman terms 
of ‘possessio’ and ‘dominium’. Therefore, as Milsom contends: 
[w]e have imagined seigniorial courts in the twelfth century as dealing in rights in rem, rights good against the 
world. But rights cannot be good against a seigniorial world, only a Roman or a modern world; and it is this 
assumption that has misled us the most, and perhaps created most of our difficulties.
164
 
It is these difficulties that have arguably been overlooked by Lord Goff. If what Milsom 
professes is correct, and his contention is read in conjunction with Donald Sutherland, Lord 
Goff’s ‘basic position’ is on precarious grounds if he is intent on utilising the period as 
justification. The historical element of his decision is dependent on an interest in land that 
was ‘good against the world’ in order to reconcile novel disseisin with exclusive 
possession.
165
 If, at the time, it was not possible for rights to be good against the world in the 
seigniorial system (only retrospectively borrowing Roman law principles) then according to 
Sutherland the right to exclude was unrealistic in novel disseisin. In his words, the ‘Roman 
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terminology’ only provided a ‘convenient adjective’:166 despite some warrant in Glanvill (and 
later Bracton) this Romanesque language has been in doubt ever since.
167
 It must be 
understood that the historical evidence is indicative that property rights did not appear until 
around the turn of the thirteenth-century; in 1176 the forward-looking Assize of Northampton 
carried the pro-feudal desirability of robust feudal relationships introduced by the 
Compromise of 1153.
168
  
Sutherland was forthright stating that possessio and dominium were ‘distinct juridical 
[Roman] concepts with no middle ground between them’.169 He maintained that possessio 
and dominium were categories of substantive law whereas seisin and right could be 
contrasted and categorised as procedural concerning a continuum. Seisin (possessory) 
involved recent disseisins and recent facts whereas right (proprietary) looked to the less well-
known and more difficult to prove facts - unimportant to a recent disseisin – regarding who 
had the oldest title. It was noted in the introduction that the question of right could not in 
general be raised in possessory actions.
170
 However the implications of the Compromise in 
1153 suggest that there was an alternative distinction between seisin and right prior to the 
assize of novel disseisin and perhaps later provided the exception for title to be raised.
171
 
There is certainly evidence of a distinction between seisin and right (seisina and ius) between 
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1154 and 1161 in a case (not novel disseisin) based on hereditary seisin from 1135
172
 that is 
indicative that there was not only a distinction prior to the Assize but that distinction was not 
one between possession and ownership.
173
 
In Sutherland’s opinion novel disseisin stood at the bottom of a hierarchy of actions under the 
writ of right at the top;
174
 whilst one was a possessory action and the other a proprietary 
action they were nonetheless merely stages on a hierarchy suggesting they were part of a 
procedure rather than separate substantive categories of law. If this was truly the case then 
novel disseisin would have been detached from the Roman terms thus conflicting with the 
notion that seisin could have been be good against the world. Although some lawyers 
understood seisin and right as substantive categories, thus seisin as a category of Roman 
possession and right a category of proprietas, much confusion was to come when right in 
property seemed to have vanished from the law by the late thirteenth-century when actions of 
right fell out of use.
175
 
The contemporaneous issue, in part owing to the Compromise that handed him the Crown, 
was caused by the juridical policy of Henry II;
176
 there were now two different essential 
concepts in land law: right and seisin.
177
 Arguably, we can deduce that the haphazard 
translation of the two Roman concepts into English Law, where before there was only the all-
important seisin, played a role in fashioning two respective actions: the possessory and 
proprietary actions. The older ‘writ of right’ was an example of a proprietary action that dealt 
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with litigation regarding right (when seisin had been withdrawn or violently lost in the distant 
past
178
) whilst the assize procedure – with its possessory actions - was ‘devised to deal with 
questions of seisin’:179 essentially novel disseisin concerned matters regarding ‘recent 
evictions’ and nocumenta (nascent nuisance) were considered an adjunct to that action. 
Following contributions by the likes of Sutherland, Van Caenegem, Milsom and Maitland we 
can infer that novel disseisin was a possessory action concerned with incidents of seisin.
180
 
Maitland, to whom novel disseisin brought a ‘transfer of jurisdiction of over disputes 
concerning abstract property rights’ from the manorial court to the king’s court,181 asserted 
the difference between right and seisin by separating the requirements of the two actions. 
Whilst the proprietary actions such as the writ of right decided whether someone or their 
ancestor was seised as of right
182
 in novel disseisin, a possessory action, it was enough to be 
disseised of free tenement ‘and of right there is no talk’.183 It is clear that the deciding factor 
was being seised (or in possession) in demesne of a free tenement.
184
 As Palmer posited 
examining Milsom’s notions of a ‘Feudal Framework’: 
…[E]arly litigation was not horizontal: not owners defending title to property against equals. Early litigation 
took place in a world and according to a model that was strictly hierarchal. The assize of novel disseisin, the 
assize of mort d’ancestor [again possessory], and the writ of right patent were conceptually upward: they were 
tenants claims against lords [and visa versa].
185
 
                                                 
178
 See Maitland, Forms of Action (23) 7; Van Caenegem, Royal Writs (22) 262-3 (who cites Glanvill, xiii, 32-9) 
and 306-9; Loengard (35) 145. 
179
 Van Caenegem ibid, 311 (see particularly note 1). Possessory assizes were a new expedient and expeditious 
process that provided a different route than the old notoriously drawn-out and cumbersome proprietary assize, 
the writ of right. In Glanvill novel disseisin was stated as ‘swift and efficient’ (Glanvill, XIII, 32-39). For 
example, Loengard described the assize as ‘justice administered with speed and simplicity’ which was terse and 
clear (Loengard ibid, 144, 145, 157-158 and Van Caenegem ibid, 262). 
180
 Sutherland (57) 40-42. Van Caenegem ibid, 311. 
181
 Palmer, Framework (8) 1133. 
182
 ut jus et hereditatem suam. 
183
 Emphasis added. Maitland, Forms of Action (23) 7 and 28; and Milsom ibid 119. 
184
 See Loengard’s analysis below (page 57). 
185
 Palmer, Origins (10) 3. 
65 
 
We can be confident that initially title - representing an abstract property right called seisin - 
was not an issue regarding bringing an assize: ‘property’ was yet to transcend seigniorial 
relationships.
186
 In reality, in stark contrast to Lord Goff’s proprietary claims, for Milsom’s 
seigniorial hierarchy to function properly someone without seisin – thus title - had to be able 
to bring the assize. This makes sense if, as Palmer acknowledged in his review of Milsom’s 
‘Framework’, lord’s found it increasingly dangerous to determine some issues of grants in his 
own jurisdiction.
187
 
Milsom’s contentions on this matter generate an interesting discourse concerning who could, 
or indeed actually did, bring an action in these disputes between tenant and lord. He 
advocates that anyone could bring an assize in novel disseisin; it was a matter of whether they 
would win.
188
 In certain circumstances lords needed an assize to proceed in order for them to 
explain to the recognitors that an ‘interloper’ had not been seised or that a possession lacked 
the vestigial element required for seigniorial assent. If a lord ejected someone then allowed 
an assize to continue the recognitors would justifiably find his favour – the plaintiff would 
not have been unlawfully disseised without judgment if he was never seised in the first place. 
If the lord had summoned the person ejected in his own court he may well be seen as 
acknowledging some tenure; as seisin was an abstract right in the lord’s courts protected by 
his warranty he would be wise to allow royal justice to take its course.
189
  
Maitland differed from Milsom, Palmer and Sutherland in this respect believing that seisin 
was influenced by Roman law.
190
 He assumed that ‘right’ and ‘seisin’ were comparable to the 
Roman concepts of dominium (right) and possessio (possession), thus were concepts of the 
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same preceding order. To Pollock and Maitland our land law was almost entirely about 
consequences of seisin: in their opinion seisin, in crude terms, simply meant possession and 
was rooted in the Latin concept of possessio.
191
 They nonetheless believed that possession 
was viewed by lawyers of the time in a manner that distinguished seisin (possessio) from any 
proprietary right (proprietas) equivalent to an abstract ownership. SE Thorne acquiesced with 
their contention positing that Roman distinctions were becoming familiar to contemporary 
lawyers who understood the Assize ‘protected possession and no more’.192  
Milsom on the other hand disputed this notion stating ‘we must not assume…that at the time 
lawyers were identifying the substantive concepts involved, dominium with the right and 
possessio with seisin’.193 Joüon des Longrais spoke of the confusions and quid pro quos that 
bedevil the subject owing to contemporary lawyers’ attempts of working with the Roman 
concepts of possessio and proprietas; he was of the opinion that such attempts were to no 
avail. He had a point: we can imagine common lawyers thinking of elaborate constructions 
where writs are ‘somewhat possessory’ and actions which are ‘mixed of right and possession’ 
– neither reconciled the Roman concepts with the quirks of feudal England.194  
Joüon des Longrais nonetheless contended that during the late twelfth-century seisin 
corresponded to right rather than possession.
195
 This argument has received much criticism; 
of note is Woodbine's polemic in his notes to his edition of Glanvill.
196
 It is evident that prior 
to Glanvill the distinction between ‘seisin right’ and ‘seisin possession’ was not clear cut but 
the distinction after Glanvill is practically undeniable.
197
 Thorne (without citation
198
) stated 
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that there was a clear distinction – firm in Glanvill - between seisin and right (saisina and 
ius). Nonetheless he objects to seisin being the type of ‘pure Roman possession’ that 
corresponded almost completely with possessio but rather a pure medieval concept not easily 
distinguishable from right.
199
 But, as it will become apparent, in the context of becoming any 
abstract property right, according to Milsom seisin was outside royal control in the Assize, it 
was a matter to be determined by seigniorial justice within the baronial courts – it was not a 
matter for novel disseisin in royal courts.
200
 
It is hard to deny English ‘right’ some of the properties of Roman ‘ownership’ but it differs in 
obvious and important respects from proprietas and could be defined only in terms of seisin. 
Beyond that it is not easy to see how far consensus goes. The ‘lion’s share’ of commentators 
regard the establishment of the assize as being responsible for a contrast between right and 
seisin to which ‘possessoriness’201 was not entirely inappropriate; and that this, the purely 
factual content of an assize verdict, and the use of Roman language amalgamate to transform 
seisin into something very like possessio.
202
 The concept of property ownership was thus at 
its embryonic stage. In that respect, and in the context of our investigation, there is an 
argument that to be in seisin equated to being in possession of land and that possession was 
protected by the royal courts. The alternate stance is that we can regard the safeguarding of 
seisin protected tenants against their lords away from the jurisdiction of the manor courts, a 
type of judicial review or perhaps court of appeal; this is the contention to which the next 
section will turn. Regardless of which theory we advocate both provide weak foundations for 
claims that there was a nascent requirement to show title of realty to bring an action in novel 
disseisin.  
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In light of the foregoing analysis, suggesting as it does, that if someone needed to prove title 
then another action was available for that purpose: the writ of right. Later the assize of mort 
d’ancestor203 and the writ of entry204 also dealt with title disputes. Hence we have succinct 
evidence that, at least initially and for the rest of the twelfth-century, there was not a need to 
show title to realty – particularly in the modern sense - to bring the Assize; this obviously 
extended to complaints concerning nocumenta under the action. Lord Goff avers wholly to 
the Roman law concept of proprietas that, not being defined in terms of seisin, had an 
uncomfortable fit within English law; his assertions in Hunter would appear to be contrary to 
a large proportion of consensus regarding the structure of the early actions.
205
 But any 
relevant historical repudiation of his Lordship’s claims should not stop at refuting proprietary 
requirements, the interesting observations by Milsom and Sutherland that cast doubt upon 
whether there could be a right to exclude the world in the seigniorial courts (or for a 
considerable time on the assize) raises doubts regarding Lord Goff’s insistence of exclusive 
possession to have standing in private nuisance today. In essence the evidence above suggests 
his utilisation of novel disseisin as the foundation for his basic position was misconceived. 
The feudal social mores relevant to the legal framework that controlled them were alien to 
contemporary living and modern tort; a brief - but often overlooked - examination of the 
social environ in which the legal framework existed will bring to light why the epoch should 
not be the template to construct doctrines for private nuisance in the modern day.  
5. Policy and Novel Disseisin: ‘Feudal’ or ‘Anti-Feudal’?  
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Novel disseisin itself had a deep-seated political
206
 and financial impetus behind its 
conception as imposed by Henry II according to - and following - his ascendancy to the 
Throne.
207
 In Maitland’s opinion208 the Assize was created to protect seisin in the sense of 
possession of land - when feudalism was the foundation of English society representing the 
quintessential feudal framework.
209
 Maitland advocated that Henry believed he had to strike a 
blow at feudalism to strengthen his position as king;
210
 which would suggest that Maitland 
saw novel disseisin as an ‘anti-feudal’ institution. He argued that Henry attempted to take as 
much litigation as possible concerning land into his courts thus starve the feudal courts, 
centralise justice and fill his coffers;
211
 a modern observer may be drawn into an 
understanding that being seised of free tenement was under royal control - this would seem to 
be an error. The viewpoint that Henry II was a strong king who distrusted feudal power is 
seemingly a myth; he did after all come to the Throne by compromise rather than conquest.
212
 
Maitland’s theory that Henry II’s motivation behind creating novel disseisin was possibly an 
attack on feudalism, in the sense of being directly aimed to enlarge royal jurisdiction at the 
expense of feudal power, is heavily, and with devastating effect,
213
 contested by Milsom. 
Professor Milsom's line of argument was that the purpose of the Assize was ‘anti-feudal’, not 
because of any jurisdictional conspiracy but - quite the opposite - in the sense of being 
directed against improper feudal action. In comparison he also viewed it as intensely ‘feudal’ 
in that it induced a due process between lord and tenant, a form of judicial review, as it were, 
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of the actions within the lords’ court upon which the whole structure was thought to lie; 
hence to make feudalism function properly rather than to attack it.
214
  
SE Thorne, partially in accord with Milsom, took a feudal stance and stated: ‘to say that 
Henry deliberately set out to protect possession in order to deprive the baronial courts of their 
jurisdiction is completely to misunderstand the conditions of the time’.215 Milsom’s apparent 
understanding of those conditions was that the Assize represented a mechanism to stop abuse 
of lords in their courts where before no sanction existed.
216
 The matter is unresolved but the 
lords readily used novel disseisin thus it was seemingly as important to them as it was to ‘the 
humblest freeman’.217 The only thing we can say for certain is that the jurisdiction of novel 
disseisin was restricted to royal proceedings away from the lords’ influences.  
Milsom’s feasible contention regarding novel disseisin being a form of judicial review – a 
nascent example of a common law action to protect the rule of law, as it were – has 
interesting implications for Lord Goff’s contention regarding nascent standing. On balance, 
today judicial review has a broad ambit concerning sufficient interest and is extended not 
only to those affected in a substantial manner or in cases where no more appropriate 
challenger exists but also to ‘legal persons’: hence organisations  (such as trade unions and 
NGOs) may have sufficient interest.
218
 McGillivray and Wightman opine in discourse 
following the Court of Appeal decision in Hunter about the opening up of ‘space for common 
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interest groups, as well as individuals’219 in order to challenge regulatory failure through 
private nuisance thus acting as an unofficial judicial review of public authority.
220
 The 
possibility of such eventualities following the continued liberalisation of the right to sue may 
well have been a motivation behind the policy decision to restrict standing in the House of 
Lords. 
Whatever Henry’s motivation, creating the possessory assizes drew litigation into his courts; 
but the scope of to whom he could extend the protection of novel disseisin was intricate and 
founded according to the deep-seated feudal principles. Arguably Henry sought to provide 
the right to seek redress to as many freemen as feudalism would allow.
221
 Maitland postulated 
that Henry may have created novel disseisin in order for the ‘blessedness of possession’, or in 
other words, the sanctity of being seised of free tenement was protection by the royal courts 
due to royal ordinance.
222
 This may have been the case regarding the function of the action 
but then again the manner in which a tenant became seised - and its subsequent nexus with 
seisin and right - is a matter of considerable dispute, but for now it is important to recognise 
that the possessory assizes were a judicial technique ordained to protect seisin (as possession) 
when seisin was the cardinal point of land law and the basis of economic life.
 223
  
6. Nascent ‘Standing’ 
The feudal principles surrounding being seised of a free tenement are essential to 
understanding the differences between contemporaneous social mores surrounding novel 
disseisin and modern societal conditions in which private nuisance now exists. The problem 
in the context of standing is that the issue has not, as far as I know, been part of substantial 
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discourse. Of course historians are unlikely to investigate medieval ‘standing’ in order to 
compare it to modern conditions in private nuisance (if there was a corresponding right 
during that period). Certainly, if consensus cannot be found on the assize’s origins, purpose 
and function then it makes sense that locus standi has been to a large extent overlooked. 
Indeed evidence, as will be seen, regarding the existence of a succinct right to sue in novel 
disseisin is difficult to isolate, it is more probable that certain seigniorial relationships 
ensured success under the assize than bestowing a right to sue.   
It is generally accepted that there was a benchmark for ‘standing’ in novel disseisin that was 
based on a ‘freehold’ interest and it is assumed - but nonetheless uncertain - that both the 
defendant and the plaintiff were required to be ‘freeholders’.224 It is suggested here that the 
term ‘freehold’ is an etymological progression more palatable for the modern audience that 
misrepresents the fact that land had to be held freely. According to Milsom the matter of a 
tenement being free was pivotal to success under the assize; indeed the ‘free tenement’ relates 
to the status of the tenant – whether s/he is free or unfree – rather than a right, per se. A free 
man who held land in villeinage could be disseised by the lord as of will; it was sufficient 
enough for a tenement to be unfree for the lord to be successful in the Assize.
225
 Thus a 
tenant needed to hold land freely (as a freeman) to be protected.
226
 Accordingly the issue of 
free tenement (liberum tenementum) dictated success on the assize rather than having 
‘freehold’ bestowing standing of sorts. We will return to this issue.   
Janet Loengard’s analysis in her thesis that focused solely on the period is entirely devoid of 
the term ‘freehold’. The only reasonable inference to be drawn from such an omission is that 
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‘freehold’ was simply not an element of novel disseisin. In recent correspondence Loengard 
confirmed that she doubts that a twelfth or thirteenth-century meaning can be attributed to 
freehold.
227
 She wrote that ‘no one ever speaks of ‘freehold’ or ‘freeholder’ in the plea rolls’.  
Instead she affirms that uniformly the reference is to a ‘free tenement’228 and indeed we can 
apportion an element of misinterpretation to the frequent use of ‘freehold’ over ‘free 
tenement’ when we look at Glanvill and a specimen writ where he specifically writes in terms 
of ad nocumenta liberi tenement sui, which translates as ‘harm to his free tenement’ rather 
than ‘freehold’:229 a number of commentators including Fifoot have substituted free tenement 
for freehold in their translation but it should not be inferred that this etymological shift 
creates a nascent benchmark for standing.
230
 
Loengard’s thesis and Milsom’s ‘Framework’ include rare insights regarding novel disseisin 
based on meticulous interpretations of the plea rolls (and Glanvill).
231
 We would expect that 
today’s requirement of exclusive possession to be less austere than any medieval equivalent, 
particularly considering the limitations bestowed by feudalist principles and the extension by 
Case beyond those with a free tenement.
232
 Then again, whilst the ambit has expanded in 
terms of land law, the nascent impetus regarding litigation in novel disseisin was far more 
liberal than is commonly presumed today. There were indeed numerous types of tenements 
and/or feudal relationships that existed which would not support an assize. At this juncture it 
is pertinent to reiterate that locus standi has evolved with societal nuances over time and that 
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it is problematic, if not undesirable, to apply feudal principles directly to the modern fabric of 
society: it is imprudent to relate modern interests and estates in land to the feudal relationship 
between land and lord.
233
 
The ability to be successful under the assize started with a requirement for a tenant to be 
seised in demesne, which we may compare to being in actual possession today but not as a 
right that was good against the world (as exclusive possession bestows) rather against an 
individual, for instance, the lord.
234
 In medieval terms being in demesne was a tenurial 
distinction that was utilised, inter alia, to exclude those entitled to a service (usually the lord) 
from a tenure that equated to a free tenement – they would be in seisin but not in demesne. 
Thus when a lord received rent from someone who was seised in demesne the lord would be 
seised only of services and thus an assize brought by him would fail.
235
  The expression ‘of 
his free tenement’ (de libero tenemento suo) in the original writ was, we assume, initially 
intended to exclude tenants in villeinage (villanum tenementum) and termors
236
 from having a 
footing in the assize
237
 because - never being seised - their possession lacked the seigniorial 
relationship necessary to create free tenements.
238
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Loengard identifies a characteristic of being seised of a free tenement was to hold for life, or 
alternatively hereditarily (in fee). It is outside the ambit of this thesis to expound the nature of 
customs of inheritance (where the heir will normally be put in on the death seised tenants) but 
a brief annotation regarding ‘fee’ is necessary for a holistic understanding of the mutual 
obligations between tenant and lord. It is also pertinent to say that customs of inheritance are, 
perhaps, the source of discussions concerning ‘proprietary right’ and ownership being forced 
upon a feudal world that ‘knew nothing of property right, only mutual obligations’ by modern 
commentators who are not legal historians familiar with the epoch.
239
 ‘Property’ did not start 
to emerge until circa 1200, as will become apparent (see also page 49 above).
240
 Obligations 
such as dower and maritagium corresponded to a right against the lord (not a property right 
against the world) to be seised but questions of right, in the modern sense, are inevitably 
transferred to the medieval setting when customs of inheritance clash.  
It would seem that having fee was entering into a ‘relationship of subordination’ where in all 
matters – even those concerning the tenants family, such as marriage – were dominated by 
the lord as guardian: default in obligations would forfeit the fee.
241
 It is clear that the heir’s 
succession to be seised of a free tenement was an important element of the relationship. The 
‘fee’ was the price of a man, who in return was maintained for life with provisions for his 
widow and heir.
242
 The widow’s dower (dos) was merely a portion of a life tenure243 that was 
a product of the obligation between the deceased tenant and the lord that also included the 
heir’s portion. This scenario is indicative of the central role of the seigniorial relationship 
through-out the twelfth-century where the fee portion was precarious, to say the least, and 
dictated according to the acceptance of the lord rather than fee being a title to property in 
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perpetuity. The lord’s relationship was with the loyal tenant. When he died the lord could 
accept another man and marry off the widow again: the heir’s loyalty was a matter of course 
having been raised in the lord’s service.244 The husband’s seisin had ended with his death 
hence at this juncture in history fee was only de facto hereditability, of sorts, where lordly 
acceptance was crucial to holding land freely.  
Loengard identified dower (dos), curtesy,
245
 maritagium, fee farm and fee tail as free 
tenements by which someone could hold freely:
246
  provided that free tenement was in 
demesne and obligations to the lord were met they would be protected by novel disseisin.  It 
is difficult to apply the formation of those manorial obligations to modern nuisance law as the 
social-economic and political conditions palpably no longer exist following the demise of the 
manorial system, but they do serve as stark examples of the essence of being protected by the 
assize. They do not translate precisely as interests that afforded standing per se but 
nonetheless convey the realities of land-holding in an unfamiliar social regime far beyond 
ancestral recollection. However, there is a succinct continuum that the evolution of novel 
disseisin reflected responses to the societal mores in which they existed.  
Loengard’s analysis is important in the context of the present discourse for two distinct 
reasons. First, she demonstrates exclusive obligations that were a product of the feudal 
framework entirely anachronistic to modern private nuisance law. Second, when her research 
is read in conjunction with the original writs a longstanding misinterpretation is revealed 
regarding freehold being the original benchmark of entitlement to sue in novel disseisin. In 
truth, on occasions, commentators substitute ‘free tenement’ by the term ‘freehold’ and in 
much commentary the terms are visibly used interchangeably. Certainly it is easier for the 
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modern commentator to utilise ‘freeholder’ instead of – in context - ‘a freeperson who is 
seised in demesne of a free tenement’: it does not exactly roll of the tongue. That interplay 
has nevertheless created confusion and impacted upon the modern perception of nascent 
nuisance law which has transcended onto who can sue today.  
7. The Effects of Novel Disseisin on Seisin  
The fundamental dogma of seigniorial relationships between lord and tenant are the strongest 
indication that Lord Goff erred in his attempt to reconcile his basic position with the need to 
show title to realty in novel disseisin. He plainly fails to appreciate the essential societal 
differences relevant to the reign of Henry II and that of contemporary living. The control the 
lord had in the familial setting is telling concerning the contemporaneous social mores. In a 
time when ‘the serious business of marriage’ had yet to be complicated by the notion of 
romance
247
 a man’s familial and personal interests were in fact subordinated to his lord. The 
question is was it Lord Goff’s intention to model modern standing on a time when, if a 
women wanted to be assured a life tenancy, or in other words have a share of the highest 
‘title’ that a feudal world would convey, she had to rely on her lord to either marry her to a 
loyal tenant or remarry her to another on the event of his death? It would certainly be a novel 
approach to interpreting ‘exclusive possession’ but at least it was a period when – unlike 
when Malone was decided – the wife was not considered subservient to her husband. The 
intrinsic nature of familial matters within seigniorial relationships during the twelfth and 
thirteenth-centuries are a world apart from today but nonetheless seem central to this 
investigation.
248
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When a tenant died the lord became guardian of his heir (rather than his widow) thus, before 
land was functionally hereditable as a rule of law, loyalty could effectively be passed down 
the generations more readily than land. The essential part of the lord’s warranty at the 
beginning of any seigniorial relationship was that land came at a price: that price was the 
man’s ‘fee’. Therefore the fee element of the bond was dependant on sustaining mutual 
obligations; palpably those obligations were onerous on the tenant. Palmer maintains that the 
measure of strength within feudal relationships was the lord’s disciplinary power that rested 
in his ability to strip a tenant of his fee for disloyalty (or non-performance of services).
249
 It is 
feasible to build the impression that the dilution of seigniorial power ran parallel with the 
heritability of free tenements becoming more secure on account of the bureaucratic authority 
(that derived from the State according to fixed rules
250
), which later became increasingly 
incongruent with social mores.
251
 What must be understood is that until the point when 
property was created by state regulation the remedy a tenant sought was restoration of a free 
tenement thus to rectify a wrong to land as an element of a relationship not to ‘property’ in 
the sense of ownership or title: this was the essence of societal requirements and the nature of 
property when novel disseisin was introduced and when nuisance is said to have 
originated.
252
  
The seigniorial relationships between lords and tenants were no doubt essential to the 
construction of the original writ for novel disseisin. It sought redress for wrongs to free 
tenements and was worded to exclude villein tenants and those tenants that held property only 
for a term of years (termors) from the Assize.
253
 Presumably the original point of excluding 
villeins was part of a (perhaps increasing) tendency during that period to analogise villeins to 
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Roman chattel slaves owned by the manorial lord.
254
 Pollock and Maitland stated that it was 
not intended; neither would it be tolerated, for men holding in villeinage to be afforded 
protection in the royal courts.
255
 They also argued that termors did not have seisin because 
they were viewed as parties to a contract; having merely a contractual right against his 
lessor.
256
 This so-called ‘contractual right’ conflicts with Milsom’s view of seigniorial 
relationships being equivalent to contractual obligations that needed to be enforced.
257
 Such a 
conflict of opinion may be attributed to a matter of mere metaphysics;
258
 regardless, it is 
seemingly consensual that villeins and termors were not protected by novel disseisin. The 
termors contractual position is interesting considering Lord Goff’s basic position: many of 
those who have exclusive possession today are parties to a contract thus, if we transpose 
modern conditions onto medieval ones, those with a term of years (or periodic lease) would 
not have had standing in novel disseisin, but would today in private nuisance. 
We know the central element to landholding was seisin. The concept of seisin and what it 
meant to be seised of free tenement is, despite being open to conjecture, of profound 
importance to the fundamental nature of novel disseisin. Maitland commented: ‘when it is 
remembered that substantially seisin is possession, no more no less, then the old law becomes 
explicable’.259 Conversely, in Milsom’s opinion to be 'seised' meant originally, and at the 
time of the instigation of the assize and Bracton, to have been put in by the lord, not to be in 
possession in the sense of Roman possessio.
260
 It would seem logical to infer that Milsom’s 
line of thought as to the status quo ante the assize of novel disseisin best describes the 
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meaning of acquiring seisin but the impact of the assize was fundamentally significant to land 
law and subsequently to the development of nuisance law as an adjunct of novel disseisin. 
Prior to the assize of novel disseisin conceptually the matter of seisin did not concern a 
property rather it was a seigniorial relationship between lord and his tenant over a parcel of 
land. There was no larger proprietary idea in a manorial court than being seised of land by the 
lord that presided over it.
261
 The lord would be seised of the whole manor then subinfeudate 
parts of the manor by accepting tenants, the lord would retain seisin in fee (of his lord) but a 
seigniorial relationship existed between lord and tenant where the tenant would be seised (in 
demesne) for life. In this sense Milsom is contending that seisin signifies not just a factual 
possession but a seigniorial acceptance where no other title could exist; there was no room 
for any further proprietary concept,
262
 hence, for instance, if a termor was ejected it was the 
lessor (usually the lord) that was disseised and had the assize to restore him.
263
 To argue that 
the tenant (including his lord) had a heritable right in this feudal world where the delivery of 
property was an arrangement between lord and tenant
264
 is academic until it became a ‘fee 
interest’ derived from the State.  
Palpably within the manorial courts villeins and termors had the right to seek redress within 
their lords’ jurisdiction for whatever wrongful invasion or encroachment. The lord would 
clearly on occasions be deciding upon whether particular tracts of land belonged to one 
tenement or another.
265
 There is an argument that the point really in dispute in novel disseisin 
(and the assize of mort d’ancestor266) was the freedom of the tenement, or in other words, the 
status of the occupier.
267
 Was he a freeman or was he ‘unfree’ incapable of being seised by 
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the lord? In reality we are looking for the seigniorial acceptance and the factual possession 
that connotes seisin therefrom. According to Milsom proprietary language within a 
seigniorial relationship – between the seised and seisor – was out of place in a relationship 
that was essentially concerned with reciprocal obligations fixed at the time when it was 
forged.
268
 When the lord put someone in seisin essentially he ‘bought’ a man - one could say 
it was a bargain between two people
269
 – the price was a life’s service (possibly only an 
economic rent) but in return the seised would gain a life tenure. Unless the tenant did not fail 
in his service he would enjoy a free tenement for life; when he dies (in the absence of 
heritability) the lord will make an arrangement with a new man.
270
 
Seemingly it was enough for the tenement to be 'unfree’ for a lord to succeed in novel 
disseisin.
271
 Matters regarding title to a tenement would not arise during the tenure of a tenant 
who properly fulfilled his obligations. It was at the point a tenant failed in his service (his 
obligation) that the lord would disseise him. This was done initially by custom and later by 
the Assize when he could only do so by due process, that was what the disciplinary justice 
novel disseisin was geared to secure.
272
 Seigniorial relationships were about the beginning 
and the end of tenures and the relevant question would be who should be seised in the first 
place; such a question was pertinent only to manorial courts. It was in the manorial courts 
that proprietary jurisdiction and deeper notions of proprietary developed not in the royal 
courts (hence actions on novel disseisin).
273
 This strengthens the theory that initially there 
never was a need to show title in novel disseisin, contrary to Lord Goff and his 
contemporaries in Hunter.  
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It was over time the assize altered seigniorial relationship between lord and tenant in the 
sense that the scope of seisin had separated ‘title’ from ‘lordly acceptance’. In a manner of 
speaking the feudal ladder was ‘flattened out’274 changing the nature of seisin. When the lord 
was taken out of the equation of this vertical structure of society - by the assize of novel 
disseisin - seisin had become an abstract property right in terms of both legal protection and 
economic function rather than an acceptance by a lord creating a relationship in vivos; the 
relationship between the person and the thing had transcended the seigniorial relationship and 
changed the order of seisin to suit the new action.
275
 In essence the discretionary character of 
the feudal relationship had been destroyed by novel disseisin: novel disseisin had destroyed 
the feudal world
276
 - land ceased to be an element of a feudal relationship and became 
‘property’ without the erstwhile ‘precarious quality of fee’.277  
If Milsom and those he influenced are correct - despite eventually destroying seigniorial 
order
278
 - novel disseisin was initially a form of judicial review that fundamentally 
safeguarded feudal relationships. At the heart of feudalism was a lord’s ability to put into 
seisin those whom he chose, but novel disseisin later distorted the meaning of being ‘seised’. 
After a period the assize focused on the moment when the seisin had been granted instead of 
the active acceptance of the lord. Seisin had become nounal ignoring the action of ‘seising’ 
and the relationship that was forged between tenant and lord.
279
 Subsequently what began as 
a method of due process to protect seisin emerged a property right - gradually good against 
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the world – that came about by juristic accident. Within the evolution of land law there was 
subtleness to the establishment of ‘property’;280  both Palmer and Milsom give the impression 
that it was created by accident through a combination of socio-political and juridical 
interplays reconciled by nascent bureaucracy rather than by design.
281
 According to Milsom 
the lord-tenant relationship that was antithetical to property continued until the time of 
Bracton
282
 but his chronology is uncertain; Palmer put a date on the arrival of ‘property’ circa 
1200 thus seigniorial relevance arguably began to dissipate slowly after that juncture.
283
 
8. Nascent ‘Ownership’ 
Maitland stated it is erroneous to think of seisin as ownership, or as any modification of 
ownership; seisin was only possession.
284
 Palmer’s interpretation of Milsom’s ‘Framework’ 
went a little further averring that ‘land was held - not owned - in return for services’, at least 
until 1200.
285
 SE Thorne seemingly acquiesced with this position.
286
 Maitland’s minimalist 
formulation is a rudimentary description of seisin as the notion of ‘mere’ possession negates 
to recognise the seigniorial assent required.
287
 What is important to understand is that the 
king owned all land (otherwise he would not be king
288
). He was the highest rung on the 
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feudal ladder and ultimately he distributed manors to lords - who were themselves tenants -
then all ‘rights in and to its lands are derived from him [the lord]’.289 Remarkably, this was a 
reality that was never entertained by Glanvill or Bracton – a lack of consideration which has 
arguably helped fuel modern confusion regarding contemporaneous title.
290
 Being seised of a 
free tenement represented a state of being that mimicked a personal and economic 
relationship with land. Van Caenegem believes seisin was the basis for economic survival. 
He stated:  
Land was everything to everybody. To lose one’s land, or in other words, to be disseised of one’s tenement, was 
as fatal a blow as losing one’s job in a society which knows no unemployment insurance. It was, economically 
speaking, the worst thing that could happen to anybody.
291
  
We must try to see early nuisance in the context of its time, if that is at all possible. In the 
same manner that freehold does not truly represent incipient standing, having seisin was quite 
distinct from, and may be sharply opposed to, proprietary right or any equivalency of 
ownership (until at least 1200) thus ‘freehold’ did not relate to nascent ownership either.292  
A freehold proprietary interest in the modern sense was of no significance to standing at that 
time; crucially, seisin was already a legally protected ‘title’ but it could be usurped by a right 
that reverted back to the Compromise of 1153.
293
 According to Palmer, as an illustration of 
the lord’s problem of the Compromise, by 1205 a rule of law ‘proper’ ensured that a man 
need not answer for his free tenement without a royal writ but Milsom saw this still as only a 
‘correct statement’ without more evidence.294  
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The historical material that has been considered herein suggests there is no foundation for 
Lord Goff’s stance regarding a need to show title in realty to sue in private nuisance 
emanating from novel disseisin: ultimately that decision was taken in Hunter and any 
correlation between exclusive possession and the assize fictional. Certainly, by the beginning 
of the eighteenth-century there was scarce precedent to suggest title (right) was a requisite in 
novel disseisin, initially at least; in fact seisin - in every stance considered - was separate 
from ius. Even if the incidents of the Compromise are taken into account seisin and right 
were exclusive. In 1704 the court in Tenant v Goldwin
295
 cited a number of cases as authority 
that seemingly supports that novel disseisin’s doctrine favoured seisin over title.  
The advent of Case brought a liberalisation in the law particularly in regard to standing as it 
was extended to leasehold interests. Furthermore, the case law of the nominate reporting era - 
illustrated by examples such as Aldred’s Case and Jones v Powell296 – reveals an increasing 
concern for the courts to protect habitation (habitatio hominis), which had become a central 
right over land. It would be misleading to state that a right to inhabit was equivalent to a title 
to land, nor exclusive possession. It is clear that title in this sense is abstract and incidental to 
humankind’s natural instinct to protect habitation.   
9. A Summary of Lord Goff’s use of Medieval History  
Using Professor Newark’s contentions in the ‘Boundaries of Nuisance’297 Lord Goff 
expressed the opinion that the genesis of nuisance law is fundamental to standing in the 
contemporary tort.
298
 Lord Goff was correct to deduce from Newark and preceding case law 
that the ‘essence’ of private nuisance lay in the protection of a ‘plaintiff’s enjoyment of rights 
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over land’;299 but it is questionable whether that ‘essence’300 derives from novel disseisin. If a 
commentator decides to utilise novel disseisin to maintain elements are central to the 
structure of modern nuisance, flaws in any such hypotheses will quickly be exposed. 
‘Experiments’301 may have been undertaken within the assize but, in the scheme of the 
antiquity of the theory of nuisance, the period in which it was the preferred manner in which 
to redress nuisances is relatively small: the assize did not suit nuisance thus litigants quickly 
sought alternative means to remedy wrongs. Without an adequate grasp of the intricacies of 
the assize in accordance with seisin it is improbable that will be recognised.  
Lord Goff’s judgment gives the impression that novel disseisin was formative rather than a 
source of reference.
302
 The method of utilising history beyond ancestral recollection to 
explain and expound a legal doctrine is both unsound in principle and is fraught with 
difficulty in practice. It therefore represents a step too far for the purposes of providing 
historical context to establishing the meaning of the modern law – private nuisance is 
ultimately a modern tort and no longer an appendage of an ancient land law fiat that was 
unsuitable even at the time. It is highly dubious in light of the foregoing analysis that Lord 
Goff should have attempted to use novel disseisin to provide the foundations of standing.
303
 
In doing so he placed himself in a position where he needed to interpret both centuries of 
unhelpful (that is to say guarded ‘unexplained general verdicts’304) and a plethora of 
conflicting academic conjecture.
305 
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To open up a connection beyond our contemporary understanding with a system of 
governance that is entirely unfamiliar and incompatible to the modern structure does not 
provide strong grounds to construct an account of private nuisance in any sense. In essence, 
to use novel disseisin in this manner is an attempt to frustrate the natural development of the 
law ignoring both the profound changes driven by actions upon the case for nuisance and 
centuries of changing societal evolution that have culminated in our contemporary needs. 
Arguably modern private nuisance should not replicate medieval law in any circumstances 
rather it is suggested that it is unsatisfactory to translate medieval concepts into the modern 
law; the investigation that has proceeded provides, at least a measure, of testimony to the 
contention.  
The process of examining medieval law for support of any claim about the essence of modern 
law requires extensive research and rigorous historical analysis. Rather Lord Goff relied upon 
a single questionable historical source – ‘The Boundaries of Nuisance’ - to maintain his 
contention that there is a requirement to show a proprietary interest to sue in contemporary 
private nuisance. This was methodologically unsound. Although it must be conceded that 
Newark lead us to the correct epoch of nuisance law (Case) where public, common and 
private nuisance, for all intents and purposes, merged and finally re-emerged as separate torts, 
it was during the development of Case that we are more likely to find what better fits the 
‘essence’ of modern nuisance law not, where Lord Goff contends, in the medieval epoch. The 
case law from during the development of Case furnishes us with an insight to the social 
mores surrounding litigation; the type of insight that is missed in the early rolls and hidden 
from Lord Goff.  
                                                                                                                                                        
example).The difficulty of differing written language contained within the reports is an obvious example of such 
difficulties: English, French and Latin were all commonly employed by reporters interchangeably. 
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It is contended that Lord Goff was misled by Newark’s interpretation of the period to which 
he defers; a period that is under-researched by legal historians for the purposes of expounding 
the origins of private nuisance. The lack of such research palpably makes sense because 
‘nuisance’ did not exist as an actionable wrong in Glanvill, the pipe rolls or in the plea rolls 
even the assize of nuisance did not exist in name.
306
 Nocumentum was not an actionable 
wrong merely a specific act done to the harm of the free tenement.
307
 A robust argument 
exists that the twelfth and thirteenth-centuries are not the relevant centuries to present an 
incipient account of modern nuisance. It was not until the fourteenth-century that Case began 
to develop and it would not be until the early seventeenth-century that we find the true origins 
of what we today call modern nuisance law. 
It is difficult to use the contemporaneous cases as precedent to shed light on standing in novel 
disseisin as the ‘right to sue’ was concealed behind mechanical writs that were concerned 
only with the complaint and its resolution. Only after following attempts such as those by 
Milsom and Palmer that engage with the social mores that surrounded the development of the 
feudal framework, can we get a glimmer of how society and law functioned together, and 
thus acquire a reasonably sound account of the coexistent law. Lord Cooke in Hunter referred 
to the subject of standing as a previously ‘unsettled issue’; we can argue that statement was 
indeed correct and extended into deep history.
308
 Whilst later cases can offer some insight 
into standing the plea rolls, pipe rolls and Year Books do not include or focus upon such 
information. Indeed after 1205 the right to sue in novel disseisin better translates as the right 
not to be sued unless the claimant sought a royal writ.  
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Milsom seemingly advocates that anyone with a link to land could bring an assize, even the 
termor, the question was whether they would win the action.
309
 Of course, the termor - similar 
to the villein - is understood to be one of the people excluded from the assize by the original 
writ but Milsom makes a good case that the Lord could utilise novel disseisin in his favour to 
quash any claims to proprietary right. In such cases it is manifest that the ability to bring an 
action was necessarily wide in ambit. The social interpretation of the feudal legal framework 
by Milsom and Palmer is revelatory casting doubts on what was assumed from solely reading 
surviving writs prior to their accounts without the reality of social mores which would have 
had profound implications.  
It can be maintained that John Baker’s ‘Introduction to Legal History’ is the current standard 
legal history textbook where he arguably offers a differing opinion regarding the underlying 
supposition of this article as he implies the assize was a proprietary action. To be fair to 
Baker there can be only conjecture as to whether he meant novel disseisin was a proprietary 
assize as he merely remarks that ‘the concept [of nuisance] grew up with the real actions’; he 
made little reference to novel disseisin thereafter.
310
 In light of the opinion of the above 
commentators, who engage fully with novel disseisin, it is hard to dispute that initially novel 
disseisin was essentially a possessory assize.
311
 It was only juridical accident that afforded 
novel disseisin a brief proprietary function by which time Case had begun to evolve and all 
but a few types of nuisance were addressed by the assize.  Lord Goff’s reasoning to affirm 
private nuisance as a tort to land, based on Professor Newark’s contentions, suggests it was 
founded on an understanding that novel disseisin was a proprietary action where a plaintiff 
was required to show title.
312
 True, it was always an action concerning land but initially it is 
reasonable to assume either that possession (seisin) rather than title (right) was the principle 
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behind dealing with interferences with land-holding or, owing to the seigniorial relationship 
depicted by the likes of Milsom, Sutherland and Palmer that property was the antithesis of 
feudal relationships where title was a foreign language. Neither of their accounts supports 
Lord Goff’s contention.  
The basic requirement to have standing emanated from being seised in demesne of a free 
tenement; it was a legally protected interest but not in respect of actual title of land, as 
reference to Loengard will confirm. It is thus contentious to assert there was a requirement to 
show a legal interest to seek redress in novel disseisin. On that pretext the modern austere 
stance that denies standing to those who occupy a property as a home - because they cannot 
show title – needs to be reevaluated by the Supreme Court at the earliest opportunity. If first 
we strip away obsolete feudalistic nuances of seigniorial relationships then work on the 
premise that people are entitled to occupy a home by demonstrating a substantial link to the 
property - in the spirit of the judicial reasoning prior to their Lordships in Hunter
313
 and the 
contentions of Milsom and Palmer - then there is an argument that modern society dictates 
that such occupants need protection from a tort based on land: private (and public) nuisance 
is the obvious choice.  
10. The Development of Case – The Impact of Social Evolution 
The ‘subtheme’ concern in this chapter suggests there is the requirement to examine the 
development of Case in order to ascertain the correct origins of modern private nuisance and 
thus put forward a theory regarding who has the right to sue in the modern tort. The 
vicissitudes of Case owing to its subtle changes and variations as it developed are thus 
essential to this analysis: it is proposed that the nature of legal change and the development of 
trespass on the case into Case are the bedrock of modern nuisance law (and other torts). 
Despite the fact that actions on the case – that dealt with wrongs done indirectly or 
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consequentially - were used scantly in relation to the Assizes during the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries trespass on the case was an integral component of the law adapting to 
social change and economic circumstances across the centuries. Together with assumpsit, 
trespass on the case was a legal action that was conceived, in part, to utilise the law as a 
mechanism to control society.
314
  
According to Palmer the development of Case was a direct product of policy implementations 
and ‘not the product of litigation strategy or of doctrinal evolution’.315 In fact he, and Milsom, 
state that parts of the law developed by accident by acts that had unintended consequences,
316
 
and as Palmer’s book ‘English law in the Age of the Black Death’ demonstrates, 
circumstances forced upon society necessitated legal change. The Black Death was an 
example of when the nature of seisin and free tenement, if not began to dissolve, certainly 
procured a different role underlying the supposition that societal changes – thus social policy 
- dictate legal evolution. For instance, the ‘demographic catastrophe’ somewhat evaded the 
need to be ‘put in by the lord’ as the diminished population left tracts of land vacant and the 
‘landless’ occupied empty tenements: the level of demand to relocate a skilled workforce 
arguably superseded manorial customs.
317
 The point Palmer makes is that: 
…[T]he important decisions were not being made in the common law courts [king’s courts] at all, but rather in 
chancery and council;
318
 moreover, the changes did not proceed from legal thought but were decisions by 
officials made in accordance with governmental policy in direct response to social factors. 
Actions on case were thus, arguably, the product of policies that were implemented rather 
than any litigation strategy or doctrinal evolution. The common law area to which nascent 
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nuisance was to evolve developed as a result of socio-legal changes: according to social and 
political influences that shaped policy.  
Case was by nature far removed from the Assizes that were a mechanism for controlling 
seigniorial relationships which created an unforeseen shift of jurisdiction.
319
 The Assizes’ 
feudal constraints help explain their swift usurpation by actions on the case for nuisance as 
soon as litigants could elect for it instead. Case was more certain, that is, less prone to the 
unintended consequences and it addressed the facts pertinent to each case rather than being 
dominated by regimented writs. Whereas judges will no doubt consider that doctrine and 
litigation strategy have directed these changes, or in other words, significant changes were 
the product of the machinations of lawyers and common law justices in court they would 
have to assume that the law exists in a vacuum and that society remains still while their 
doctrines evolve – the Black Death, at the beginning of Case’s evolution, perhaps its ‘Big 
Bang’ event, suggests this was simply not the situation.320 Perhaps Palmer unwittingly 
foresaw the decision in Hunter when he commented: 
That the old forms changed to fit the new indicates that the new writs did not develop analogically from 
analytically similar situations but from policy decisions.
321
   
Lord Cooke’s policy connection in Hunter echoes Palmer’s thoughts regarding the 
development of the common law despite his lack of historical analysis. In addition, ironically, 
his dissenting judgment implies that the decision to restrict standing to those who could show 
title to property was in the end a choice of policy ‘between competing principles’.322  
Lord Cooke did not elaborate on this comment but we can infer that the competing principles 
related to the competing issues of economic growth and environmental protection. The Court 
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of Appeal decision that was the culmination of acceptance of modern societal change and the 
affirmation of the judge’s decision in the late sixteenth and seventeenth-century to extend 
standing – which policy then demanded - unquestionably presented private nuisance with the 
potential to safeguard environmentally motivated litigation on a large scale. If we return to 
the introduction and remind ourselves of John Wightman’s comments regarding the decision 
in Hunter closing ‘vistas’, to Wightman this was ‘restoring normal service’:323 certainly 
restricting the ambit of standing has inhibited the role private nuisance can play in 
environmental protection. The majority decision turned the common law away from attempts 
to develop an understanding of the relationship between individuals and land in terms other 
than proprietary interests as a part of the growth economy. Interests that recognise the nexus 
of humankind and land beyond the growth economy could return private nuisance to its role 
of, as Conor Gearty professed, ‘protection of the world’.324 
11. Analysing Lord Goff’s historical reasoning 
The above analysis challenges Lord Goff’s assertion in Hunter that historically standing in 
nuisance required a proprietary interest. His assertion was founded, in part, on extremely 
fragile historical grounds. In the search for academic historical evidence to support his 
conclusions based on case law, Lord Goff chose to rely largely on opinion expressed in 
Professor Newark’s article ‘The Boundaries of Nuisance’.325 The article was principally a 
short critique of nuisance law in light of the evolution of the more modern tort of negligence. 
Clearly, the sheer complexity of the history of private nuisance demands a more intricate 
analysis on its own merits. Newark sought to establish the doctrinal boundaries between 
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nuisance and negligence in terms, inter alia, of the former’s concern with interests in land.326 
Newark’s contentions were used as justifications for Lord Goff’s ‘basic position’ which 
posits that the ‘essence’ of the tort lies exclusively against land and thus ‘some title to realty’ 
must be shown in order to sue.
327
  
a) Newark’s Analysis 
Newark regarded incipient nuisance as proprietary in nature to the exclusion of the obvious 
possessory character inherent within novel disseisin. His position was clear professing that a 
plaintiff required evidence of ‘title to realty’ in order to sue.328 In light of the evidence set 
forth in this chapter we can be confident that Newark’s contentions detrimentally mislead 
Lord Goff in that respect as it was crucial to the structure of his basic position. Newark’s 
assertion that private nuisance is ‘directed against the plaintiff’s enjoyment of rights over 
land’ is again generally accepted as accurate but it lacks clarity regarding what he considers 
as ‘rights’ worthy of protection.329 Indeed there is a case that his statement is inadequate and 
needs to be extended, particularly in modern terms, to include being directed against the 
value and/or utility of land. Newark’s intention behind his thesis was to categorically assert 
that nuisance was a pure tort to land but we cannot say that he did not attempt to delineate 
‘rights over land’ owing to his sub thesis that claims interference with ‘bodily security’ as 
being incapable of diminishing rights, value or amenity of land (this is discussed in depth in 
Chapter 3). 
Newark’s overall understanding of the history of nuisance is found wanting in many respects 
thus it is important to recognise that his article is not an authoritative account of medieval 
common law, despite his contentions about the epoch. Lord Goff, however, laid down the 
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modern law without such recognition. Some of Newark’s errors will be considered in later 
chapters, nevertheless there are issues specific to Lord Goff’s basic position in Hunter that 
require consideration here. His assertion that disseisin was ‘a trespass according to whether 
the act was done on or off the plaintiff’s land’ – as a pretext to assert the essence of nuisance 
is a tort to land - has directly affected the benchmark of modern standing because Lord Goff 
builds his basic position in a sequential manner after proclaiming Newark’s contentions as 
historical fact.
330
 Part of that ‘historical fact’ lay behind Newark’s insistence that ‘nuisance 
could never be committed on the plaintiff’s land’.331 That claim is simply not true. The assize 
of novel disseisin and nuisance during the twelfth and a significant portion of the thirteenth-
century were the same action; the name assize of nuisance per se did not exist by name.
332
 
The site of the injury was irrelevant until the assize of nuisance was recognised as an separate 
action, possibly by Bracton,  until then the actual writ was amended to deal with different 
forms of the same action, or in other words, the action did not change the writ did.
333
 
Regardless, Newark believed trespass dealt solely with injuries on the plaintiff’s land but 
both nascent trespass and novel disseisin existed on a parallel – not exclusive – plain. 
Trespass (and trespass on the case) could be used on occasions as a substitute action for novel 
disseisin.
334
 The situation was not that trespass was the appropriate action for harms created 
on plaintiffs land rather trespass could sometimes be treated as disseisin if they so 
preferred.
335
 
                                                 
330
 Hunter (1) 687-8 (Lord Goff). Italics added. 
331
 Newark (17) 481-2. 
332
 See Loengard (35) 158-9 (especially note 44); GJ Turner Brevia Placitata, (134) cxix; Stenton (57), 42 (59). 
333
 Loengard ibid 160. She cites Glanvill, Book XIII, 37. 
334
 The relationship between trespass and novel disseisin is extremely complex which, from the latter fifth of the 
fourteenth-century, marked the beginnings of the end for the ‘venerable’ assize that passed out of use by around 
1500 (Sutherland (57) 176 (read Chapter V, 169-203)). 
335
 For an explanation of the actions that shared and could act as substitutes for novel disseisin see Sutherland 
who describes five different possibilities (Sutherland ibid 170-6). 
96 
 
During the nascent period of novel disseisin there were only a small number of harms capable 
of protection;
336
 the site of injury could feasibly be on the plaintiff’s land. There is no 
evidence (that I am aware of) that asserts during the twelfth and the early thirteenth-century 
there was a rule of law that states nuisance could not be on the plaintiff’s land. In fact, 
considering the feudal idiosyncrasies within the seigniorial relationship, it makes sense that 
Bracton constructed the test of election to ensure that actions were not too remote for the 
concept of novel disseisin when the assize of nuisance had found its own identity some time 
during the thirteenth-century.
337
 But this was probably to keep the king’s court from being 
clogged up (whilst spreading jurisdiction under the assize out to local jurisdiction) not an 
exercise to explain that nocumenta were harms to land.
338
  
His comment about the sulphurous chimney being a nuisance because it prevents someone 
using their garden is confusing.
339
 Whilst he recognises that interference with the utility of 
land is an actionable nuisance he concludes that this is the reason why a title to realty must be 
shown. It is difficult to appreciate why Newark came to his conclusion but we can be certain 
he failed to recognise that novel disseisin protected different types of possession including 
‘untitled’ possession.340 The same can be said of Newark’s principal concern to expose the 
myth of personal injury being actionable within a nuisance framework, based also on 
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assumptions about the relationship between nuisance and land law.
341
 A great transformation 
of the nuisance concept occurred as a result of significant changes in the social and economic 
milieu over the centuries. It came to pass that land-holding was no longer an adjunct of 
seigniorial relationships but abstract interests alien to seisin. Social mores such as personal 
physical welfare and the well-being of the human beings were in need of protection to meet 
contemporary societal needs, and Case delivered in that respect.
342
 
Newark claimed that ‘in true cases of nuisance the interest of the plaintiff which is invaded is 
not the interest of bodily security but the interest of liberty to exercise rights over land in the 
amplest manner’.343 He used this statement as a means by which to distinguish personal injury 
from private (and public) nuisance and his exclusion of personal injury was justification 
offered to explain, in circular fashion, why nuisance is a tort solely to land. Once again, 
however, it can be questioned what is meant by ‘rights over land in the amplest manner’ such 
as to include or exclude a particular category of injury. This could mean that someone who 
has a licence to use land can enforce that use value by means of a nuisance action, bringing 
an action for interference with comfort, enjoyment, and even personal injury. It does not 
necessarily mean (as Newark supposes) that it is only people with the most ample rights – 
involving title to realty – can sue.  
In essence, the usurpation of the older forms of action by actions on the case embodies the 
culmination of judicial activity – that commenced in the fourteenth-century – which reacted 
to changing societal mores as feudalism declined. The advent of Cantrell v Churche 
344
which 
allowed those with a termor interest in land – thus someone outside the manorial relationship 
between tenant and lord – to bring an action in nuisance is evidence that a title to realty was 
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not the essence of protecting rights in land. It is posited that the simple form of nuisance law 
evolves according to societal needs and Cantrell is representative of that. Clearly the societal 
norm in 1601 was such that the courts needed to recognise that the protection of proprietary 
rights was not exclusive to those with a type of interest in land that was dependent upon a 
relationship between lord and tenant, or, in other words, a title to realty and the ambit of 
‘standing’ was extended accordingly. In light of the decision in Cantrell, it can be argued that 
Lord Goff’s basic position regarding the right to sue in private nuisance being dependent 
upon title to realty is a misuse of history. The importance of this notion is best illustrated 
through three cases that supported Lord Goff’s decision in Hunter (based on Newark’s 
contentions).  
b) The Supporting Trilogy  
To reinforce his basic position, Lord Goff cited a trilogy of purportedly supporting cases:
345
  
Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan;346 Read v J. Lyons & Co. Ltd;347 and Tate & Lyle Food & 
Distribution Ltd. v Greater London Council.
348
 Despite his claim that these cases are 
‘authoritative statements which bear out [the] thesis of Professor Newark’,349 it is telling that 
he elected not to elaborate on these cases any further in his judgment: almost certainly none 
of these cases unequivocally substantiates Newark’s contentions nor verifies Lord Goff’s 
basic position. For instance, despite the error of Lord Wright (in Sedleigh-Denfield) in stating 
that the assize of novel disseisin was a real action (which would support Newark’s thesis),350 
the remainder of the judgment suggests that ‘occupation’ is a central element to standing. 
Lord Goff cited the same paragraph that Pill LJ cited in the Court of Appeal to assert that 
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‘occupation of property’ gave the capacity to sue in private nuisance and therefore represents 
the ‘essential character’ of standing.351 Lord Wright stated: ‘[w]ith certain anomalous 
exceptions…possession or occupation is still the test’.352 This may explain the lack of any 
further engagement by Lord Goff with the paragraphs he cited in Sedleigh-Denfield, for the 
case is not supportive of his position. 
Quoting Read (essentially a case concerned with dangerous escapes under the rule in Rylands 
v Fletcher
353), Lord Goff focuses attention on Lord Simonds’ judgment at page 183 of the 
Appeals Cases report.  It is debatable which part of the judgment is intended to support Lord 
Goff’s basic position (founded on Newark’s contentions). After close scrutiny we can isolate 
the ambiguous statement:  
For if a man commits a legal nuisance it is no answer to his neighbour that he took the utmost care not to 
commit it. There the liability is strict, and there he alone has a lawful claim who has suffered an invasion of 
some proprietary or other interest in land.
354
  
Representatives for the plaintiffs regarded ‘some proprietary or other interest in land’ to 
reconcile the test for standing as ‘occupancy of a property as a home’.355 The ambiguity of 
Lord Simonds’ statement is patent, as previously both sides attempted to use it to substantiate 
their position in Hunter (preceding the House of Lords decision). It is important to note that 
nowhere in Read is there any reference to novel disseisin or to incipient standing requiring a 
title of realty - one would expect that such a reference would be essential to ‘bear out’ 
Newark’s thesis..  
Once again, Tate & Lyle is neither expanded upon by Lord Goff nor mentions novel disseisin 
requiring a title to realty to sue. In the relevant pages cited (536-7) Lord Templeman applied 
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Booth v Ratté
356
 which stated that either an owner or a ‘licensee’ has standing in private 
nuisance. The case should, nonetheless, be distinguished from Hunter, as the type of ‘private 
right’ that is under discussion. Riparian rights emanate from having a proprietary interest but 
a licensee can include someone falling short of someone with exclusive possession. Lord 
Templeman spoke of the need to prove a ‘private right’ to protect riparian rights under 
nuisance or negligence but it is difficult to interpret a private right, in the context of Tate & 
Lyle, as a title to realty in the same sense as in Hunter. Fishermen who are members of a 
fishing club can have the right to protect a private ‘riparian’ right and to sue in nuisance but 
such a right is unlikely to be construed as such a wide category of persons having exclusive 
possession. In light of that and the fact that Lord Templeman spoke in terms of occupation 
and possession rather than proprietary interest, private right can easily be construed as the 
right to occupy - even to be there - rather than a requirement to have exclusive possession. It 
is clear that none of these cases emphatically support either Newark’s contentions or Lord 
Goff's basic position – in truth it is difficult, except in the case of Sedleigh-Denfield, to even 
reconcile them with true cases of private nuisance. There remains the issue of influence that 
Malone had on the majority in Hunter and the ratio of that case that seemingly supports their 
opinion. 
Representatives for the plaintiffs in Hunter questioned whether Malone was wrongly decided, 
at least with respect to past precedent. The question they asked the Court of Appeal was: ‘was 
there ever a need to prove a legal title to be qualified to sue in private nuisance’? It has been 
shown that the question may be answered in the negative; historically there arguably never 
was such a requirement and by 1704 in Tenant v Goldwin
357
 this had remained the case, 
therefore Malone was incorrectly decided in that respect. The essential problem with 
                                                 
356
 (1890) 15 App Cas 188, 190-1. 
357
 Tenant v Goldwin (1704) 2 Lord Raymond’s Reports 1089; 1 Salkeld's  KB Reports 21. 
101 
 
overruling Khorasandjian v Bush,
358
 other than the issue that a resident daughter was 
consider to be merely present on land,
359
 was that the Lords ignored the true development of 
nuisance law.  
The amalgamation of nuisance law when Case supplanted the Assizes and the centuries of 
private (common) and private nuisance being used interchangeably prior to them emerging as 
separate areas of the nuisance family is of profound significance to today’s nature of the tort. 
Public nuisance has deep historical antecedents but today public nuisance has all the 
attractions of private nuisance without two major limitations – narrow standing and exclusion 
of personal injury.
360
 The case law since the latter half of the nineteenth-century has focused 
more on private nuisance, thus arguably public nuisance and its nexus with its private right 
sibling has been largely ignored by commentators. But recent cases such as Corby,
361
 and 
Biffa,
362
 indicate that public nuisance is on the rise whilst private nuisance is in decline. It is 
suggested that the decision in Hunter to restrict standing has caused a resurgence of common 
law public nuisance to circumvent that hurdle, particularly in group litigation scenarios. 
Sir Gorrel Barnes held that someone without a title in property cannot ‘maintain an action for 
nuisance’.363 However in Simpson v Savage364 it was decided in fact that ‘occupiers’ may sue. 
Despite Sir Gorrel Barnes arguing that no authority had been cited to the contrary he failed to 
provide any authority to substantiate his opinion that a plaintiff required title to land to have 
standing. Further, the other judges, Fletcher Moulton and Kennedy LJJ failed to cite any 
authority that there was a need to show title to sue. The fact is that the close nexus between 
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private and public nuisance during the vicissitudes of Case and the significance of the 
decision in Cantrell v Churche had been ignored or overlooked. Cantrell was effectively 
judicial recognition that the seigniorial requisite need to be seised in demesne, discussed 
above, in order to be successful in a nuisance type action was a distant memory of 
feudalism.
365
 Termors – those with a term of years or periodic lease – that were 
fundamentally barred in the land-based Assizes now had the right to sue.  
The significance of the case of Cantrell v Churche should never be underestimated because, 
in line with societal nuances and the external events that had influenced them over the 
centuries, the case changed the destiny of nuisance law forever. This is the juncture in history 
that arguably represents the ‘point zero’ for modern nuisance law. In short an essential 
fundamental element of novel disseisin significant to nascent nuisance had been removed. 
Whereas the original writ had to include the words ad nocumentum liberi tenementi sui (to 
the nuisance of his free tenement) the seigniorial nexus inherent within feudal principle that 
gave substance to those words had been alleviated;
366
 the plaintiff no longer had to be a 
‘freeman’. Lord Goff failed to make that connection because he lacked the requisite historical 
knowledge. 
The great fundamental import of the ‘freeman’ connection to the existence of a ‘free 
tenement’ to being bestowed protection by novel disseisin cannot be accentuated enough; it is 
a central element to this discourse if the essence of nascent ‘standing’ is to be understood. As 
it has been argued above, ‘proprietary interest’ was likely to have been foreign to the 
language of the system and the status of a person in the context of the manor pivotal to the 
ability to be seised a free tenement. Following Cantrell there was now a new fundamental 
nature of private nuisance because it was severed from its seigniorial land law past. The case 
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law throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth and most of the nineteenth centuries are mostly 
extant of the issue of standing which is why the judges in Malone failed to find precedent for 
their reasoning. The decision in Hunter to utilise Malone could be described as judicial 
‘sleight of hand’ but in light of this investigation the fundamental flaws behind their 
reasoning identifies the illusion of imposing medieval doctrine entwined in contemporaneous 
principles onto modern doctrines considering contemporary living conditions and societal 
needs. 
The point also needs to be made that it can be argued Malone was entirely distinguishable 
from Hunter on its facts and that Malone should be restricted to those facts.
367
 Malone was 
concerned with personal injury caused to the wife of a subtenant with no proprietary interest; 
in fact the judgments are extempore and almost entirely on liability in negligence. The 
husband was only permitted to live there as a condition of his employment and thus could 
lose his dispensation to reside at the property at any time. But, interestingly, if we attempt to 
conceptualise the scenario into the twelfth-century, owing to the due process enforcing 
manorial custom through novel disseisin, it would have been harder to evict Mr Malone (the 
plaintiff’s husband). As a freeman Mr Malone’s employment (lordly acceptance) would have 
been regarded as service to his lord (creating the seigniorial relationship) thus we can infer he 
would have been seised in demesne of a free tenement and would have had the protection of 
the assize. Accordingly Mr Malone (and his plaintiff wife) could only have been evicted in a 
manner that was protected by the royal court – justly and with judgment unless he 
relinquished his services or failed in their execution. Of course, Mrs Malone’s ‘harm’ would 
not have been of a type recognised in novel disseisin, as will become apparent in the 
following chapter, but an idiosyncrasy of utilising Malone as precedent to deny standing in 
modern private nuisance is plain to see. 
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As a final note about this case, it should not be readily assumed that the ‘rather light 
treatment of a wife’368 - referred to in Malone - which excluded her from having standing – 
was anything other than ‘unacceptable’369 at the time when the case was decided. Though her 
treatment was highly criticised by a number of judges both prior to and during Hunter, female 
emancipation had broad support in its peaceful incarnation back then, at least where 
advocates, such as Mrs Malone, were willing to work within legal procedures and rule of law. 
We can only speculate as to whether the judgment would have withstood the scrutiny of the 
House of Lords at that time, but what is most crucial is that this never was a clear authority 
for limited standing to sue in private nuisance. 
12. Conclusions  
On the face of things, following Hunter, when a husband and wife and their children attempt 
to bring an action against their neighbour(s) for interferences to the family home questions 
will be asked concerning the nature of their proprietary interest. Each will inevitably be 
required to prove that s/he has an adequate interest in order to sue in private nuisance. 
However McBride and Bagshaw
370
 posited that normally someone who enjoys or asserts de 
facto exclusive possession is not required to prove the right, but we can go farther if we are 
willing to embrace the original conception of nuisance law found in novel disseisin, 
particularly that professed by Milsom and Palmer. If indeed property right was antithetical to 
twelfth-century feudal relationships it can be assumed that the requisite interest to be 
protected under the assize was implicit unless the existence of a free tenement was 
challenged. It has been suggested, in line with Loengard, Milsom, and Palmer that the issue 
in such circumstances was pertaining to whether the ‘tenant’ was free or ‘unfree’. This 
palpably does not apply to modern conditions but the assumption of free tenement could be 
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applied to de facto exclusive possession today. Arguably the courts decided in Cantrell that 
mere possession was the benchmark for standing when they recognised that manorial 
constraints regarding free tenement had been superseded by contemporary society.  
A strong case has been made that the essence of private nuisance, forged in novel disseisin, 
was designed to give redress to those in actual possession of a free tenement. Being seised 
equated – in a modern sense - to already having a legally recognised interest which required 
no proof of title unless the actual right to seisin was being challenged. This strongly suggests 
that everyone could bring an assize in novel disseisin; it was a matter of whether they would 
win – if the question was asked about whether a plaintiff was a villein they would often 
withdrawal and place themselves in mercy of the court.
371
 The fundamental characteristic of 
the law remained: it either protected possession that arguably found its roots in Roman law or 
regulated seigniorial relationships. Today when commentators and judges mention possession 
in terms of land law they often think of ‘exclusive possession’ as per the Law of Property Act 
1925 as construed by the courts.
372
 Yet it is not at all clear that the intention of Parliament in 
enacting this legislation was to limit the number of victims of nuisance who could seek a 
common law remedy – which is the effect of Hunter.  
The method of analysis in this article differs from Lord Cooke’s dissenting opinion (agreeing 
with Pill LJ in the Court of Appeal) but nonetheless arrives at the same conclusion. For Lord 
Cooke the problem with the majority reasoning in Hunter was that it failed to recognise that 
the law needed to move with the times and to embrace a more liberal conception of standing 
than in the early twentieth century and the centuries before.  Malone in particular should no 
longer be viewed as good law by virtue of its embodying an outdated policy according to 
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which wives were subservient to their husbands.
373
  The argument above is that the past is not 
quite as big an obstacle to liberal standing as Lord Cooke believed and is the perfect role 
model for the law being driven by changing social mores.  ‘Being there’ in the sense of 
enjoying a nexus with land, particularly in regards to habitation, can be traced back to the 
origins of the law. Unfortunately Lord Cooke is as mistaken as Lord Goff regarding what the 
past says about who can sue today. William Drapper Lewis once stated that ‘If a rule of law 
has apparently no foundation in reason, we usually find that history gives us, if not a reason 
carrying its own justification, at least an explanation’, it would seem that this does not collate 
with the modern law on standing in private nuisance.
374
 
The conventional perception that environmental protection is best obtained through the 
attenuation of private activities through legislation in the interest of the public ignores the 
benefits that can ensue from mounting privately initiated actions, whether against other 
private individuals, large corporations or government bodies. To argue that effective 
environmental protection can only truly be obtained through government initiated regulations 
and planning controls to is entirely short-sighted. The Court of Appeal Decision in Hunter 
rediscovered the nexus between humans and land exposing a potential pluralistic approach to 
modern environmentalism where both private and public law can play their role. Of course, in 
the past, private nuisance has been hailed as an effective means for individuals to protect the 
environment but the affirmation that something other than a proprietary interest was required 
to seek redress for environmentally harmful activities revealed an extra aspect of private 
nuisance’s potential as the environmental tort. McGillivray and Wightman immediately 
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recognised that private nuisance not only protected spouses and children in their homes but 
that there was room for common interest groups to have standing.
375
   
This thesis seeks the proposition that an inherent simplicity exists within the doctrines of 
private nuisance and whilst there is palpably an abundance of historical materials that 
expound the simplicity argument, the issue of standing is not immediately obvious. As such 
an in-depth analysis over numerous centuries has been required to expound the various facets 
of the right to sue in relation to changes in societal needs.  This chapter shows that the 
societal nuances which encompassed the law and those that drove changes in it have been 
visibly lost within our period of living memory owing to misuses of nuisance’s rich history 
that first structured the law. Undeniably, the narrower ambit concerning the right to sue in 
private nuisance has weakened the torts ‘green’ credentials in a modern setting. As such, the 
House of Lords decision in Hunter, omits to recognise the relationship between changes in 
law and engagement of the law according to societal needs (in contrast to the Court of Appeal 
ruling). Formative junctures across the epochs have been overlooked arguably generating 
confusion about private nuisance’s purpose and scope today. In essence, by curtailing the 
right to sue, this modern development in nuisance law has broadly weakened the common 
law’s capacity to function as recourse for environment-type harm, as it affects individuals in 
occupation of land, and thus their ability to adequately remedy pollution of the natural 
environment. 
Drawing on historical materials we are exposed to the notion that, despite attempts to develop 
the law in modern decisions, opportunities have been missed to continue on a path of broadly 
adequate protection of interests in land affected by environmental harm. The attempt to move 
the law forward by narrowing the class of person capable of bringing an action in private 
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nuisance has, in reality, taken a step back in relation to the level of environmental control 
nuisance has conferred for centuries. In the next chapter the issue of ‘actionability’ is tackled 
by centring on the historical aspects regarding the actionability of person injury in private 
nuisance. In a similar fashion to this chapter, it begins with the modern case law that 
contradicts the manner in which the has law evolved and then makes the case regarding how 
modern decisions have misused the history and in turn demonstrates how the proper use of 
history can be positively helpful in developing the law of nuisance. 
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Chapter 3 
           Actionability 
 
1. Introduction 
In the 2008 public nuisance case of Corby Litigation Claimants v Corby Borough Council 
376
 
Ward, Dyson and Smith LJJ stepped off point to address the question of the actionability of 
personal injury in private nuisance. Following various obiter dicta in Hunter
377
 and also the 
dicta of Lord Hoffmann in Transco Plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council,
378
 the 
judges in the Court of Appeal in Corby were in agreement that personal injury is not a 
protected interest in private nuisance.
379
 The court’s philosophy on this point was heavily 
informed by the analysis of Newark’s article ‘The Boundaries of Nuisance’.380 Newark 
professed that the ‘problems’ associated with private nuisance law were being caused by ‘an 
improper extension’ of the tort to include injuries to the person. His historical appraisal of 
private nuisance led him to the conclusion that it is a profanation of the tort to perceive it as 
an avenue for redress for injuries to the person. He criticised what was, in his opinion, an 
‘erroneous belief’ that nuisance actions are ‘a suitable remedy for recovering damages for 
personal injury’. He stated emphatically that:  
This is a heresy which is equally offensive to the legal historian and the jurisprudent. In true cases of nuisance 
the interest of the plaintiff which is invaded is not the interest of bodily security but the interest of liberty to 
exercise rights over the land in the amplest manner.
381
 
This statement has become well utilised by modern Law Lords. It even forms part of the basis 
of Lord Goff’s ‘basic position’ regarding who has the right to sue in the tort (discussed in 
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depth in the previous chapter).
382
 Despite its ambiguity, being capable of supporting both 
schools of thought regarding the actionability of ‘personal injury’,383 Newark’s statement is 
nonetheless an enduring part of modern nuisance law analysis. Commentators and judges 
alike seemingly regard it as invaluable to the modern understanding of past aspects of private 
nuisance; however, it is debatable that the statement withstands rigorous historical scrutiny. 
In actuality it constitutes a mixed collection of historical truths and untruths, a misnomer, one 
could say, and is an example of why the tort is, to borrow Newark’s own words, so 
‘immersed in undefined uncertainty’.384  
In Hunter Lord Goff and Lord Lloyd made general assertions that normally negligence was 
the proper tort to sue for personal injuries.
385
 Undeniably personal injury represents the 
subject matter of a large body of negligence law. However the actionability of physical injury 
caused by nuisances to those with the requisite interest in land has not been resolved 
authoritatively by the Supreme Court, so there is some uncertainty about the actionability of 
this head of damage and whether it has a place in private nuisance: certainly it has a place in 
public nuisance.
386
 Indeed Lord Hoffmann - in the same case - somewhat challenges his 
counterparts’ opinions after considering Lord Westbury’s comments in the seminal case of St 
Helen’s v Tipping.387 He draws attention to the fact that in the past ‘actions in respect of the 
discomfort or personal injury’ has been actionable where such injury is a consequence of 
interference with land. He states: 
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In the case of nuisances ‘productive of sensible personal discomfort’, the action is not for causing discomfort to 
the person but…for causing injury to the land. True it is that the land has not suffered ‘sensible’ injury, but its 
utility has been diminished by the existence of the nuisance. It is for an unlawful threat to the utility of his land 
that the possessor or occupier is entitled to an injunction and it is for the diminution in such utility that he is 
entitled to compensation.
388
 
Lord Hoffmann is hence pointing out that whilst a claim for personal injury in negligence 
terms would fail - as there is no right to claim in those circumstances in private nuisance – 
someone should not be prevented from seeking to enforce their common law right to be 
uninhibited by any substantial diminution of the amenity value of property. 
When we consider the modern commonly adopted description of private nuisance, ‘an 
unlawful interference with a person’s use or enjoyment of land, or some right over, or in 
connection with it’389 it is patent that its composition is wide in scope. The definition falls 
short of providing a succinct outline of the interests that are protected thus lending a degree 
of legitimacy to an argument that a doctrinally pure form of the tort exists. Newark’s 
influential argument advocates private nuisance should not go beyond protecting 
interferences related to the use and enjoyment of land or rights associated with land-
holding.
390
 Nonetheless, very early on in the evolution of nuisance law, it was evident that 
there were other protected interests. For instance, in 1330 in Dalby v Berch
391
 physical 
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damage to land was clearly an actionable protected interest beyond the use and enjoyment of 
land. 
Despite recent judicial and academic murmurings to the contrary
392
 it is traditional that the 
law of private nuisance protects other interests than a narrow interpretation of Winfield’s 
description stipulates.
393
 Probably related to the familiar problem of establishing a precise 
definition for the tort, we are placed in open territory regarding what is actionable (the 
‘measure of actionability’). Unfortunately, any assertion that attempts to encapsulate the 
entire essence of the tort will likely be inadequate owing to the inherent difficulties of 
capturing ‘the highly nuanced approach that must be adopted in order to grasp fully what is, 
and is not, protected’. 394 In light of modern reservations about its actionability this chapter 
focuses on the debate regarding ‘personal injury’ as a protected interest in private nuisance. 
Notwithstanding the tort protects other interests, such as interferences with the use or 
enjoyment of land and its servitudes or damage to property and chattels, it will be explained 
that safeguarding ‘bodily security’ is indivisible from landholding at a fundamental level, 
despite some modern claims to the contrary.
395
  
The general measure of actionability that insists interferences must be substantial to 
constitute a nuisance is conceivably personified by activities that harm one’s health or 
physical well-being. The debate about excluding damage to the person becomes intriguing in 
that respect as it is hard to imagine a more substantial interference to proprietary interests 
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than to the ‘comfort of physical existence on that property’.396 Further to that point, 
interference that causes personal injury acts simultaneously as evidence that a substantial 
diminution of the amenity value of land has occurred;
397
 ‘consequences which become or are 
prejudicial to person or property’ are adjudged as actionable interests.398 Interferences are 
deemed substantial enough to equate to an actionable nuisance when either the ‘comfortable 
or profitable occupation’ of a dwelling is unreasonably effected.399 For instance, when 
someone is prevented from relaxing in their garden owing to noxious fumes causing health 
problems there is diminution in relation to both comfortable and profitable occupation.  At 
the turn of the twentieth-century actionable nuisances were certainly assessed in such a 
manner.  
In the preceding chapter, despite a strong case against exclusive possession being the 
requisite interest to sue in private nuisance, it is not difficult, in certain circumstances, to 
allude to their Lordships’ decision to adopt an austere stance towards standing in the tort. An 
anomaly exists that circumvents the austerity of standing being restricted to a proprietary 
interest in private nuisance. Whereas occupiers of a home will find themselves without 
remedy in the private embodiment of the law they may well find that they have a remedy in 
public nuisance; this was the situation in Corby and it is by no means an isolated case in 
point. A theoretical and definitional problem exists where pollution affects a number of 
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households. In cases such as Corby and Barr v Biffa
400
 it is legitimate to question, on the 
facts of the cases, whether the nuisance is anything more than a ‘private nuisance’ dressed up 
to fit the ‘public nuisance’ mould. Alternatively, it is legitimate to question whether it is truly 
possible that there could ever be a personal injury in the home that is not in reality a private 
nuisance. The question can be posed in another way: will there ever be a situation where the 
facts replicate or are similar to those in Corby and Biffa that public nuisance does not come 
to the rescue to sidestep standing issues? For the sake of coherence, we must examine the 
unacceptable situation where personal injury is actionable in public nuisance but not in 
private nuisance. 
The following section examines the long-established nexus between human beings and the 
land they occupy as a home. It is suggested that nuisance theory is inexorably intertwined in 
land-holding and since the sixteenth-century nuisance law has always been concerned with – 
or is based upon – matters regarding health and mental well-being. The section proceeds by 
discussing the actionability of comfort and enjoyment in early modern law and the 
development of the ‘necessity rule’. That discussion challenges Professor Newark’s famous 
thesis in ‘The Boundaries of Nuisance’401 that sought to position ‘personal injury’ solely in 
the context of negligence. Then the modern measure of actionability is scrutinised before 
building the case for injury to the person as a protected interest in modern nuisance law. It 
will be shown that attempts to exclude personal injury from private nuisance have emerged 
exclusively in the realm of public nuisance and under the rule Rylands v Fletcher.
402
 Before 
the concluding remarks the amalgamation of nuisance law as a single entity during the 
evolution of Case is examined in order to elucidate the contention that personal injury should 
not be restricted to public nuisance alone.  
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2. The Significance of Bodily Security within Nuisance Theory 
‘Home’ is an evocative term for everyone as it is the embodiment of the handful of precious 
ingredients that coexist to create the place where we live. It provides shelter; a sense of 
belonging; the means to grow food; and a source of water – all the right ingredients for a 
healthy way of life. In essence, ‘home’ is the place where the conditions for the biology and 
chemistry which enables our physical being to function properly are present.  Although the 
term ‘home’ is not something innately human (as all flora and fauna require an essential list 
of ingredients to provide an environment in which they can thrive) private nuisance is a 
forum unique to us - as human beings – that has developed to protect our interests in the land, 
thus furnishing us with the conditions necessary for a healthy environment. Although we 
cannot state categorically from the regimented writs (discussed in the preceding chapter) we 
can, nonetheless, make some assumptions concerning our medieval ancestors’ relationship 
with land that furnished them with bodily and financial security. It was a time when the 
seigniorial relationship between lord and tenant and the importance of being seised of land 
was vital to prosper, thus we can infer that bodily security was a natural element of what 
evolved into ‘property’ and beyond - being disseissed was enough to make our ancestors 
vulnerable to both physical and financial hardship.
403
  
The analysis in Chapter 2 identifies novel disseisin as the ‘grass roots’ of nuisance law. In 
light of that analysis, it can be posited that being seised of a free tenement was conceptually 
something more than a ‘title’ in land that granted access to the royal court - it is perhaps 
better described as a ‘state of being’. The ideology behind a lord’s acceptance of a tenant into 
free tenure provided a status that was synonymous with ‘security under law’. That status 
                                                 
403
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ensured that the most important contemporaneous rights – manifested in lands and tenements 
- were protected. To medieval man, being seised of a free tenement not only bestowed 
standing in the Assize and in society but determined also his physical well-being. ‘Security 
under law’ as a precept henceforward naturally encompassed ‘bodily security’ as a protected 
right. It can be asserted that at a fundamental level ‘bodily security’ was an integral element 
of the feudal seigniorial relationship that created a free tenement.
404
 Centuries later that 
remained the situation. For example, at first instance in the seminal case of Aldred v 
Benton
405
 (Aldred’s Case406) in 1610 Coke CJ remarked that ‘a man builds for habitation, for 
health and for ornament. If a man does anything which hinders another’s habitation407 or 
health an action lies; but not if he hinders his pleasure’.408  
Cockayne observes that ‘sensory perceptions’ of the people during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries ‘shaped cultural and practical responses’.409 Coke CJ’s reasoning in 
Aldred reflects that sentiment. Actionability in private nuisance evolved representing the 
connection between interests in land-holding and interests of the physical person;
410
 the 
physical integrity of land and the physical integrity of the person have been inexorably linked 
- born out of instinct – as a natural aspect of the built and natural environment. Milton 
observed that during the sixteenth-century: 
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Cultural changes in English society [as a result, in part, of the enclosure movement
411
] led to the formulation and 
recognition of new interests of land holding, involving many claims to the integrity of the land unit and the 
comfort and physical welfare of its occupants.
412
 
In essence Milton was referring to the concept of nuisance and the echoes of its evolutionary 
path from the ‘state of being’ afforded by seisin of land to a transformation of abstract 
interests - such as the ‘personal physical welfare and well-being of the human organism’ – 
driven by social mores.
413
 Professor Palmer provides evidence of social events, particularly 
demographic catastrophes, influencing and moulding legal change. It would seem the 
inexorable nexus between land and humankind merely adjusted in accordance with each 
concurrent societal state of affairs across the epochs,
414
 at least until the twentieth-century 
when well-ordered negligence principles came to the fore. Ultimately – if Corby and Biffa are 
upheld in any future Supreme Court action – eight centuries of nuisance law that developed 
around societal nuances (one of which was the need to protect the health and well-being of 
landholders) will be supplanted. Whilst the judges in Corby and Biffa have preferred a 
negligence analysis and chosen to remove personal injury from private nuisance (but not 
public nuisance) and place it into negligence, it is questionable whether they had a grasp of 
the fundamental nexus between land-holding and ‘bodily security’.  
Fundamentally, that removal is a misinterpretation of the traditional character of private 
nuisance (essential to the simple form of nuisance law). It can be asserted that this is a misuse 
of history and, perhaps, an improper manner in which to develop the tort. The only apparent 
                                                 
411
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justification for this development is the cross-infection of negligence into nuisance. It is 
suggested that the more ‘fashionable’, well-ordered doctrines of negligence provide a quick 
fix to the difficulties (under discussion in this thesis) that have developed in private nuisance 
in recent times. Further, it is argued that much of those difficulties have emanated from 
misuses of history of this type. The removal of bodily security as a protected interest from the 
tort provides a succinct example of this in practice. This will now be demonstrated. 
Roscoe Pound considered the five natural interests of the physical person.
415
  Among those 
interests were the protection of the body from direct or indirect injury; maintenance of bodily 
health; and the protection from direct or indirect injury of one’s mental health. Thus Pound 
identifies human beings’ natural desire to strive for freedom from annoyance which interferes 
with not just physical comfort but also mental poise. Importantly, Pound characterised the 
instinct to protect physical and mental health, essentially, as protecting property rights, thus 
his three anthropocentric interests reveal bodily security and mental welfare as being entirely 
anthropomorphised in the concept of ‘property’. As such the law of nuisance has traditionally 
served to protect what is necessary to habitation and we can surmise that health is a necessity 
of ‘property’.416  
In Allison v Merton, Sutton and Wandsworth Area Health Authority the plaintiff’s sleep was 
affected to such a degree by the incessant noise and vibrations from the defendant’s boilers 
that she developed depression. She sought an injunction and was successful on grounds to 
preserve her mental health.
417
 The Allison case is important for two reasons: first, it highlights 
our strong instinct to safeguard our well-being holistically; and second, ‘personal injury’ 
extends to mental well-being in private nuisance. ‘Property’ has clearly been the legal 
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manifestation of a safeguarding platform for human self-preservation in all guises. Allison is 
not an isolated example where an intrusion that caused mental anguish gave rise to an 
actionable nuisance. In both Thompson-Schwab v Costaki
418
 and Laws v Florinplace Ltd
419
 
the close proximity of a brothel and a sex shop (respectively) caused mental upset and the 
mere presence of those premises were deemed to be actionable on that ground. Thus private 
nuisance traditionally protects occupiers, not simply against physical damage to their 
property, but likewise against nonphysical interference with their enjoyment of their land).
420
 
Gerry Cross labelled ‘mental upset’ as a nonphysical interference but logically depression 
and mental upset are under the general umbrella of health. Bearing in mind Thompson-
Schwab received House of Lords approval in Hunter we must question why mental well-
being is considered to be a protected interest whereas physical injury to the person is not: 
surely actual physical injury should, at the very least, be on a level setting as something that 
can offend.
421
 
Our ancestors recognised the best means of securing the paramount human facets was to 
secure habitation: we can argue that the situation is similar today. It is a general principle that 
‘every person [with the requisite interest] is entitled, as against his neighbour, to the 
comfortable and healthful enjoyment of the premises owned or occupied by him’.422 
Debatably any argument that disputes the inescapable nexus between human and land and the 
interests that connection naturally generates have weak foundations. One could venture as far 
as to say that the contention that ‘personal injury’ is not actionable in private nuisance 
because it is a ‘tort to land’ is little more than quibbling over semantics. It is suggested here 
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that recognition of bodily and mental security as crucial proprietary interests should be, again 
to borrow Professor Newark’s words, defended rigorously ‘against all comers’.423 
Certainly there are numerous examples over the centuries where the courts were explicit 
regarding the relationship between ‘bodily security’ and human habitation. In Hales’ Case in 
1569 Mounson commented: 
The first and chiefe use of an house is to defend men from the extremity of the winde, and weather. And by the 
receipt of comfortable light, and wholeseome aire, into the same to preserve man’s body in health. Therefore 
who so taketh from man so great a commodity as that which preserveth man’s health in his castle or house doth 
a manner as great wrong as if he disseised him altogether of his freehold [sic].
424 
It is important to reiterate the point in fact from above and the previous chapter, that being 
seised of a free tenement represented a ‘state of being’ denoted by a personal and economic 
relationship with  land (and lord) when ‘land was everything to everybody’.425 The sheer 
prominence of land as a personal and economic entity cannot be understated. Thus to 
analogise the preservation of health and well-being alongside being seised of a free tenement, 
as Mounson did, highlights the nexus between man and land (and health and status) at an 
early stage of the modern tort.  
A definite impression during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth-centuries can be 
formed that ‘bodily security’ was a protected interest inherent to landholding. Accordingly 
injury to health would invoke an action in nuisance law. This brings us back the question as 
to why the development of negligence should provide justification to remove such an 
inherent proprietary interest. Social historian Emily Cockayne (quoting Mounson in Hales’ 
Case) explains how lands, including dwellings, were conceived fundamentally in health 
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terms. Precedent in the courts continued to support such a notion. Shortly after Aldred’s 
Case,
426
 Jones J in Jones v Powell reasoned:
427
  
I conceive that an action on the case lies if someone suffers special prejudice…as Jones has in this case – for his 
air is corrupted, which is a prejudice to his body, since his health is thereby taken away; and his papers and 
writings are spoilt, so that he [being a registrar] is deprived of his maintenance and livelihood. So judgment 
should be given to the plaintiff.
428
 
This small selection of ratio from the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries is debatably 
conclusive (rather than indicative) evidence concerning the holistic value of landholding – 
land was not merely viewed as a thing to be owned, indeed the concept of ownership did not 
start to develop until approximately half a century after the earliest experiments with 
nocumenta (nuisance) began,
429
 but alternatively something that provided the foundations for 
bodily and economic security as ‘natural incidents’ of landholding protected by actions for 
nuisance.
430
  
Notwithstanding the importance of Cantrell v Churche
431
 (when both proprietary and 
personal aspects of nuisance could truly be said to have come together ‘under the same legal 
heading’432) the case did not clarify what interests should be protected in nuisance. But the 
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formative decision concerning actionability came less than a decade later in Aldred’s Case:433 
Aldred is considered the lead case of the time: it continues to have an influence on modern 
judges today.
434
 William Aldred had freehold possession of a house and piece of land (31 feet 
long and 2.5 feet wide) in Harleston, Norfolk. The land was situated next to the hall and 
parlour of his house. On the east side of the land the defendant, Thomas Benton, possessed a 
small orchard where he erected a pig-sty. Topical to this chapter, the case was contested on 
the grounds of ‘a fetid and unwholesome’435 stench (from Benton’s newly erected pig-sty) 
that rendered Aldred’s home uninhabitable. It was claimed his servants and other persons 
who lived there could not stay ‘without danger of infection’.436 Owing to the fact that Aldred 
was successful in his claim it is important to understand the judges’ interpretation of nuisance 
doctrine - at the birth of modern nuisance law - that resulted in a successful appeal (on arrest 
of judgment) on the grounds essentially of a risk to health.  
‘Personal nuisances’ where there was a fear of infection were recognised from early on in the 
development of actions on the case, possibly from the beginning. Baker recognised that such 
cases had earlier been ‘remedied in local courts’ which emphasises – prior to royal protection 
under the Assize – health was inexorably linked to ‘home’.437 In cases that involved smell, 
for instance from lime-kilns, there was a heightened fear of infection, as such, because not 
every interference could be deemed a nuisance, the fear of infection played a vital role in the 
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nascent balancing act (of competing user of land) between someone having the freedom to do 
what they want with their land and the obligation not to harm their neighbours land.
438
  
Safeguarding health was a necessity of habitation, or expressed differently, personal injury 
could be the deciding factor in regards to actionability. The risk of infection or injury to one’s 
health had a vital role in what became Baron Bramwell’s rule of reciprocity.439 The rule of 
reciprocity (and rule of reasonableness) evolved into the reasonable user test (see Chapter 
4
440) out of the need to establish ‘whether the interference alleged surmounts the threshold of 
interference necessary to give rise to an action in nuisance’.441 Baker remarked that Aldred 
would have been well served to emphasise the danger of infection from the ‘pollution’ that 
emanated from Benton’s newly erected pig-sty but regardless Benton was held liable, not for 
interfering with comfort and enjoyment, but for ‘infecting’ the air.442 
The notion of types of pollution affecting the health of plaintiffs as being nuisances has, 
without doubt, a long lineage. Baker avers that activities in certain cases from the late 
fourteenth-century were considered nuisances; for instance, where potable water supplies 
were polluted or dwellings infected so they were rendered uninhabitable.
443
 Certainly for a 
significant period actions on the case - specifically for pollution - were one of the most 
common forms of nuisance action which reflected the lack of public health regulations and 
times when standards of hygiene were poor;
444
 there were a number of different 
unwholesome activities that would give rise to a nuisance action.
445
 But the advent of 
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regulatory law – that can be argued to be better suited to safeguarding health - did not curtail 
the potential of the private nuisance action as an alternative means to protect ‘bodily 
security’. If we consider the famous example of Hale’s Case (where nonfeasance was 
actionable) then we start to paint a vivid picture of the necessarily wide scope of the nascent 
tort: a tort that put health as a cornerstone of actionability. Mounson stated that: ‘if one who 
has a horrible sickness be in my house, and will not depart, an action will lie against him; and 
yet he taketh not any air from me, but infecteth that which I have’.446 Labelling ‘bodily 
security’ as ‘personal injury’ (in the language of negligence) with the outcome that it is no 
longer actionable in private nuisance is demonstrably a deviation from orthodox nuisance 
law. 
Ultimately actionability has been, for centuries, conditional upon the ‘necessity rule’.447 As a 
result a limitation was put on the natural rights of seisin: an interference not only had to be 
construed as a legal wrong (injuria), the courts would maintain that damage (damnum) was 
required to be done to a ‘thing of necessity’ associated with a free tenement. What amounted 
to a thing of necessity was a matter of judicial discretion and what amounted to an actionable 
nuisance turned on whether an activity went beyond the threshold of what someone ought 
reasonably to be expected to endure.
448
 Crucially, securing salubrious conditions for those 
seised of land was not challenged as a thing of necessity. On the facts of Aldred the court 
held that the smell of the pigs and the restriction of light from the pig-sty interfered with 
things of necessity, that is, necessity of light (‘necessitas lumis’) and clean air (‘salubritas 
aeris’);449 to qualify that ruling it was held that ‘things of delight’ were not considered a 
necessity and were thus not actionable. Although an early example of judicial reasoning 
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putting limitations on liability in nuisance, it is significant that necessity is associated with 
the natural environment, and the environmental conditions on which ‘ample’ enjoyment of 
rights in land rests; for that reason Aldred may be described as one of the earliest 
environmental nuisance actions.
450
 
It is straightforward to see how references to ill-health in the context of air pollution at this 
time should be interpreted. Sulphurous smoke was associated then, as now, with coughing 
and spluttering, and it is possible that it was believed then, as now, to be a cause of 
respiratory complaints. What may be lost on a modern audience is that at this time the mere 
smell of fumes was considered an agent of harm.
451
 This was an age of miasma theory, in 
which odours were linked causally with disease. It was believed that unwholesome or 
corrupted air, when breathed in, was the source of ill-health. Placing these cases in the 
context of miasma theory strengthens the interpretation of case law as incorporating, from its 
original conception, remedies for ill-health. The complaint against odours from a piggery (in 
Aldred) and noxious fumes from sea-coal combustion (in Jones) were, I suggest, at core 
concerned with threats to health - reminiscent of public health issues - rather than injuries 
caused by negligent behaviour. The pretext of the damages is thus entirely distinguishable.  
Newark’s article was principally a short critique of nuisance law in light of the evolution of 
the more modern tort of negligence. His observations regarding the actionability of personal 
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injury outwardly concentrated on clear examples of injuries that fit the negligence mould. It 
is important to readdress his contentions in that context. In consideration of the 
contemporaneous credence placed upon miasmic theory, corrupting salubrious air would 
have been conceived as a genuine threat to health. Newark’s conclusions, founded on 
excluding ‘personal injury’ outside of that context, are at best weak, and at worst entirely 
misconceived. Jurisprudence requires that his inaccuracies are readdressed prior to using 
them as reliable authority, albeit a little belated for Dyson LJ following his judgment in 
Corby. It is patent from Dyson’s comments that he, like his counterparts in Hunter and 
Cambridge, thought interpreting the law of private nuisance required a historical analysis to 
take the tort back to its foundations.
452
 But unfortunately, for the sake of accurate historical 
content, he, like Lord Goff, turned to Newark’s article. Drawing on the critique in this 
chapter, it would be interesting to see how these matters would be addressed in the future if a 
specified claim for damage to the person (in an actual private nuisance action) came before 
the Supreme Court. 
3. The actionability of comfort and enjoyment in early modern law 
We have seen that in the early modern epoch it was assumed, and sometimes explicitly 
acknowledged, that smells, smuts and the like which harmed health were thereby actionable. 
It is one thing to argue that a healthy unpolluted environment is crucial to the enjoyment of 
land, but what of Newark’s thesis that remedy rests exclusively within negligence? The crux 
of Newark’s thesis in the context of excluding personal injury as a protected interest lies 
behind his remarks that:  
In true cases of nuisance the interest of the plaintiff which is invaded is not the interest of bodily security but the 
interest of liberty to exercise rights over land in the amplest manner. A sulphurous chimney in a residential area 
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is not a nuisance because it makes them cough and splutter but because it prevents them taking their ease in their 
gardens.
453
 
This well utilised statement has been interpreted to support conflicting stances concerning the 
actionability of ‘personal injury’. For instance, John Murphy’s interpretation is indicative that 
personal injury can be evidence of a diminution of amenity value of land whilst Lord Goff’s 
obiter in Hunter raises doubts concerning the actionability of personal injury in a land-based 
tort.
454
  
It would be a serious error for Newark to have not only failed to recognise an aspect of 
actionable nuisance that is integral to the original conception of the law (ie ‘bodily security’), 
but to have presented his argument regarding the ‘true’ action of private nuisance using 
nuances of ‘pleasure’ betrays its conception from the renaissance period. His portrayal 
entirely contradicts the ‘necessity rule’ by implying that being prevented from taking one’s 
ease in the garden (as a ‘thing of delight’) can justify an action in nuisance. There was a 
‘repeatedly contested issue’ throughout the sixteenth-century concerning ‘whether the law 
took any notice of things of pleasure’.455 The problem is that Newark overlooked the relevant 
case law, and how it developed, which concerned how much (or little) enjoyment of land was 
strictly necessary such that the law ought to protect it.   
Wray LJ in various cases of this period was in the thick of the issue. It can be observed after 
analysing a series of cases from the late sixteenth century that initially Wray was a proponent 
of things of delight being actionable, but later he amended his view in line with the necessity 
rule. In Hales’ Case456 Wray and Manwood LJJ had opposing opinions regarding whether 
                                                 
453
 Newark (5) 488-9. Emphasis added. 
454
 Murphy (8) 64 and Hunter (2), 688 and 692. 
455
 Coquillette (58) 771 (note 46).  
456
 Hale’s Case (71). See Mounson, above note 49. A French manuscript has never been discovered. The only 
known report is KU MS D152(5) (1569) (also in English). See Baker (16) 592 (note 78). See also report LI MS 
Maynard 87 fo 51 (Trin 1569).  
128 
 
things of pleasure where actionable.
457
 In Manwood LJ’s view the debate centred upon the 
maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas pertaining to ‘things of profit’ and was not 
actionable in the context of ‘things of pleasure’.458 Wray’s argument was that if too much 
light was obscured or clean air made insalubrious then a house resembled a ‘dungeon’ and 
thus the enjoyment of land was affected to a degree that was actionable. Manwood evidently 
agreed that if light was completely blocked and/or airflow suppressed an action would lie, on 
the other hand he believed the amount of light/air obscured was the decisive element to 
actionability. Wray was of the opinion in Hales’ Case that in the context of the common law: 
one should not hurt the Freeholder of another, and no greater hurt, grievance, or damage can be done to any 
man’s Freehold, then to take away the light and ayre thereof, which is comfortable, & commodious for him, for 
when this light, and ayre are taken from him, his house remaineth as a dungeon.
459
 
Thus Wray LJ believed, at this point in time, that things of pleasure were significant to the 
enjoyment of property rights as any degree of interference would suffice as an actionable 
nuisance. Manwood LJ differed in his opinion. His judgment provided an early account of the 
necessity rule, which attempted to clarify the rule that something needed to be necessary for 
the habitation of man in order to be actionable. In response to Wray’s judgment he stated: 
I will agree with you, that if all your windowes were stopped, that an action will lie, and where you say sic utere 
ut alienum non laedas, this is not meant of things of pleasure, but things of profit. And here is not any part of 
your house consumed, but herein a let of your pleasure only, for which your action is not maintaineable…[sic]. 
And the civil laws say, that two lights on the former part and back of a house are sufficient…neither hereby any 
offence or hurt is done unto Mr Hales, for this house is not thereby impaired. And therefore I think his action 
will not lie.
460
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By 1587, now as Chief Justice, Wray had evidently altered his position regarding the 
actionability of things of pleasure. In Bland v Moseley
461
 he held: 
It is a hard prescription to stop up lights, for that is a great benefit to the house, and windows have three 
advantages: prospect, air and light. One may build in restraint of another’s prospect, air or light, but not so as to 
take away his light: though he may diminish it, so long as he leaves sufficient light for the house. 
This judgment suggests a change in attitude from Hales’ Case; he is starting to talk in terms 
of ‘necessity’. In an action for loss of prospect, he held that matters of delight (including 
prospect) were not matters of necessity such as to fall within the necessity rule that:  
for prospect, which is matter only of delight, and not necessity, no action lies for stopping thereof, and yet it is a 
great commendation of a house if it has a long and large prospect…[But] the law does not give an action for 
such things of delight.
462
 
The debate surrounding things of necessity and pleasure was coming to a head and the new 
era of actions on the case in nuisance ushered in a settlement. Coke’s judgment in Aldred 
proved seminal on the matter. Something which is commendable need not be something that 
is necessary; ‘necessary’ is an absolute minimum, and it is minimum ‘standards’ that the new 
action was to protect. Taking his cue from Wray CJ in Bland v Moseley, the new Chief 
Justice Coke concluded - in Aldred - that things of pleasure were not actionable in 
nuisance.
463
 The timing of the two Chief Justices agreement on that point in fact is significant 
because the two cases spanned the supplanting period of Case over the assize of nuisance. 
The judgments therefore represent a ‘before and after shot’, as it were, of the state of 
nuisance during that crucial time. It is clear that Coke intended to expand upon and clarify the 
necessity principle. Prior to citing Wray he avowed that four things are ‘desirable’ for 
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habitation.
464
  Those ‘desirables’ were habitatio hominis, delectation inhabitantis, necessitas 
lumis and salubritas aeris. Coke CJ, in his famous statement, held: 
And now it was moved in arrest of judgment, that the building of the house for hogs was necessary for the 
sustenance of man: and one ought not to have so delicate a nose, that he cannot bear the smell of hogs…but it 
was resolved that an action for it is (as the case is) well maintainable; for in a house four things are desired 
habitatio hominis, delectation inhabitantis, necessitas lumis and salubritas aeris, and for nusance done to three 
of them an action lies…[sic].465 
His method of first laying down the four desirables of habitation before elucidating what is 
necessary has interesting conations for the necessity rule and how ‘enjoyment to land’ is 
perceived as the preeminent protected interest today. Although we cannot be certain of the 
intended meaning of Coke’s ratio regarding the four things that are desirable for human 
habitation and his statement, ‘for a nuisance done to three of these an action lies’, there are 
only truly two feasible interpretations.
466
 What is clear is that he did exclude one ‘desirable’ 
before stating what was actionable. The question is: did he intend that exclusion to be a rule 
of law or merely a matter of fact specific to Aldred’s Case? 
Some have interpreted Coke’s statement as being fact specific.  That is to say, that all four 
‘desirables’ were actionable but Aldred only suffered injury to three (to the exclusion of 
delectatio inhabitantis). My interpretation is that Coke was making a statement of law. 
Habitatio hominis is translated as the habitation of man, necessitas lumis as the need for light 
and salubritas aeris as wholesome air. The translation for delectatio inhabitantis is the 
delight (or enjoyment
467
) of the dweller. Caution needs to be taken when interpreting that 
translation. The fact that inhabitanis is used instead of terra or terrenum (ie land) raises 
questions regarding the ‘enjoyment of land’ (thus delactatio terra) interpretation that it is 
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commonly accepted to imply. The significance of this translation regarding early actionability 
in private nuisance rests at both first instance and the case on arrest. 
It is logical to surmise that Coke’s intention was to make the distinction between what is 
desirable and what is necessary for habitation. In essence he was saying whilst A, B, C and D 
are desirable only A, B and C are actionable because they are necessities of habitation. In 
asserting that an action would lie for three of the four ‘desirables’ to the exclusion of 
delectatio inhabitatis (delight of the dweller) he affirms the settled dispute from the previous 
century regarding things of pleasure not being actionable. After considering the prior 
judgments in Hale’s Case and Bland and the consequential cases, for instance Jones, we have 
enough precedent to support Coke’s intention in Aldred was to make a statement of law that 
laid down the necessity rule.
468
 Indeed, a century and a half later William Blackstone was 
quoting Aldred in the context that enjoyment was not an actionable nuisance: ‘But depriving 
one of a mere matter of pleasure…as it abridges nothing really convenient or necessary, is no 
injury to the sufferer, and is therefore not an actionable nuisance’.469  
It should be stressed that this argument is not advocating that so called ‘amenity’ nuisance 
has no foundation in nascent nuisance (before it patently became part of the law in the 
nineteenth century
470
). The law here is protean - in line with the simple form of the tort 
identified within this thesis - and thus, it is self-evident that actionability has altered with the 
times, indeed the original heads of injury in the varying forums for redressing nocumenta are 
practically unrecognisable to us today. But, on occasions throughout its protracted history, 
the law has travelled full circle. Newark constructs the modern tort of nuisance in a very 
different manner from early modern judges making concessions for pleasurable things; 
seemingly his dilemma reflects that of the sixteenth-century judges. Nevertheless, Newark’s 
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historical critique is flawed by virtue of its superficiality and its neglect of relevant authority. 
It asserts that the original conception of nuisance law is one thing and not another, when 
some, and perhaps much, of the evidence he ignores suggests quite the opposite. 
Newark’s portrayal of nuisance is often contradictory.  Terms such as ‘liberty’ to express the 
‘ample manner’ in which someone can enjoy their property and relax in their garden have 
their sheen taken off somewhat when, in effect, and as he advocates, bodily integrity and 
mental well-being is excluded from protection. It is nonsensical to imagine ‘exercising rights 
over land in the amplest manner’ if those rights do not safeguard the health of the person(s) 
who create the proprietary rights in the first place. Put in another way, the medieval and early 
modern concept of man building dwellings for the primary reasons of guarding against 
weather and to preserve health
471
  - that represents a fundamental necessity for the purpose of 
nuisance law – should, on Newark’s authority, have no bearing in the modern law, 
surprisingly at a time when high court activity professes to return private nuisance back to its 
foundations (as evidenced in Hunter).
472
 It is important to emphasise that Newark’s article 
was principally a short critique of nuisance law in light of the evolution of the more modern 
tort of negligence. It sought to establish the doctrinal boundaries between nuisance and 
negligence in terms of the former’s concern with interests in land, including bracketing 
liability for personal injury exclusively into the tort of negligence.
473
 Newark’s positioning of 
‘personal injury’ in the context of negligence for the purposes of his thesis misses the larger 
picture and the inexorable nexus between human beings and land in nuisance terms.  
4. The Modern Measure of Actionability 
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In 1931 Percy Winfield, the architect of the modern description of private nuisance, stated 
that the tort is incapable of precise definition, ‘and considering its historical origin we should 
be astonished if it were’:474 Jenny Steele posits that it is generally accepted that the courts 
cannot provide a distinct definition for the tort.
475
 Whilst it is beyond the ambit of this chapter 
to fully engage with the problematic ramifications of an indistinct definition for private 
nuisance, undoubtedly the perceived inherent difficulties have consequences concerning the 
issue of establishing the ‘measure of actionability’, or, in other words what is actionable. 
Maria Lee remarks the tort is inhibited by historical factors that ‘address only activities and 
effects on land’.476 Despite the fact that an amount of historical restrictions based on the 
nexus between human beings and land make perfect sense in a tort that concerns interests in 
land, we must question whether the degree of those restrictions, as established in Hunter, 
goes beyond a rational measure of actionability. Accordingly the manner in which the crucial 
observation that ‘nuisance is a tort against land’477 is interpreted is essential to ascertaining 
what is actionable.  
Considering over eight decades have passed since Winfield first provided his description, 
without an adequate improvement, Steele’s remarks about the difficulty of providing a 
distinct definition are hard to dispute. Whilst Winfield’s description, ‘an unlawful 
interference with a person’s use or enjoyment of land, or some right over, or in connection 
with it’ remains the judges’ most utilised depiction of what embodies private nuisance, John 
Murphy’s recent (2010) description (‘any on-going or recurrent activity or state of affairs that 
causes substantial and unreasonable interference with a claimant’s land or with his use and 
                                                 
474
 PH Winfield (14) 189. 
475
 Jenny Steele observed that the statement has been deemed to be a description rather than a definition. She 
rightly attributed this to the fact that nuisance actions are often decided by referring to previous decisions to 
settle the intricacies of particular circumstances rather than turning to an ‘abstract definition’ (Steele, Tort law 
(75) 601). 
476
 Lee (77) 324. 
477
 Hunter (2), 702 (per Lord Goff). Similarly Scarman LJ commented that ‘nuisance is a wrong to property’ 
Bone v Seale [1975] 1 All ER 787, 794. 
134 
 
enjoyment of that land’478) arguably offers a marked enhancement, but it still has its 
problems; indeed it seemingly remains the fact that a succinct definition for the tort is 
frustratingly beyond our grasp. 
It is noteworthy that Murphy inserted that harm should be of a type that is ‘substantial’ (or 
not merely ‘trifling’) into his description. Modern commentators - such as Murphy - have 
generally embraced that notion and have, in effect, introduced it into the general domain of 
private nuisance, thus partially revising Winfield’s description from an academic 
standpoint.
479
 Indeed it is explicit from a significant body of the case law that the courts have 
generally adopted the stance that interferences should be substantial and not merely trivial. 
On the other hand it is evident from the formative case of Hunter that this is not always the 
case as ‘substantial interference’ is sometimes not capable of being a nuisance no matter how 
extreme the interference suffered by the claimant.
480
  
Another popular ‘revision’ of Winfield’s description, probably owing to the central role of 
reasonableness of user within private nuisance, is substituting the phrase ‘unlawful 
interference’ with ‘unreasonable interference’ but this has caused doctrinal problems owing 
to an unwarranted overlap with negligence. The nuisance/negligence paradigm is analysed in 
depth in Chapter 4 in regards to liability, but it is important to understand at this juncture that 
the introduction of the language of negligence, particularly following Lord Goff’s decision in 
Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather,
481
 has created an unnecessary blurring of the 
boundaries between negligence and nuisance; accordingly, it has created certain problematic 
doctrinal issues in private nuisance. The main issue regarding actionability in this respect 
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centres, arguably, upon the manner in which ‘reasonableness’ in traditional (historical) 
nuisance terms has begun to be interpreted in negligence terms. This, of course, adds to the 
difficulty of providing a succinct definition of private nuisance. 
The cross-infection of terms has, in effect, changed the essence of the reasonable user test, 
which was traditionally used to establish whether an alleged interference transcends the 
threshold necessary to give rise to an action in nuisance. Negligence-type ‘reasonableness’ 
terms, in which the notion of the hypothetical ‘reasonable man’ is fundamental (and thus the 
concept of reasonable foreseeability), has essentially altered the reasonable user test. Where 
before judges balanced conflicting interests in land in order to assess ‘actionability’ (if any 
interference was deemed actionable then liability was strict), following Cambridge, the test 
now ascertains liability first, when never before has liability been a prerequisite of the 
reasonable user test.
482
 This aberration of the test has confused the issue of actionability 
further and has produced an additional obstacle to providing a succinct definition of private 
nuisance.   
It is perhaps the difficulties of providing a succinct definition that judges have chosen to 
adopt the negligence analysis into the torts doctrines but, as Chapter 4 explains, this has 
proven problematic, especially when the ‘simple form’ of nuisance, elucidated in this thesis, 
is taken into account. Although part of the simple form suggests that the law evolves 
according to societal needs, and thus an aspect of that form is the inherently evolutionary 
character of nuisance, it is debatable whether adopting doctrines that alter the simple form of 
nuisance law is the correct manner in which to develop the tort. This is an example of an 
unacceptable use of history. If we examine Winfield’s theses we can argue that nuisance law 
has developed along regressive lines in recent decades and attempts to develop the law in 
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modern decisions have missed opportunities to continue on a path of broadly adequate 
protection of interests in land affected by environmental harm. In effect this chapter (and the 
next) reveal a trend of negligence doctrines infecting the pure form of nuisance law and thus 
the simplicity of its doctrines. 
We can gain an enhanced understanding of the contextual significance behind Winfield’s 
description from his seminal article ‘Nuisance as a Tort’, where it was first illustrated.483 The 
phrase ‘an unlawful interference’, when read in isolation, palpably fails to convey his 
intended meaning because it does not specify what constitutes unlawful for the purposes of 
the tort. On the face of things this is problematic but becomes clearer when read in 
conjunction with the contextual nuances within the article where it originated. Winfield 
seemingly understood that the unlawfulness of an interference - that creates an actionable 
nuisance – was not an investigation into the ‘type of harm’ rather whether an injury 
diminished the value of property and the comfort and enjoyment of it to be considered 
unlawful.
484
 This was determined by applying the ‘rule of reasonableness’485 to the 
circumstances of each case and balancing competing land uses.
486
 Thus Winfield was of the 
opinion that the meaning of ‘unlawful’ was depicted by the manner and scale in which 
interferences occurred - thus the nature of the damage - to protected interests rather than 
seeking a specific type of injury.
487
  
After examining Winfield’s words ‘or some right over, or in connection with it’ and the 
historical evolution of nuisance law from the original actionable nuisances (under the assize 
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of novel disseisin) it is clear that there was never a pure doctrine that protected merely the 
‘use and enjoyment of land’ but since Case, at least, it has always been enough if an 
interference ‘renders the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable’.488 Whilst Winfield 
visibly recognised that ensuring the use and enjoyment of land is an essential component to 
what is an actionable nuisance it is manifest from his description in ‘Nuisance as a Tort’ that 
actionability is not straightforward and a number of interests are protected by the tort.
489
 
Identifying those interests is an essential exercise to assess the measure of actionability but it 
can be asserted that interferences to land that amount to personal injury are both substantial 
and unreasonable. 
R. A. Buckley pondered whether the tort should be available for personal injury
490
 and it was 
recognised by David Hughes that doubt had been cast by Professor Newark in ‘The 
Boundaries of Nuisance’491 regarding private nuisance as the proper remedy for ‘personal 
injury’.492 Nonetheless he concedes: ‘[t]hat the most should be said in such circumstances is 
that an occupier of land may be able to recover in nuisance for damage to the person...where 
land or its enjoyment is also affected’.493 Thus Hughes never interpreted Newark’s article as 
being capable of removing ‘damage to the person’ from the tort completely. Certainly, 
Newark stated in his conclusion that ‘damage to the person…cannot in itself amount to a 
nuisance’.494 In this statement he concedes that in true cases of nuisance, if the enjoyment of 
rights in land is affected, then personal damage is actionable. Steele is partially in agreement 
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with Newark and Hughes but suggests further that injunctions and damages should be 
available for damage to the person ‘in respect of the loss of amenity value, just as there would 
be for other interference with comfort and enjoyment’. From Steele’s contentions (regarding 
any conclusions that should be drawn from Hunter) we may deduce that there is not a 
prerequisite for land - or its amenity - to also be affected for injury to the person or health in 
order to be actionable.
495
 This relates to, and somewhat qualifies, Murphy’s modern 
description of what is actionable where, as long as interference causes substantial and 
unreasonable harm, any on-going or recurrent activity that adversely affects a claimant’s land 
(or his use and enjoyment of that land) an actionable nuisance exists.
496
 
5. The Case for Injury to the Person 
If it is truly the case that harms injurious to health are no longer to be considered an 
actionable head under private nuisance then there has been a shift in the juridical reasoning 
concerning the necessity rule and subsequently the measure beyond which something is 
tolerable (and lawful). From a juncture when the judiciary spoke in terms of interferences to 
land not needing to be as severe as to cause an injury to the person in order to be actionable 
(in line with the necessity rule) they have seemingly shifted towards personal injury simply 
not being actionable in nuisance. This is problematic, for in the ‘celebrated’497 case of Gerard 
v Muspratt
498
 where Sir Cresswell Cresswell
499
 laid down a theory of nuisance law that was 
extremely influential: indeed, it was incorporated to direct the jury in the lead case of St 
Helens Smelting Co v Tipping.
500
 He declared that ‘the law [private nuisance] did not tolerate 
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any injury to health and property of another’; Mr Justice Mellor’s direction to the jury in 
Tipping went thus: 
I tell you that if a man by an act – either by the erection of lime-kiln, or brick-kiln, or copper works, or any 
works of that description – sends over his neighbour’s land that which is noxious and hurtful to an extent which 
sensibly diminished the comfort and value of the property, and the comfort of existence on the property, that is 
an actionable injury.
501 
That direction summarised the character of private nuisance concerning the measure 
actionability. John Murphy, nearly a century and a half later, averred to the premise that 
persons would be deprived of a comfortable existence on a property if personal injury were to 
be suffered.
502
 Mellor J’s comments to the jury using the Cresswell theory of nuisance 
encapsulates all the elements of actionability through identifying the protected interests: 
namely, things injurious to the amenity value of property, the economic value of the property 
itself, and the well-being of the person from whom the proprietary rights generate. What is 
important here is that Mellor J - in line with Sir Cresswell Cresswell’s judgment - separated 
the ‘appreciable’503 diminution of ‘comfort and value of the property’ from ‘comfort of 
existence on the property’ as actionable heads. Surely this is, at least, illustrative of an 
acceptance that the person is coupled with the protected interests under the tort.  
Sir Frederick Pollock later discussed the concept of ‘comfort of existence on the property’ 
advocating, whilst positing that injuries must be something more than trifling, that injury to 
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the person and activities that caused malady denoted the definitive protected interest. His 
comments underline the juridical shift described above. He stated:
504
  
It is not necessary to constitute a private nuisance that the acts or state of things complained of should be 
noxious in the sense of being injurious to health. It is enough that there is a material interference with the 
ordinary comfort and convenience of life - ‘the physical comfort of human existence’ - by an ordinary and 
reasonable standard;
505
 there must be something more than mere loss of amenity,
506
 but there need not be 
positive hurt or disease. 
In consideration of the Cresswell Cresswell theory of nuisance, Pollock’s remarks and John 
Murphy’s description of modern nuisance507 there is a strong argument that the consensus has 
shifted regarding actionability. Lord Macmillan’s remarked that ‘whatever may have been the 
law of England in early times I am of the opinion that as the law now stands an allegation of 
negligence is in general essential to the relevancy of an action of reparation for personal 
injuries’.508 Where once an activity was not required to injure the person to be actionable, 
today – to some - personal injury is simply not actionable. The justification for that shift in 
attitude it would seem is because of the difficulties the courts have separating nuisance 
doctrine from the dominant language of negligence that became overbearing in the twentieth-
century.
509
 
However, the apparition of injury to the person still glimmers in private nuisance, arguably 
because it is so central to its quintessence. As recently as 1980 Megaw LJ made passing 
reference to the abundance of previous case law which implied personal injury is actionable. 
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He stated: ‘There is, I think, ample authority that, if I have a right of abatement, I have also a 
remedy in damages if the nuisance remains unabated and causes me damage or personal 
injury’.510 In reality the perceived status quo of actionability in private nuisance holistically 
has substantially altered and ‘personal injury’ is a ‘symbol’ of that change. Maria Lee avers 
that the ‘notion of reasonableness’ where the courts were concerned with the reasonableness 
of the defendant’s user and the unreasonableness of interference with the claimant 
(‘reasonable user’), or in other words the traditional balancing exercise between competing 
interests in land embodied by Baron Bramwell’s rule of give and take511 (which had steadily 
developed since at least the time of Bracton), has become ‘redundant and misleading in many 
cases in private nuisance’. The side-lining of the balancing of interests (discussed in detail in 
the following chapter in regards to liability) has effectively been substituted by what type of 
harm invokes actionability.
512
 It can be stated that this represents a fundamental doctrinal 
shift.  
In the spirit of John Murphy’s description of modern nuisance, if an injury can be perceived 
as resulting from an on-going or recurrent activity (or state of affairs) and deemed a 
substantial and unreasonable interference with a claimant’s land or with his use and 
enjoyment of that land then the ‘type of harm’ should be irrelevant.513 We have seen that 
traditionally a doctrinal trait of private nuisance has been to protect interests necessary to 
habitation; the type of harm did not feature unless it was a thing of pleasure in which case 
there would not be an actionable nuisance – guarding bodily security cannot be termed as a 
thing of pleasure, rather it is a thing central to the whole concept of habitation. To present it 
as something merely desirable is irrational; in consideration of Murphy’s description personal 
injury can only be excluded is if it is deemed a thing of pleasure. And, if the injury is caused 
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by negligent conduct, if it still corresponds to an actionable nuisance, then the claimant 
should be entitled to remedy in either tort.  
It is pertinent to stress that the Lords in Tipping could not have anticipated the procured 
dominance of the tort of negligence in the following century to assert explicitly that ‘personal 
injury’ is actionable in that judgment. It was taken as read. Of course, Newark’s thesis was 
written at a juncture when negligence had matured following a period where a generalisation 
of the law was sought,
514
 thus was reasoned in hindsight, as it were, out of frustration for the 
complexities of private nuisance which appeared exacerbated in the face of the newer more 
‘principled’ tort of negligence.515 Nevertheless the evidence does suggest that safeguarding 
bodily security in nuisance law was considered the norm; one could say, like any legal 
ultimate, it went unnoticed without appropriate analysis.  
When negligence became fashionable, as the following chapter discusses in depth, the 
language associated with it cross-infected nuisance doctrines. In the instance of ‘personal 
injury’ as a term it took on the meaning applicable in the tort of negligence. It was in that 
manner that ‘the person’ has suffered a slow separation from nuisance, but using cases that 
did not concern private nuisance. That was until Hunter which, according to Lord Bingham in 
Transco (together with Cambridge Water),
516
 ‘strongly fortified’ the decisions taken in those 
extraneous cases to exclude the erstwhile protected interests.
 
 Assertions concerning private 
nuisance being a land-based tort are without doubt accurate but that does not equate to the 
person being excluded. Lord Bingham’s interpretation of Hunter and Cambridge identifying 
the tort as ‘directed, and directed only, to the protection of interests in land’ fails to reflect 
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that personal physical integrity is a fundamental protected interest in land. In that respect 
nuisance has always been concerned with – or based upon – matters regarding health.  
6. The Need for a Supreme Court Re-evaluation of Bodily Security 
In his obiter remarks in Hunter, Lord Goff addressed a ‘developing school of thought 
that…personal injury claims should altogether be excluded from the domain of nuisance’.517 
He bore Professor Newark, nearly fifty years previously,
518
 as the ‘forthright proponent’ of 
that ‘developing’ approach to actionability. Newark’s outspoken comments sought to 
establish the doctrinal boundaries between nuisance and negligence - in terms of the former’s 
concern with interests in land - including bracketing liability for personal injury exclusively 
into the tort of negligence.
519
 He contended that it is irrational for any type of personal injury 
to be placed in private nuisance
520
 and that the problems in the tort are a consequence of the 
law being set on the ‘wrong track’ in the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries by including 
claims for personal injury. It is contended here that that claim is somewhat implausible: his 
inference that personal injury belonged to negligence at that time is historically inaccurate; 
negligence was still, to a large extent, merely a mode of committing numerous tortious 
activities not a separate tort.
521
 Again a topic fully explored in the next chapter, the general 
consensus is that negligence did not emerge as an independent tort until the early eighteenth-
century. Thus to suggest personal injury belonged to the ‘tort of negligence’ at a time it did 
not exist is a critical error. It is also noteworthy that between 1535 and 1794 there were only 
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two cases of the type Newark objected to thus the problem – as he envisioned it - was hardly 
ubiquitous:
522
 one could say those examples were the exception rather than the rule.   
Lord Goff’s comments (in Hunter) - including his reference to Newark - have, on the face of 
things, forced the exclusion of personal injury from private nuisance through a succession of 
dicta in a number of cases, that are in the main extraneous to the central tort.
523
 The key cases 
(other than Hunter itself) that have in essence excluded personal injury have been Read v 
Lyons, Cambridge Water, Transco and Corby. In Read, Cambridge, and Transco liability 
under the rule of Rylands v Fletcher was under consideration by the House of Lords. Albeit 
outside the scope of this chapter, the influence – indeed the relevance – of these cases to 
private nuisance is ‘highly contentious’ as the notion that Rylands v Fletcher is ‘a special 
form of nuisance’524 is uncertain.525 Without a doubt the incorporation of the rule under those 
auspices divides both the judiciary and academics.
526
 Arguably it would be ideal if Rylands 
could be separated from private nuisance as there are too many demonstrable differences 
between them. Certainly, the ups and downs in case law regarding personal injury not being 
actionable under the rule itself offer no definitive authority that private nuisance should 
follow suit. 
Moving onto the other key cases, Corby is a case of public nuisance decided in the Court of 
Appeal and Hunter, whilst decided in the House of Lords, did not directly concern the issue 
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of personal injury. Owing to the absence of an authoritative case that specifically deals with 
the issue, in essence, a series of Ryland v Fletcher type cases, a public nuisance case and 
Newark’s article have been determining the place of personal injury in private nuisance in 
recent times. Subsequently one could say the jury is still out, as it were, concerning the 
actionability of physical damage to the person. It is certainly noteworthy that ‘high-level 
authority’ on the status of personal injury in the law of nuisance has not been directly through 
case law on private nuisance. 
It generally goes without comment that the important questions regarding personal injury in 
private nuisance are debated outside its own domain. In Transco, Lord Bingham 
acknowledged that actionability of ‘personal injury’ in private nuisance has yet to be 
authoritatively decided at the highest level.
527
 Nearly a decade later such a case has yet to 
materialise. In spite of that fact and in light of the decision in Corby, the judiciary are 
seemingly suggesting the grounding of personal injury should be exclusively in negligence 
(whilst it remains actionable in public nuisance).
528
 Critically, Murphy maintains that the 
reasoning behind actionability is such that ‘as long as the harm complained of can plausibly 
be made referable to the diminution in the amenity value of the land, there can be no 
objection to a nuisance action being mounted’ in private nuisance.529  
The historical lineage of health being central to actions on the case for nuisance is well-
established hence it is difficult to sympathise with a notion that would see ‘personal injury’ 
excluded from the tort entirely. Despite judicial murmurings and academic commentary that 
doubts its status as a protected interest the issue remains undecided, prolonging divisions in 
judicial and academic opinion. Lord Bingham in Transco accepted that the matter had been 
                                                 
527
 ibid.  
528
 As per the decision in Corby (1). 
529
 Murphy (8) 63. 
146 
 
left open in Perry v Kendricks Transport Ltd
530
 but that was inconsistent with the earlier 
decisions of Shiffman v Order of the Hospital of St John of Jerusalem;
531
 Hale v Jennings 
Bros;
532
 and Miles v Forest Rock Granite Co (Leicestershire) Ltd.
533
 In each of those cases 
damages for personal injury were considered to be actionable. However in response to Lord 
Macmillan's opinion in Read
534
 Lord Bingham expressed doubts whether personal injury 
claims lie within the boundaries of the tort.  
Lord Hoffmann stretched the law a little further in the same case, albeit primarily to ensure 
that it did not extend to Rylands liability: 
I think that the point is now settled by two recent decisions of the House of Lords: Cambridge Water, which 
decided that Rylands v Fletcher is a special form of nuisance and Hunter, which decided that nuisance is a tort 
against land. It must, I think, follow that damages for personal injuries are not recoverable under the rule.
535
 
It is unsatisfactory to use Lord Macmillan’s dicta in Read as binding authority in private 
nuisance terms for two important reasons: first, by his own admission, the action was ‘one of 
damages for personal injuries’ in the sense they were caused by negligence thus distinguished 
from an interference ‘made referable to the diminution in the amenity value of the land’ and, 
second he expressly denied that the rule under Rylands v Fletcher applied. On both accounts, 
if one is to acquiesce with Rylands liability being a ‘sub-species’ of private nuisance, Read is 
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distinguishable.
536
 Further Lord Hoffmann’s comments where he utilises Hunter to state it is 
a tort ‘against land’ ignores the detail that injury to the person can be diminutive to the 
amenity or pecuniary value of land. Such subtle judicial sleights of hand are the tip of a much 
deeper problem concerning the issue of safeguarding bodily security in private nuisance as an 
essential protected interest.  
Lord Macmillan’s remarks (mentioned in the previous section537) about personal injury being 
actionable in the past infer that situation has changed owing to the vicissitudes of modern 
negligence. Those remarks fundamentally conflict with the reasoning of Slesser and Scott LJJ 
in Hale where they concluded, based on contemporary academic opinion, that: 
The occupier of land who brings and keeps upon it anything likely to do damage if it escapes is bound at his 
peril to prevent its escape, and is liable for all the direct consequences of its escape, even if he has been guilty of 
no negligence.
538
 
In that sense Lord Macmillan’ comments clearly advance nuisance towards capitulating to the 
newly acquired dominance of the modern tort of negligence to the detriment of older, long-
established doctrines under nuisance law. In that sense it can be argued that negligence is 
now steering nuisance rather than running in a separate channel. In essence he set the tone for 
things to come: cases that are distinguished from private nuisance have undoubtedly 
influenced its structure and doctrines. The evolutionary path of the rule under Rylands v 
Fletcher has visibly played a pivotal role in the long drawn-out divorce of personal injury 
from private nuisance. In reality, such are the interplays in the courts, it would be more 
accurate to assert that the rule under Rylands v Fletcher does not support claims for personal 
injury rather than private nuisance itself, which is to a degree disconcerting when we consider 
the connotations for the central tort. 
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The series of cases mentioned by Lord Bingham (Miles, Hale, and Shiffman) were indicative 
that personal injury (whether assessed under negligence principles or not) should be 
actionable under the rule of Rylands. The other case cited by his lordship (Perry) alludes to 
an important reason as to why that should be the situation: in certain circumstances (where 
exceptions to the rule do not exist
539
), and in the absence of negligence, someone could suffer 
personal injury for no fault of their own and be without remedy.
540
  It is true that in Read 
Lord Macmillan, Lord Porter and Lord Simonds all doubted whether the rule under Rylands 
extended to cover personal injuries, but the final decision on the matter, as Parker LJ pointed 
out, was expressly left open, he stated: ‘as the matter stands at present, I think we are bound 
to hold that the defendants are liable in this case, quite apart from negligence’.541 This 
comment requires examination in the context of Newark’s remark that nuisance is used to 
bolster up doubtful cases of negligence.
542
 Parker LJ infers that injuries to the person in 
nuisance have their own identity thus have been incongruent from personal injury in 
negligence; there is a strong case for arguing against the marriage of terms. Disputably it is a 
consequence of negligence’s final push to become a fully developed tort in the twentieth-
century
543
 that conditions for the uncomfortable union were created but, regardless, damage 
to the person can evidently be inflicted by wrongs without the element of negligence. 
In Ribee v Norrie a question that faced the Court of Appeal was whether negligent 
interference with land may give rise to a claim in both negligence and nuisance (as well as for 
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an escape from land under the rule in Rylands);
544
 however, the judges ‘refused to enter into a 
discussion’ regarding whether the claimant could recover for personal injury. Maria Lee 
recognises the confusion in the Court of Appeal that year was plain to see: in Railtrack v 
Wandsworth London Borough Council the court rejected the Leakey
545
 approach was 
restricted to physical damage to property:
546
 they stated, ‘where there is physical damage to 
land…or injury to a claimant…it may be easier…to prove that the threat amounted to a 
nuisance’.547 Railtrack was decided under public nuisance. Following the decision in Corby 
affirming that ‘personal injury’ is actionable in public nuisance but at the same time 
maintaining that it was not a ‘type of injury’ actionable in private nuisance an important 
historical issue is introduced concerning the nexus between the two modern torts during the 
vicissitudes of action on the case for nuisance. That issue has a modern undertone that raises 
a theoretical and definitional problem, particularly where pollution affects a number of 
households. 
The facts in Corby v Corby and Barr v Biffa
548
 were such that there was interference to 
multiple individuals that occupied property as a home without a proprietary interest.  Owing 
to the austere stance concerning standing in private nuisance discussed in Chapter 2 they 
were, in essence, forced to seek remedy in public nuisance. Therefore it is a legitimate point 
to assert that the nuisance was nothing more than a ‘private nuisance’ dressed up to fit the 
‘public nuisance’ mould in order for claimants to sidestep the standing restrictions. In the vast 
majority of these cases there is justification to suggest that there could never truly be a 
situation where injury to the person in the home cannot theoretically be defined as a private 
nuisance, especially if Murphy’s modern description is adopted. In reality where the facts 
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replicate (or are similar to) those in Corby and Biffa bringing an action in public nuisance is 
necessary to sidestep the issue of standing in private nuisance. This poses the question 
whether it is an acceptable situation where personal injury is actionable in public nuisance but 
not in private nuisance. The issues discussed in this chapter suggest that this is an 
unacceptable use of history. The exclusion in private nuisance certainly lacks coherence. As 
is topical in this thesis, when we look to the past for a measure of coherence it would seem 
that the modern law has diverted away from its evolutionary path as seen in simple form of 
nuisance. The development of nuisance as a single entity during Case provides evidence that 
human health was an all-encompassing interest across the sphere of law and questions why 
today personal injury should be restricted to public nuisance alone. 
The notion that ‘bodily security’ should not be protected as an independent interest in private 
nuisance lacks foundation and is illogical enough to suggest any future decision in the 
Supreme Court to that effect could only be policy driven, perhaps in the same manner as it 
was in Hunter. The potential capability of pollutants harming health, but at the same time not 
causing physical damage to property, is arguably too feasible to ignore: certainly in the 
context of excluding what is a fundamental aspect of holding land. After all, humans are in 
the fortunate position to be able to speak out when insalubrious conditions exist that affect 
them as a physical entity whereas natural objects cannot; a degree of stewardship is required 
for natural objects in that respect.
549
 In addition, damage to land may well be too subtle to 
notice prior to any human health concerns emerging, and, indeed, can take longer to manifest. 
Damage to land (or consequent diminution of amenity value) can continue for years 
unnoticed, by which time it is often too late for restorative justice.
550
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7. The private/public nuisance paradigm 
Under close scrutiny Newark’s influence on modern judges is somewhat surprising. His use 
of predominantly embryonic negligence cases that, by his own admission,
551
 were contested 
on negligence grounds was certainly distinguishable from modern private nuisance. Personal 
injury caused by plaintiffs falling down ‘cellar flaps’ and tripping over obstructions on 
highways should indeed only be labelled as negligence actions. These cases in reality did 
little to support his notion to exclude personal injury from private nuisance. But, it is 
especially noteworthy that, despite in the main approaching ‘nuisance law’ as a single sphere 
of law, it is extraordinary that he fails to recognise the blurring of the ‘functional line’552 
between private, common and public nuisance during a significant period that he covers. This 
oversight exacerbates the unwarranted influence of his article.  
The evolution of Case reveals the often overlooked contemporaneous status quo concerning 
the visible blurring of the ‘functional line’ between private, common and public nuisance. 
Few commentators – as far as I know only James Oldham and John Spencer - engage with 
the importance of the interplays between the nuisance law family during that crucial period of 
its evolutionary path when ‘the judges as well as the writers had occasion to talk about 
common nuisance in the same breath as private nuisance’ and it was a defence ‘for someone 
sued for private nuisance to show that it was really a public one’.553 Professor Spencer 
explained the blurring of the ‘jurisdictional line’ thus:  
If what the defendant had done affected the plaintiff only, this was a matter for the courts of common law, but if 
it affected the whole community it was exclusively a matter for the local criminal courts, and the common law 
courts relented to the extent of allowing a person who had suffered special damage from a common nuisance to 
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bring an action on the case; and so ensured that judges in civil cases continued to talk about common 
nuisance.
554
 
Newark outwardly fails to penetrate the much deeper issue regarding nuisance law during 
that period: whilst there were internal divisions between what are today called public and 
private nuisance they were (unless by indictment
555
) part of the same form of action (then 
action on the case) and then later action on the case for nuisance.
556
 Newark only 
distinguishes between private and public nuisance by tendering private nuisance as a tort to 
land and public nuisance as a crime, completely omitting that public/common nexus with 
private in the king’s (civil) courts.557 Although private and public nuisance eventually 
emerged from Case as separate entities (common nuisance waned
558
), Newark was short-
sighted in the sense that he failed to identify that much of the law of nuisance was 
amalgamated as a single concept during the period he examined. The significance of his 
omission is exacerbated because established commentators treat it as a single entity (as do the 
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law reports throughout that period) - Ibbetson went a little further and questioned whether the 
nuisance actions can be separated at that time.
559
  
Ibbetson’s doubt regarding a separation of the torts, Oldham’s and Spencer’s discourse 
regarding the blurring of the functional line and the manner in which ‘nuisance’ is treated in 
the law reports is indicative that there was a merging of the entire law of nuisance during that 
vital formative period. As such we should be mindful of the modern definition of ‘public 
nuisance’. According to Archbold’s Criminal Pleadings:  
Public nuisance is an offence at common law. A person is guilty of a public nuisance (also known as common 
nuisance), who (a) does an act not warranted by law, or (b) omits to discharge a legal duty, if the effect of the 
act or omission is to endanger the life, health, property or comfort of the public, or to obstruct the public in the 
exercise or enjoyment of rights common to all Her Majesty's subjects.
560
 
Owing to the interplays between what are now private and public nuisance during Case, and 
in light of the foregoing analysis, it is contended it is difficult to justify separating matters 
pertaining to health of human beings from one tort but not the other.  The manner in which 
‘public nuisance’ becomes a tort, thus distinguishable from a crime, is significant to defining 
nuisance as a tort holistically.
561
 
The commonality of nuisance was seemingly identified by Holt CJ in Iveson v Moore (1699) 
where actionability within the nuisance family turned on ‘particular rights’.562 The particular 
right in a private suit would be specific to occupation or possession of land whereas in a 
                                                 
559
 Ibbetson (15) 106. 
560
 Archbold Criminal Pleading Evidence & Practice 2013 Ed. Chapter 31 - Offences Against Public Morals 
and Policy, para 31-40. JR Spencer cites the 42nd ed., (1985), para. 27-44 which is similar: ‘Every person is 
guilty of an offence at common law, known as public nuisance, who does an act not warranted by law, or omits 
to discharge a legal duty, if the effect of the act or omission is to endanger the life, health, property, morals, or 
comfort of the public, or to obstruct the public in the exercise or enjoyment of rights common to all Her 
Majesty's subjects’. What is common to both definitions of public nuisance is, inter alia, the fact that it is an 
offence to ‘endanger the life, health, property or comfort of the public’ (Spencer (177) 55-84). 
561
 See above (182) and (184).  
562
 Holt CJ stated that ‘actions upon the case for nuisances are founded upon particular rights; but where there 
is not any particular right, the plaintiff shall have no action’. Emphasis added (1 Ld Raym 486, 492-3). 
154 
 
public suit an action on the case for nuisance would depend on the ‘damage’ being special, 
that is an injury peculiar to the plaintiff from any other King’s subject563 – ‘everyone who 
brings an action shall have it proportional to his right’.564 The modern concept of public 
versus private nuisance was entwined and palpably many of the doctrines were shared: 
safeguarding ‘bodily security’ was ubiquitous. Baker observed that ‘many forms of private 
nuisance became public when committed in a city or town; for example, piling rubbish in 
public places so as to increase the risk of plague, setting up butcher’s stalls in the street and 
leaving entrails in the gutters, or generating industrial fumes.’565 Interference with health (and 
pollution) is clearly visible as an actionable head in actions on the case for nuisance 
throughout the English Reports. 
Despite the divisions – some of which are not resolved today - public, common and private 
nuisance were one sphere of law remedial under actions on the case for nuisance where 
personal injury was integral to the concept of nuisance. The reality of the situation, as 
recognised by Denning LJ in Southport Corporation v Esso,
566
 was that whilst some 
activities, that would today be labelled as either a public or private nuisance, circa 1535 (the 
time to which Newark referred) both would have been actions on the case (later for nuisance) 
– that nexus preceded 1535, remained for centuries, and even today is sometimes difficult to 
reject.
567
 Newark remarked: 
And then Fitzherbert J went on to give an illustration which sent subsequent generations wrong in their law: ‘As 
if a man make a trench across the highway, and I come riding that way by night, and I and my horse together fall 
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in the trench so that I have great damage and inconvenience in that, I shall have an action against him who made 
the trench across the road because I am more damaged than any other man.’ At this point we have moved into 
the realm of personal injuries and away from the original conception of nuisance…
568
 
Newark failed to grasp that ‘public’ nuisance has deep historical antecedents that evolved 
with ‘private’ nuisance (initially as nocumenta) within the realms of actions on the case from 
around the mid to late fourteenth-century.
569
 Instead, Newark saw the birth of public nuisance 
when the language of negligence was beginning to infiltrate the law of torts.
570
 He fell short 
of recognising the importance of the role that special damage played in the development of 
nuisance or there was little or (on occasion) no difference between a private nuisance and a 
private action for a public nuisance prior to the emergence of two separate nuisance actions 
from Case.
571
  
It was made clear in the previous chapter that the original concept of nuisance grew out of 
medieval land law where the assize of novel disseisin was a judicial tool to protect tenants 
from their lords. Personal injury was extant in that judicial process but health and well-being 
centred on the seigniorial relationship between lord and tenant. In addition, whichever way 
Newark labels (or terms) injury to the person, protecting health remained central to the theory 
of nuisance after it had shook free from the grip of medieval land law. Newark proceeded to 
argue that personal injury, or ‘bodily security’, falls solely within the province of negligence. 
Yet to argue that the legal historian, if not the jurist, must understand it as falling to a greater 
or lesser extent exclusively within negligence is highly misconceived and problematic, for 
reasons which are explained, but not least the significantly late advent of negligence as a tort.  
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Newark was correct that the essence of nuisance lies in the fact that it is a tort to land: ‘or to 
be more accurate it was a tort directed against the plaintiff’s enjoyment of rights over 
land…incommode him in [that] enjoyment…you commit a nuisance’.572 Prior to incipient 
nuisance becoming a tort in its own right it was embodied in land law thus to say it was 
anything other than a tort to land would be inaccurate. However to take bodily security out of 
the concept of land-holding – arguably the founding principle for building habitation - is 
entirely illogical. Newark makes an excellent case that negligence is alien to nuisance but has 
no basis for removing bodily security, the epitome of comfort and convenience, from the 
ambit of what can be considered one’s quiet enjoyment of land. 
Newark’s attempt to reduce protecting ‘bodily security’ on one’s land to the realms of 
negligence pre-empts a pressing modern dilemma within private nuisance regarding 
actionability (and subsequently liability
573
) which can be attributed to the steady trickle of 
negligence principles into an action where they have no place.
574
 The relationship between 
nuisance and negligence has blurred a ‘doctrinal dimension’575 of nuisance by instigating 
questions concerning the type of harm (ie whether it is physical or non-physical damage) 
which in turn has created the lingering confusions concerning the conduct of defendants 
where before it played no part. Not only has physical damage to the person been placed under 
scrutiny as a type of harm that should be excluded but so too has physical damage to 
property.
576
 Maria Lee identified that this has indirectly made the reasonable user test 
redundant and misleading in many cases of private nuisance. Thus the cornerstone of 
ascertaining whether an alleged intrusion transcends the threshold of interference necessary 
to give rise to an action has been diluted. In light of Lee’s contention, the foregoing analysis 
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and the discussion in Chapter 4, we should query whether the solution to many of modern 
nuisance’s problems would be to remove principles ‘subversive’ to nuisance’s doctrines than 
any head that is essential for a fully functioning environmental tort. 
The ensuing chapter describes in detail that the balancing of interests between claimant and 
defendant has been a constant of true nuisance law actions throughout its evolution. 
Following a ‘rule of reasonableness’ that was ubiquitous by the eighteenth-century Baron 
Bramwell laid down the reciprocity test in Bamford; later, Lord Wright stated: ‘A balance has 
to be maintained between the right of the occupier to do what he likes with his own, and the 
right of his neighbour not to be interfered with’.577  Those remarks are reminiscent of Bracton 
in the thirteenth-century. If we are to preserve nuisance’s presiding doctrinal characteristic of 
balancing interests between neighbours we must question negligence’s role in the tort. It is 
suggested that it is more logical to remove principles such as foreseeability of harm and fault-
based conduct (central to negligence) than protected interests that were fundamental to 
nuisance law during its evolution in Case, from which private nuisance emerged.
578
  
The lack of due care or any recklessness on the part of a defendant is irrelevant in continuing 
a nuisance therefore perfectly careful and/or deliberate conduct can be actionable.
579
 
Accordingly when injuries occur on property from, for instance, noxious fumes, chemical 
spills or any pollutant from commercial or domestic activity then any resultant injury to 
person or health is capable of amounting to an actionable nuisance.
580
 As Mr Justice Rinfret 
held: ‘pollution is always unlawful and, in itself constitutes a nuisance’.581 When an 
injunction is sought to prevent such nuisances, negligence principles such as ‘foreseeability 
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of harm’ are irrelevant, thus ‘bodily security’ has no bearing on ‘personal injury’ 
synonymous with negligence in comparable circumstances. Newark advocates that damages 
in ‘the realm of personal injury’582 should be confined to negligence but it is incumbent on 
the tort scholar to question how interferences with ‘bodily security’ of the kind described by 
Rinfret can be confined to negligence when negligent or reckless conduct is not germane to 
the facts.
583
  
The manner in which both Newark’s and Lord Goff’s comments have been utilised – 
particularly in Corby – is conflicting. For instance, if Ward, Dyson and Smith LJJ interpreted 
Lord Goff as maintaining personal injury should be removed as a protected interest why did 
they retain its status as an actionable head in public nuisance? If Lord Goff’s comments are 
read holistically they omitted his inference that physical damage (to person and land) should 
be removed from the ‘domain’ of nuisance entirely.  
Conclusions 
We must continuously remind ourselves when considering personal injury in private nuisance 
that there is no binding authority that directly addresses the matter of ‘bodily security’ at the 
echelon of, what is now, the Supreme Court. How can it be the case that personal injury is 
firmly established in public nuisance but excluded from private nuisance?
584
 The fact that 
personal injury has been held to be actionable in both the Court of Appeal and House of 
Lords is a strong indication that that will remain the status quo, especially when we consider 
the definitional harmony regarding safeguarding human health between the tort and crime.
585
 
Without removing personal injury from public nuisance claimants will continue to a platform 
from which to circumvent standing issues in private nuisance. The blurring of the boundaries 
                                                 
582
 Newark (5) 483. 
583
 Newark ibid 488-90. 
584
 See Mint v Good [1951] 1 KB 517.  
585
 See Corby (1); and Jacobs v LCC [1950] AC 361, 374-377 (HL); see also Lord Wright’s dicta in Sedleigh-
Denfield (194). 
159 
 
between nuisance and negligence that Newark attempted to rectify is not merely set to remain 
blurred but looks to be exacerbated whilst the courts insist on maintaining a separation 
between nuisance and negligence without first removing the language of negligence from 
nuisance: there is a large definitional divide between negligence type ‘personal injury’ and 
injury to the person in nuisance terms. It is hard to justify perceiving ‘personal injury’ as 
remedial damage in the tort of negligence alone. It can be posited that justification on that 
premise is little more than a presentational exercise to restrict litigation into the modern 
fashionable and principled tort of negligence and, perhaps, to avoid the recent modern 
intricacies that have, arguably, been imposed upon nuisance law (by the type of historical 
misuses discussed throughout this thesis). 
Similar to any other interference with the comfort and enjoyment of land, personal injuries 
and damage to health incur a loss of amenity and pecuniary value to a property, indeed it 
could be logically argued that the serious nature of some injuries to the person should result 
in damages being increased.
586
 Whilst some nuisances are capable of inflicting physical 
damage to buildings, trees and plants they can damage the health of inhabitants; patently the 
‘use and enjoyment’ of one’s land is affected when physical injury occurs owing to ‘unlawful 
interference’. Therefore it is contended that the obiter comments in Hunter supported and 
seemingly affirmed in Corby which suggest that damage to one’s health should not be 
actionable in private nuisance are, in fact, stark contradiction to a conceivable interpretation 
of the modern description of the tort, which is bolstered by robust academic opinion and 
rigorous historical interpretation.  
There can be a fine balance between damage to human health and environmental damage as 
the case of Cambridge Water demonstrated. The nuisance in question was a threat to human 
health from polluted water (owing to chemicals used in the leather tanning process) 
                                                 
586
 See L Crabb, ‘The Property Torts’ (2003) 11 Tort L Rev 104-18; also Steele (75) 643. 
160 
 
percolating into underground aquifers over a number of years. On the grounds that it would 
be a greater liability than that imposed for negligence, Lord Goff refused to impart liability 
on the defendant tanner after latent unforeseen damage had become patent and thus became a 
continuing nuisance. The traditional common law private rights afforded by proprietorship, 
considered to be sacrosanct,
587
 should conceivably give redress in such instances; the 
alternative would be, in the absence of foreseeable harm, a situation where injured parties are 
without redress. 
For obvious reasons, in environmental protection terms, denying redress (particularly 
injunctive relief) simply because the interference was unforeseeable in the past is extremely 
problematic. Wilkinson commented that Lord Goff’s reasoning is indeed questionable when 
polluters are, for all intents and purposes, given free rein to continue polluting in such 
circumstances.
588
 In human terms however, theoretically, damage to health could be either 
the first indicator that the drinking water was contaminated or alternatively evidence of an 
actionable nuisance.
589
 It is unjustifiable to grant polluters’ immunity from liability in a 
continuing nuisance on the premise that the damage was not foreseeable many years before 
the damage was identified as a nuisance; both humans and the environment can suffer as a 
consequence.
590
 
The underlying purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that ‘personal injury’ is a protected 
proprietary interest in private nuisance owing to the long-established nexus between human 
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beings and the land they occupy as a home. This has become important because the 
introduction of negligence to the tort proper (following Cambridge) means that judges prefer 
to look at whether the type of harm is actionable. But, what is important to understand, in the 
context of this chapter, is that protecting bodily security is an integral part of a tort that is 
inherently environmental. Without recognising the nexus between human beings and the land 
they occupy, particularly as a home, the traditional function of private nuisance affording 
environmental protection is decidedly weakened. The essence of nuisance dictates that the 
tort should change according to societal needs; taking the person out of the home, as it were, 
ignores that society requires a private law mechanism which can initiate private challenges to 
environmentally harmful activities of their neighbours and there are situations where public 
bodies must be kept in check by private responses to either unjust or unacceptable decisions. 
However, by focusing on ‘personal injury’ in the debate surrounding what is actionable in the 
tort, other unacceptable misuses of history have been highlighted.  
Perhaps the most important issue identified in this chapter for the tort as a whole in a modern 
setting (and its future development) is the negligence/nuisance paradigm, which has 
demonstrably blurred the boundaries between the two torts and thus created doctrinal 
complications. The simple form of private nuisance that afforded nuisance law the tools to 
effect environmental protection across the epochs, in line with the true essence of the tort, 
should continue to protect any potential litigants from environmental harm. Nonetheless, the 
doctrinal issues concerning the measure of actionability have palpably been affected by the 
introduction of negligence principles, thus complicating the simple form. Essentially, the 
aberration of the ‘reasonable user’ test has confused the issue of actionability.  
Today, following Cambridge, judges must decide whether the type of damage is actionable 
and use the reasonable user test to ascertain whether liability can be apportioned, based on the 
hypothetical reasonable man. That is a clear deviation from the traditional role of the 
162 
 
reasonable user test; it can be argued that the cross-infection of negligence language has 
altered that time-honoured nuisance principle. Historically, the role of the judges was simple. 
Based on the circumstances of the case they needed to decide whether there was an 
actionable nuisance; if that was the situation then liability was automatically incurred. Of 
course, in both circumstances the role of the judge is ultimately to ascertain whether plaintiffs 
are liable for their actions, but the addition of negligence principles has changed the manner 
in which liability is examined.  
Before Cambridge, liability was traditionally strict - if harm was deemed actionable – and 
questions as to whether the actions of the plaintiff were negligent or that the type of damage 
was foreseeable were not an issue. The fact that such issues are now often crucial to 
apportioning liability means that the reasonable user test (as a means of determining an 
actionable nuisance) has become less effective in its role of effecting environmental 
protection. Palpably the nexus between actionability and liability has changed since 
Cambridge; it is to the issue of liability that we now turn (in Chapter 4), where the 
nuisance/negligence paradigm is examined in detail.   
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Chapter 4  
The Nature of Liability – The Nuisance/Negligence Paradigm 
 
1. Introduction 
The decision by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather
591
 
declared that negligent conduct is, in the specific respect of the foreseeability of the 
consequences of neighbourly conduct, a relevant consideration in the context of nuisance.
592
 
The target of this analysis is to assess Lord Goff’s remarks in Cambridge in order to 
demonstrate the problems associated with introducing negligence doctrines into nuisance law. 
It is considered in this chapter that the introduction of the language of negligence into private 
nuisance has altered conceptual elements of the law of nuisance where liability has been 
traditionally strict.
593
 This has proven problematic on various levels for both torts. The 
relationship between nuisance and negligence has notably received more academic 
commentary than the other issues dealt with in other chapters, however, the relationship 
between ‘actionability’ and ‘liability’ and the influence of these issues on the notion of 
reasonableness is a problem that has received less attention. It is contended that where before 
the test for ‘reasonable user’ was a matter of ‘actionability’ the modern focus has shifted 
away from balancing the interests of litigants and, in essence, altered into a matter of liability. 
It is argued that this is the direct result of the recent interpretation of ‘reasonableness’ (by the 
courts) in negligence rather than nuisance terms. 
The standard of reasonableness has continually shifted according to societal needs across the 
centuries but it is contended that the introduction of negligence into nuisance represents a 
cross-infection of negligence language that has changed the notion of nuisance-type 
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reasonableness. Thus, in particular, this chapter examines the distinction between 
‘reasonableness’ as it applies to the foreseeability of the consequences of conduct (i.e. the 
negligence aspect presented in Cambridge Water), and reasonableness as it applies to the 
consequences of that conduct (as it is traditionally understood within the paradigm of private 
nuisance law). It is argued that the decision in Cambridge has created doctrinal confusion by 
an unnecessary blurring of the boundaries between the torts (where a separation has been 
traditionally maintained by the courts) through the introduction of the alien concept of 
reasonable foreseeability, based on the notion of the hypothetical reasonable man.
594
  
In a tort where a ‘rule of reasonableness’ (the foundations for ‘reasonable user’) has been an 
essential element of liability since the eighteenth-century, this relatively recent change of 
assimilating negligence doctrine by the courts has clearly proven problematic for private 
nuisance, specifically since the ‘rule of reasonableness’ was initially utilised to take into 
account the effects of snowballing urbanisation and industrialisation.
595
 What became 
‘reasonable user’ was more a question of reciprocity between neighbours (concerning what 
they could and could not do to the quality of the neighbourhood) than of liability. This 
suggests that nuisance cases, more than other areas of law, were ‘susceptible to compromise’ 
and reference to the reasonableness of the defendant’s use of land in conjunction with the 
unreasonableness of the interference with the claimant is an inherent quality of such 
compromise.
596
 This trait was famously captured by Baron Bramwell in Bamford v Turnley
597
 
where ordinary use of land was deemed to be such that it should not subject those who use it 
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to an action.
598
 That forged the rule of ‘give and take, live and let live’ which encapsulates 
the essence of reasonableness in nuisance terms.
599
  
The discernible doctrinal problems caused by negligence language are completely out of 
proportion considering the small number of nuisance claims that are actually capable of 
invoking its principles. Typically, it is where liability in damages arises owing to natural 
causes (acts of God) or by the act of a third party (for which the defendant is not responsible) 
that the language of negligence is relevant. Negligence, however, is a separate tort and its 
language in nuisance equates to an incidence of liability ancillary to the cause of action. It is 
advocated that it is unsatisfactory to analyse nuisance using that language in any 
circumstances; if the need to analyse nuisance in negligence terms arises then negligence is 
the logical action. The decision in the earlier case of Sedleigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan
600
 
shows that this category of cases only fits into the law of nuisance by ‘grafting’ the concept 
of duty of care on to it. In the post-Donoghue v Stevenson
601
 era it is manifest that to establish 
common law negligence there must be a duty of care.
602
 
Nuisance has over the centuries developed its own customised land-based doctrine of 
‘reasonable user’ that functions as a control mechanism to ensure a threshold between 
neighbours is maintained to prevent acceptable interferences with a neighbourhood becoming 
actionable nuisances. As such the reasonable user test evolved from nuisance’s traditional 
role of protecting competing interests, rather than a prerequisite for liability.
603
 Such a 
balancing act between proprietary interests suggests that no protection against interference 
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can be absolute (for instance, no one could expect a right not to be interfered with by any 
noise
604
).  However the House of Lords decision in St Helen’s v Tipping605 deemed the 
concept of reasonable user immaterial where the relevant injury was physical damage to 
property, which was followed in Sedleigh-Denfield.
606
 ‘Property damage’ (the precise 
meaning of which is not in issue
607
) seemingly attracted a higher level of protection than 
amenity damage until, without overruling Tipping, a number of cases decided according to 
the ‘Sedleigh-Denfield line’ sought judicial concession where the defendant ‘continued’ 
rather than created the nuisance involved. It was at that point the language of negligence 
began its cross-infection into the doctrines of nuisance. 
It may be questioned whether it is suitable for doctrines from separate torts, where liability is 
approached from opposing spectrums, to be amalgamated. Personal security is absolute and 
liability imposed when negligence is established in that tort but there is a conduct-specific 
investigation to ascertain negligence in the first place. In nuisance, however, certain 
intrusions are to be tolerated as the ‘inevitable price of living in an organised society in 
proximity to one’s neighbour’; thus assessing liability is fundamentally opposed.608 On the 
other hand, a greater degree of liability is often to be expected in private nuisance, perhaps 
inescapable, owing to the very fact of landownership or occupation itself. Indeed the point at 
issue in Sedleigh-Denfield where the defendants were liable for adopting damage caused by a 
trespasser is indicative of a higher standard of liability for landowners in nuisance than would 
be expected in negligence.  
Lord Goff’s dicta in Cambridge have seemingly blurred the question of strict liability in 
nuisance law based on a set of limited circumstances (acts of God and the actions of third 
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parties). He asserted, ‘although liability for nuisance has generally been regarded as strict, at 
least in the case of a defendant who has been responsible for the creation of a nuisance, that 
liability has been kept under control by the principle of reasonable user.’609 His judgment 
clearly articulates that he did not consider it just or equitable for a neighbour to be liable for 
injury to another neighbour which was not reasonably foreseeable but,
610
 to borrow John 
Murphy’s words, this raises questions about ‘identifying the precise relationship between the 
central concept of reasonable user and the notion of unreasonable conduct for the purposes of 
fault-based liability’.611 In turn this raises questions concerning the autonomy of nuisance law 
in relation to negligence law and the efficacy of nuisance for the purposes of environmental 
protection. In the context of this thesis a resolution of this issue is crucial to nuisance law’s 
adaptation to modern social mores within a political arena that faces profound environmental 
challenges. 
Palpably a parallel between the hypothetical reasonable man and reasonable user cannot be 
readily drawn because in negligence ‘fault of some kind is almost always necessary, and fault 
generally involves foreseeability’612 whereas something ‘may be done deliberately, and in 
good faith and in a genuine belief that it is justified’613 but still be construed a nuisance. This 
suggests a stricter form of liability is intrinsic within the concept of nuisance; indeed 
‘nuisance is, typically, “stricter than” negligence’.614 The general impression one gets from 
reading the plethora of dicta
615
 on this matter is that the relationship between reasonableness 
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in nuisance and fault in private nuisance is conceptually different.
616
 Much of that conceptual 
disparity is a consequence of the evolution of the two torts.  
In section 2 the two very different evolutionary paths of nuisance and negligence are 
explored. It will be shown that whereas a form of nuisance was very much involved in 
medieval law, negligence was extant from that period, in fact, the concept of ‘fault’ per se did 
not play any part in early law and that (when liability later developed) foreseeability of harm 
pre-dated the notion of duty of care. The true conceptual differences between the modern 
torts of nuisance and negligence can only be fully appreciated in consideration of their 
disparate evolutionary paths, including their differing relationship with Trespass (and 
Trespass vi et armis) and the development of liability amidst the evolution of action on the 
case. However, seemingly there is a common theme that they both evolved, albeit separately, 
according to societal needs.  
In section 3 we return to the modern day and scrutinise the concept of reasonable user, its 
reciprocal nature and the extent to which it is distinct from ‘reasonable conduct’ is examined. 
It is argued that the decision in Tipping to treat physical damage differently (more strictly) 
from other kinds of nuisance (which remain grounded in reasonable user principles) lies 
behind the blurring of nuisance and negligence that is at the heart of the discussion. The 
confusion arises from the line of cases concerning physical damage arising from third party 
interventions (following Sedleigh-Denfield), which are best interpreted as a limited exception 
to the strict liability approach in Tipping when liability is thrust upon someone through acts 
of another or by nature. One could argue in light of Lord Goff’s decision in Cambridge a new 
general rule regarding the need for physical harm to be foreseeable has been constructed 
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without overruling Tipping. Accordingly judges are now looking to the type of harm instead 
of the traditional reasonable user test. This, it is argued, has changed the test from a manner 
of assessing actionability (which would be traditionally strict) into a matter of apportioning 
liability.
617
  
2. The Evolutionary Path of Liability 
a) The Evolution of Liability and the Emergence of Negligence 
Private nuisance today is only loosely described as a strict liability tort but, as this chapter 
will explain, nuisance related actions traditionally afforded a stricter standard of liability than 
its distant cousin negligence. The disparate characteristics of measuring liability between the 
two torts can arguably be attributed to the fact that they developed independently of one 
another (and centuries apart) and are accordingly far removed conceptually. One could say 
that they are conceptually independent. For negligence to emerge, first liability had to 
develop in order to lay the foundations for its principles that are second nature to the tort 
scholar today. Nuisance took a different path. Although modern nuisance and negligence 
were both forged in actions on the case their dependency on Case was for different reasons 
and they emerged later as separate entities; it is only the High Court activity in the twentieth-
century discussed below that has, to a certain degree, created the illusion that they are more 
closely related.  
What must be borne in mind is that until the decision in Cantrell v Churche
618
 early in the 
seventeenth-century after a slow supplanting period (that began proper in the sixteenth-
century, despite numerous attempts over the centuries
619
) actions on the case were 
consistently not permitted for nuisance on the grounds that the new remedy ‘should never be 
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available’ when the assize of nuisance was appropriate.620 David Ibbetson expressed, 
‘throughout the sixteenth-century the conservative Court of Common Pleas held to the theory 
that the action on the case and the assize of nuisance were mutually exclusive remedies’;621 
thus, during the formative developmental period of civil liability, nascent nuisance was 
developing independently of the principles that laid negligence’s foundations until Case 
supplanted the Assize in 1601 by which time ‘nuisance was quintessentially a tort’.622 The 
tort of negligence on the other hand was yet centuries in the making. 
It is outside the remit of this thesis to convey a detailed précis of the development of 
negligence to the fashionable, hegemonic tort it is today, however a rudimentary 
understanding is necessary to illustrate the evolutionary differences between nuisance and 
negligence that have a bearing on their conceptual disparities. Evidently negligence - as we 
apprehend it today - was a conception entirely unknown to medieval law and subsequently 
devoid from the origins of the law of torts. Pollock and Maitland unequivocally believed that 
investigators in search of a medieval law of negligence would be fruitless in their 
endeavours.
623
 Indeed by the time of Bracton there is no more than what can be described as a 
scant trace of the language of negligence;
 624
  certainly there was no manifestation of what 
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was to become our contemporary law of negligence which is contended to have only begun to 
exist as an independent action during the nineteenth-century.
625
  
The origins of private nuisance, on the other hand, we know can be traced as far back into 
legal antiquity as the late twelfth-century and some resemblance of the modern tort can 
clearly be seen in the civil pleas of the early thirteenth-century.
626
 Arguably nuisance can be 
viewed as a distinct sphere of law from 1359 when Bracton’s test ‘to determine the 
boundaries of nuisance and novel disseisin was abandoned’.627 Whilst it can be argued that 
nuisance was regarded as an independent action prior to action on the case, that break-
through nevertheless took place at a time when actions on the case were poised to supplant 
the assize process. This cannot be said for negligence; its evolution was almost entirely a 
factor of the vicissitudes of various actions on the case instead of, for a significant measure of 
time, as part of a different process of law where it had already existed as a separate action.
628
  
CHS Fifoot opened his chapter on ‘Negligence’ by stating: ‘It is generally agreed that little or 
nothing akin to the modern idea of negligence is to be found in the common law before the 
evolution of Case’.629 The ‘tort’ of negligence was seemingly a product of alternation 
between contrasting elements of Case, thus the gradual unravelling of the implications of 
different actions on the case, where there was an unruly tangle of differing aspects of 
evolving spheres of law. In that respect it is similar to nuisance as the concept of negligence 
was initially dependent on other actions to develop but the differing conditions associated 
with seigniorial relationships, nascent nuisance and the assize process extraneous to Case 
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betrays that comparison somewhat. Whereas the concept of nuisance merged into the law as a 
principle inherent to landholding conditions, needed to be ideal in order for the tort of 
negligence to manifest from the vicissitudes of case - particularly assumpsit (nascent 
contract) and bailment - and it took centuries for those conditions to exist simultaneously to 
provide a cogent separate sphere of tort. Prior to that juncture it truly was merely a mode in 
which most torts could be committed.  
In a Selden Society Lecture in 1973 MJ Pritchard identified the conditions that ostensibly 
produced the tort of negligence. First and foremost it appears that liability in negligence 
terms needed to develop independently of Trespass (vi et armis) in which the requirement for 
direct forcible injury left no room for remedy in negligence-type injuries.
630
 In Miller’s 
Case
631
 a distinction was made (by both court and counsel) for the first time between ‘a 
special writ of trespass’ (which later became known as Accion sur le Case or actions on the 
case) and ‘a general writ with force and arms’ (Trespass vi et armis). Miller was nonetheless 
summarily dismissed on the ground that a ‘common writ of Trespass’ was available but, two 
years later, in the Innkeeper’s Case632 the experiment was replicated successfully when a 
traveller’s possessions were stolen from his room. The writ against the innkeeper was a writ 
of Trespass ‘on all the matter according to case’ for failing to uphold the custom of keeping 
guests property safe.
633
 In Waldon v Marshall
634
 (where redress for the negligent killing of a 
horse by a horse doctor was sought) an early example of the functionality of actions on the 
case, as a ‘special writ’ of Trespass, distinct from a ‘general writ’ of Trespass can be seen.635 
It was clear again in Rikhill v Two Parsons of Bromaye
636
 and Browne v Hawkins
637
 that the 
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manner in which the injury was sustained demanded a different action to afford a remedy 
when liability could not be adapted to fit the vi et armis writ.
638
  
Pritchard also averred that by the nineteenth-century negligent performance for certain 
undertakings, callings or offices had existed for centuries
639
 but liability for that carelessness 
was confined to prior relationships (based on occupation). The requirement for a previous 
relationship between parties for an injury to be recognised suppressed the manifestation of a 
separate tort of negligence whilst confusing the ambit of Case; indeed the occupation-based 
side was closely related to assumpsit because an informal contractual relationship had been 
established.
640
 Negligence could not exist as an entity unless a form of liability also ensured 
that damages could be incurred independent of any prior relationships between parties. 
Furthermore the contractual character to the occupation-based side of Case demanded a 
specific action on the case in tort for negligence. This encouraged an alignment of negligent 
conduct - entirely in tort - without distinctions between occupation-based performance and 
injuries caused outside a prior relationship which was achieved by adopting a common 
standard of care (the reasonable man) and ‘a common technique of pleading’ – the duty of 
care.
641
 
According to Pritchard the emergence of ‘non-relationship negligence’642 liability began 
proper in the late seventeenth-century. After a small number of loosely cited cases, which 
represent strands of its evolution through Case, Pritchard convincingly suggests ‘non-
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relationship negligence’ was initiated by the seminal ‘running-down’ case of Mitchil v 
Alstree.
643
 With Mitchil a ‘thin trickle’ of running-down actions began which eventually 
became a ‘torrent’ in the early nineteenth-century helping to prompt negligence to emerge as 
an independent tort. The case therefore marked the beginnings of liability in negligence that 
was not only independent of Trespass vi et armis but also liability that was distinguishable 
from the old restrictive need for a prior relationship. Despite the later fusing of occupation-
based and non-relationship liability (which created the reasonable man through a common 
standard of care) first the notion that defendant’s had to guard against any consequences of 
their actions developed, or in other words, a liability developed for what defendants ought to 
have foreseen.
644
 Topical to this discourse regarding the consequences of Cambridge and the 
assimilation of foreseeability it is interesting that foresight of harm preceded a duty of care in 
the context of liability. Nevertheless by the early eighteenth-century all the conditions 
required for a tort of negligence existed simultaneously; it was then that the concept of the 
duty of care developed, subsequent to – and arguably as a consequence of - the issues of 
liability that had been thrashed out during the evolution of Case.  
2. b) Social Background to New Liabilities  
A central objective of this thesis has been to demonstrate that the ‘true essence’ of private 
nuisance lies in the fact it has changed across the epochs in response to societal needs. 
Seemingly the evolution of liability was also a result of social needs. The societal influence 
of medieval legal constructs has generally eluded the mainstream of legal history, ironically 
until relatively recently. SFC Milsom and RC Palmer have engaged with how the social order 
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has consistently been related to and driven the evolution of English common law more than 
other commentators, but they do not always agree. Equally as Milsom expressly made it part 
of his life’s work to challenge the conclusions of FW Maitland,645 Palmer has, on occasion, 
systematically approached Milsom’s hypotheses with the same distinct quality of critical 
examination;
646
 Milsom’s hypothesis on liability in Case has received a noteworthy measure 
of that criticism. Milsom’s contribution to expounding legal history has been instrumental to 
current thinking and his influence on other commentators is ubiquitous in modern literature 
which is, perhaps, why Palmer has outwardly chosen to make Milsom’s conclusions central 
to a number of his conclusions. His work ‘English Law in the Age of the Black Death (1348-
81)’ significantly lays open to doubt a number of Milsom’s theories concerning liability in 
Case as they fail to take into account the profound connotations the plague had on law and 
social mores.  
Indeed it is more plausible to accept Palmer’s account that professes case writs were issued 
by Chancery to provide remedies for specific areas of concern (that had been identified 
following the Black Death) than a manipulation of the law from within the courts. This 
disputes Milsom’s notion that common law judges and lawyers were ultimately left to their 
own devices to find useful or relevant parts of existing writs to remedy wrongs and mould the 
common law.  Accepting Milsom’s contentions that the ‘winnowing of pleas’ was left to the 
courts without reference to Palmer would be to accept theory without proper reference to the 
literature of the debate; this section focuses on Palmer’s observations which cannot be 
ignored owing to the implications of such a huge demographic catastrophe.
647
 To ignore any 
contention that avers to the necessity of enforcing legal changes to preserve society at such a 
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time disputably lacks forethought. In essence Palmer raises issues about the dating of Case
648
 
and, at the same time, refutes Milsom’s contentions that there was a fictitious use of forms 
(including trespass vi et armis and incitement
649
) which importantly, in relation to this 
discourse, masked the nascent evolution of civil liability.
650
 With Milsom’s refusal to accept 
that Case predated 1367 came the isolation of significant elements concerning the evolution 
of certain liabilities; all of which have connotations to modern liability in tort.  
Palmer’s historical analysis of Trespass on the Case describes a diverse collection of 
remedies that imposed civil liability. Some liabilities preceded the Black Death but the post 
plague social demographics forced social policy to establish new liabilities that were 
essentially harsh impositions - through the law - to coerce people to act responsibly and to 
perform general ethical and occupational obligations with competence.
651
 Royal mandate 
given to the chancellor to deal with problems in the common law exemplified by the Black 
Death ensured chancery increasingly issued writs for new situations; Palmer averred to the 
impressive diversity of situations where chancery, in a ministerial function, provided 
remedies in the face of crisis.
652
 The Black Death thus played a pivotal role in legal 
innovation that was purposive, in the sense of maintaining civilised society in the wake of 
‘demographic catastrophe’.653 What needs to be understood is the most efficient way to tackle 
the crisis was through central government; in that respect the Chancery was the most 
equipped governmental agency to retain traditional social order. The sheer diversity of 
remedies that chancery handled is evidence that it was involved with the problems of society 
holistically thus it was unlikely that, as Milsom contends, legal change was generated by 
juridical thought. Throughout this process of legal change civil liability was being structured. 
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It should not be a surprise, in the absence of negligence, that most liabilities during the 
development of case writs veered more in accord with a stricter form of liability.   
Occupation-based liability was often considerably ‘harsh’, for instance, innkeepers’ liability 
was strict
654
 whilst liability in scienter writs was also stringent as knowingly keeping vicious 
dogs ‘was sufficient for damage they might do’.655 The development of negligence was 
merely an adjunct of the development of actions on the case where varying levels of liability 
existed for different activities. The early emergence of case writs during the fourteenth and 
fifteenth-centuries can be described as the arena where varying categories of liability 
developed; it was from those forms of liability (often based on negligent acts) that the 
language of negligence developed. Whilst the early sixteenth-century has been described as 
the ‘Renaissance of the Common law’656 that later apparent willingness for juridical 
experimentation with Case - that eventually saw the emergence of a tort of negligence – was, 
as professed by Palmer, disputably prompted by a deliberate social policy that forced legal 
innovation after the Black Death.
657
  
The new liability, this time not based on any occupation, provided by the scienter writ in 
1358 is an example of this in practice. According to Palmer scienter liability was imposed 
after the Black Death to ‘coerce people to accept responsibility and thus preserve society’.658 
Initially the writ was provided by Chancery to increase the liability bestowed on those who 
kept vicious dogs, thus imparted further liability on dog owners for unintentional damage. 
The nature of scienter liability accordingly reflected the broader social concern after the 
Black Death that citizens should be compelled to ‘abide by their ethical obligations’ whilst 
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embodying the fact that inadvertent damage should not be permitted without redress; damage 
that could be foreseen was sufficient to determine liability.
659
 Scienter was thus an 
independent liability established in chancery - in accordance with government policy - that 
addressed a general social problem (initially vicious dogs); in that sense chancery were acting 
to ‘reinforce a social responsibility’.660  
Seemingly it is ‘somewhat defective’ to assert that Case was ‘a miscellaneous category of 
remedial wrongs’;661 any such miscellany was restricted to cases of ‘indirect and 
inconsequential injury’ where chancery made rational decisions to apportion liability into 
particular writs on a case to case basis.
662
 Ostensibly the different classifications of case writs 
were not logically related to one another but the need to create liability to tackle perceived 
problems to ensure social stability provided a corporate purpose that underpinned legal 
change. Where before remedy was otherwise unavailable liability was created to either coerce 
competent performance of an occupation, to get people to stand by their obligations or as a 
response to considerations of justice that were only plausibly remediable without allegations 
of force and arms.  
The distinct ‘lack of conceptual unity’ is further evidence that Case, at least initially, was a 
consequence of social policy rather than a matter of conceptual advance. This, of course, adds 
substance to the notion nuisance law’s protean nature (its essence) continued throughout the 
evolution of Case according to societal needs – its doctrines, therefore, were a product of 
such needs. In the process of reacting to social problems, chancery introduced new writs that 
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provided remedies for those specific areas of concern.
663
  Chancery was proactively plugging 
gaps in those problem areas. Occupation-based liability often could have easily fitted 
Trespass vi et armis, for example, farriers could injure a plaintiff’s property forcibly and 
directly when shoeing a horse. At the same time an informal contractual relationship would 
have been established to comfortably fit assumpsit when the plaintiff entrusted the farrier 
with his horse. The case of the farrier therefore provides another example of how new 
liabilities were created by chancery to deal with identifiable social concerns. 
Chancery and the courts actively strove towards getting the form of the writ right in order for 
it to embody a defensible foundation for liability.
664
 These strides to find the correct 
formulation of writs were certainly evident in the development of liability for farriers. At one 
point chancery ceased issuing writs for six years after experimenting with various 
formulations that were inappropriate. It was a matter of coercing farriers to assume liability 
for careless work where, before 1352, their occupation had been shielded from civil liability 
and furthermore competition would have seemingly ensured competent workmanship in a 
much larger population.
665
 Initially liability of this sort was considered indistinguishable from 
Trespass vi et armis; clearly an injury caused by a nail being driven into a horses hoof was 
done forcibly and the injury a direct consequence of substandard work. In the end the case 
writ was adopted instead of vi et armis or assumpsit thus legal thought gave way to legal 
change dictated by the social policy that instigated the need for farriers to be reliable 
following the mass depletion of the population from the plague.
666
  
Outside relationships concerning occupation, classes were formulated in Case because 
liability was neither based on a relationship nor fitted the mould of vi et armis formulations. 
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Palmer describes numerous miscellaneous case writs and offers a degree of caution regarding 
the ‘nineteenth-century notion’ that associated Case with damages from harm inflicted 
indirectly or consequentially. Although it is a good generalisation, that ‘test’ could not predict 
whether a particular situation would fall under the umbrella of Case or Trespass vi et armis.  
This is highlighted by the struggle to find a precise formulation of the 
immediate/consequential test over the centuries that lead to the decision in Scott v 
Shepherd
667
 in 1773, where it was held the Trespass was the appropriate action for immediate 
rather than consequential injuries.
668
 There were certainly identifiable classes of special writs 
on the case but at no point was there a ‘general distribution of actions’ amongst those classes 
that produced ‘categories of action with logical precision’.669  
However, all case writs had a common denominator in that they were implausible within the 
formulation of vi et armis writs, perhaps, prompting the strict separation of the actions and 
resistance to any overlapping of Trespass and Case for centuries to come.
670
 This deliberate 
separation of Trespass and Case is an illustration of social and legal evolution preventing 
cross-infection of doctrines between actions. Nuisance and negligence actions often have 
common denominators, but that is not a juridical justification to distort the doctrines of 
nuisance owing to the rise of well-ordered (modern) negligence principles. The predecessors 
of modern judges demonstrably avoided such activities to prevent changing the law.  
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Reasonable User Scrutinised 
a) The Development of the Test 
The principle of ‘reasonable user’ has early modern origins when it came to the fore to deal 
with the need to bring equilibrium to an urbanising and industrialising society. Indeed James 
Oldham noted that Lord Mansfield’s approach to nuisance during the eighteenth-century was 
to assess circumstances using a ‘rule of reasonableness’ in order for him to take into account 
the implications of increasing urbanisation and industrialisation. At a time that generally 
restated and stabilised principles forged in the sixteenth and seventeenth-century the 
increasingly changing physical landscape and social milieu could not be ignored, which 
implies an element of environmental control was intrinsic to nuisance actions during those 
centuries.
671
  
Lord Mansfield’s trial notes provide examples that arbitration and settlement were actively 
encouraged and nearly half of his cases on nuisance involved pollution that were highly 
contested land-use conflicts.
672
 Of course today these conflicting land-use cases would 
normally be dealt with by planning law, but in those eighteenth-century cases litigants’ 
interests were visibly balanced on a variety of factors relevant to the circumstances of 
individual cases.
673
 Although Lord Mansfield himself visibly made compromises that 
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increasingly struck the balance in favour of industrialists,
674
 the reciprocal nature of 
proprietary interests in the sense of the ‘rule of reasonableness’ was clearly taking shape from 
a status quo of cooperation and concession between neighbours.
675
 
Despite only fully emerging during the eighteenth-century, this vital account of reciprocity 
that frequently asks the courts to balance reasonableness of user against the unreasonableness 
of interference to plaintiffs, in fact, has much more ancient origins. As discussed by Winfield, 
it emulates Bracton whereby he spoke of the ‘natural right’ (of seisin) for man to use his land 
in a manner he wanted but,
676
 on the other hand, man was forbidden ‘to do on his land what 
may harm his neighbour’.677 This notion later developed into a ‘rule of reason’678 commonly 
known by the Latin maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your land that you do 
not injure that of another). The ancient, sometimes ill-reputed,
679
 but not entirely redundant 
maxim is a presumptive rule that implies everyone is obligated to use their own property in 
such a manner as not to injure the property of his neighbour.
680
  
Ibbetson refers to the maxim as conveying a ‘duty’ that could be breached but was 
nonetheless ‘singularly unhelpful’ as a positive test for the scope of liability owing to its 
wide, undefined ambit.
681
 The sic utere tuo doctrine undoubtedly leaves unanswered the 
question of when does an interference become unlawful. In a manner that still makes the 
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ancient doctrine relevant to a modern law of nuisance WVH Rogers answers that question. 
He states:  
The law repeatedly recognises that a man may use his own land so as to injure another without committing a 
nuisance. It is only if such use becomes unreasonable that it becomes unlawful.
682
 
The natural right of seisin - heralded by Bracton - that a man can do what he likes on his own 
land provided he does not harm his neighbour’s land is thus upheld in the modern setting and 
qualified by the ‘reasonable user test’.683  
Bracton suggests that landholders were initially under an obligation not to harm their 
neighbour’s property. However, that obligation was not a contractual obligation or notional 
duty, the type that would impose absolute liability. It was instead akin to a ‘duty in fact’ 
where in any particular case the defendant ought to have avoided injury to the plaintiff;
684
 as 
nuisance evolved it transpired that plaintiffs could guard against activities that were 
potentially harmful by seeking an injunction, thus seemingly the ancient obligation had been 
reinforced.
685
 Private nuisance was designed to and hence has a long tradition of preventing 
interferences with a plaintiff’s rights over land – a tradition that has been bolstered by the 
evolution of injunctions discussed in the next chapter.
686
 Ultimately Bracton’s Treatise 
depicts that from a very early stage liability was measured by balancing conflicting interests 
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between neighbours - the doctrine of reasonable user was a natural, albeit later, consequence 
to ascertain the outcome of a judicial inquiry in nuisance actions.  
Whereas the origins of nuisance suggest an obligation exists not to use your property in a 
manner that injures one’s neighbours that obligation does not confer a duty of care rather, as 
we have seen, a state of balancing conflicting interests - the issue is protecting the right of 
quiet enjoyment of one’s property, not imposing a duty of care. With that in mind, where 
Williams and Hepple contend that ‘people are under a duty of care not to be noisy’,687  that 
would be a mistake of analysis. In reality such a duty would be ‘unworkable’688 in practice 
because everyone living in close proximity of one’s neighbours would be minded to 
constantly keep quiet for fear of breaching a duty of care; palpably this would diminish the 
amenity value of millions of properties.
689
 
Lord Wright’s 1940 assessment of the boundaries of nuisance in Sedleigh-Denfield v 
O’Callaghan restates that a reciprocal relationship between neighbours exists. He specified 
that ‘[a] balance has to be maintained between the right of the occupier to do what he likes 
with his own [property], and the right of his neighbour not to be interfered with’.690  
Reciprocity between neighbours has been visibly constant throughout the history of the action 
thus its importance to nuisance at a fundamental level cannot be understated. Winfield and 
Jolowicz go as far as to state: ‘In fact the whole of the law of private nuisance represents an 
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attempt to preserve a balance between two conflicting interests, that of one occupier in using 
his land as he thinks fit, and that of his neighbour in the quiet enjoyment of his land’.691 
Good neighbourliness and keeping the peace are seemingly intimate elements of modern 
nuisance under the umbrella of reasonableness in its own terms: balancing conflicting 
interests in land is supposed to be the measure of those terms. The standard of reasonableness 
is a judicially controlled measure the application of which continually shifts with changing 
societal needs and legal nuances. Oldham recognised this inherent trait within nuisance in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries: 
The standard of reasonableness is, of course, ever shifting. In Georgian and Victorian times it was held very 
low, in thwarting attempts to check some of the highly unpleasant industrial processes considered vital to the 
nation’s economy.692 
Maria Lee views this type of judicial discretion (applying the reasonable user test) negatively 
owing, perhaps, to the lack of constraints on judges for determining the measure of 
reasonableness; she comments, ‘free rein is given to judicial value judgements at a number of 
stages of the inquiry’.693 However the conceptual characteristic that allows the standard of 
reasonableness to shift enables the tort to adapt to changing societal mores and aspirations; 
arguably this is essential to prevent standards redolent of a different age ruling from their 
graves and dictating what activities are to be considered reasonable in any given generation.  
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If interference affects a protected interest we must (generally
694
) inquire whether user of land 
is reasonable in the circumstances. Whether a right of way is blocked, or another amenity of 
land adversely affected, or even the physical integrity of the land diminished, traditionally in 
each circumstance a judicial inquiry was instigated to balance conflicting uses of land. The 
question is whether Bramwell B’s rule of ‘give and take, live and let live’ is to be understood 
in the sense of ‘reciprocality’ of interests (the balancing of two residential users’ interests) or 
balancing conflicting interests in the context of an interest in private property use against an 
interest in industrialisation or urbanisation.
695
 According to James Penner, Bramwell B’s 
words invoke ‘reciprocality’ of interests but Lord Mansfield clearly used nascent reasonable 
user to strike a balance between the value of increasing industrial activity and urbanisation 
over smoke and pollution-free air.
696
 For environmental protection purposes arguably 
balancing both ‘reciprocality’ of interests and conflicting land use are desirable depending on 
the circumstances of the case – we can only assume Bramwell B’s true intentions but 
considering the timing of the Bamford case (during the height of Victorian industrialisation) 
it would be illogical to dismiss that he would have been mindful of both interpretations of 
competing interests.  
Regardless, the doctrine of reciprocity between neighbours survives the test of time, 
transcending the centuries, until the twentieth-century where, as Lee identifies, the courts 
make the decision to focus upon ‘the type of harm that is required in order to have an action’ 
rather than balancing interests of the parties.
697
 Once the focus of the enquiry included the 
type of harm - which the courts associate with negligence type liability - the conduct of the 
defendant began to attract attention and the traditional strict liability element of the tort of 
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nuisance was inevitably revisited and adulterated. Here we can see the ‘reasonable user test’ - 
unique to private nuisance – being obscured to consider the issue of liability. The test was not 
a ‘general prerequisite of liability’. Instead liability was a consequence of an unreasonable 
use of land that went beyond the threshold of acceptable interference with the plaintiff's 
enjoyment of land.
698
 In short the reasonable user test was an investigative process to 
ascertain whether interference suffered is sufficiently serious enough to give rise to an action. 
Cross posited: 
[T]hat to give the reasonable user test an application outside the context of determining the threshold of 
interference with the plaintiff's enjoyment of her land which must be crossed before that interference will be 
actionable is to misread the case law and to extend unjustifiably the scope and role of the test.
699
 
Whereas before reasonable user was a matter of actionability the modern focus that has 
moved away from balancing the interests of litigants has accordingly misconstrued the case 
law and distorted the meaning of the reasonable user test: a matter of actionability has in 
essence morphed into a matter of liability.
700
 Indeed Lee argues that the ‘notion of 
reasonableness has now become redundant and misleading in many cases of private 
nuisance’.701 Unquestionably the type of cases she refers to involve negligence-type 
scenarios; thus we must recognise that negligence principles have been assimilated into the 
tort, and accordingly a fault-based liability has entered the realms of strict liability. The 
consequences in terms of doctrinal confusion are explored below.  
b) The role of ‘Reasonable’ in the Twentieth-Century and Beyond 
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Amongst claims that nuisance has lost its identity as a strict liability tort
702
 and that the notion 
of reasonableness has become redundant,
703
 the most confusing issue of the entire law of 
private nuisance is conceivably whether or not today liability should be construed as ‘strict’. 
Following high court activity in the twentieth-century that culminated in Cambridge some 
commentators feel nuisance has been ‘assimilated in all but name into the fault-based tort of 
negligence, or that it is in immediate danger of such assimilation’.704 In his judgment in 
Cambridge Lord Goff contributed to the confusion regarding the status of liability in 
nuisance. He stated that liability for nuisance ‘has generally been regarded as strict’ but then 
comments that the strictness of strict liability is ‘controlled’, varying according to ‘the 
principle of reasonable user’.705  We may argue his reference to ‘control’ was an attempt to 
evoke the impression that there are limits to the strictness of nuisance liability (perhaps even 
to soften the blow before submitting liability can also vary in strictness according to the role 
rendered by the foreseeability of damage
706
) but in reality the nature of reasonable user has 
changed owing to his comments. It is conceivable that his ambiguity regarding the strict 
nature of nuisance was to facilitate the introduction of a fault-based element into the tort but, 
whether or not that was the case, it can be posited that Lord Goff reassessed reasonable user 
and elevated it to the status of a general prerequisite of liability.
707
  
                                                 
702
 Cross (13) 445; FH Newark ‘The Boundaries of Nuisance’ (1949) 65 LQR 480. See also C Gearty, ‘The 
Place of Private Nuisance in a Modern Law of Torts’ [1989] CLJ 214; JM Eekelaar, ‘Nuisance and Strict 
Liability’ (1973) 8 Ir Jur 191; PH Winfield, ‘Restatement of the Law of Torts, Volume IV’ (1940) 18 NYULR 
66, 74-75; and Friedmann, ‘Incidence of Liability in Nuisance’ (1943) 59 LQR 63. 
703
 Lee (103) 298. Negligence has arguably become the poisoned challis of private nuisance as it has 
overburdened nuisance with new principles alien to its long-standing doctrines and new responsibilities that 
have challenged its very existence. In their section on negligence and nuisance Professors Williams and Hepple 
controversially suggest that nuisance is merely a branch of negligence (Williams & Hepple (97) 124 (see 
generally 123-127)); See comments by Lord Parker in  British Road Services v Slater [1964] 1 WLR 498 [504]; 
and Gearty ibid 215. 
704
 Cross (14). 
705
 Cambridge (1) 299 (see generally Lord Goff’s engagement with Lord Reid’s judgment in The Wagon Mound 
(22) 299-301). 
706
 Cambridge ibid 300-1.  
707
 Gerry Cross concludes his article ‘Does the Polluter Pay?’ on this very point (Cross (14) 474). 
189 
 
By the time Cambridge reached the House of Lords the nuisance and negligence aspects of 
the original action had been dropped and liability in regards to the rule in Rylands v Fletcher 
became the focus of the appeal. It is beyond the ambit of this thesis to expound the nature of 
that rule; however its comparison with reasonable user has powerful ramifications. The focus 
upon the rule in Rylands v Flethcher, in a manner of speaking, switched tests from reasonable 
user to natural (or ordinary) use of land. Importantly, Lord Goff referred to the point that 
‘reasonable user’ and ‘natural user’ had developed into ‘comparable’708 principles, which 
explains to a certain degree why he felt it necessary to reassess reasonable user in private 
nuisance in a case centred on the rule under Rylands v Fletcher, albeit without any attempt to 
redefine natural user.
709
  
Cross views a comparison between the two principles that asserts a similarity of function as a 
mistaken position in regards to the nature of inquiry involved in the reasonable user test and 
its origins and development within the law. The origins and development of the test described 
above undoubtedly support his contentions; it is palpable that the test developed from a 
historic viewpoint of balancing interests which lead to a ‘highly fact specific, contextual 
decision-making process’710 to determine the standard of reasonableness. In contrast natural 
user does not ordinarily enter into such a complex investigation.
711
 Rather it ‘simply’ 
examines the defendant’s conduct regarding an activity then ascertains whether the rule in 
Ryland v Fletcher should apply;
712
 this suggests, at least from one aspect, that liability in 
private nuisance is stricter than under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher because there is some 
limitation concerning the user of land in nuisance.
713
 The bottom-line being addressed by 
judges when ascertaining reasonable user relates to whether interference in those 
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circumstances has gone beyond the threshold of reasonableness and to such a degree that an 
action can be maintained. 
The history does not support the view that the real question is whether or not one injures their 
neighbour.
714
 Otherwise the investigation that has been conducted by judges to balance 
reciprocal interests for centuries would have been an act of wasting. As Rogers professed in 
Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort the law repeatedly recognises that we may use our property in 
a manner that injures our neighbours;
715
 the question is whether the injurious activity is 
unreasonable and thus assesses the ‘degree of interference necessary to maintain an 
action’.716 Gerry Cross’ reference to Melish LJ in Ball v Ray is pertinent to this point in 
discussion: 
When, in a street like Green Street, the ground floor of a neighbouring house is turned into a stable, we are not 
to consider the noise of horses from that stable like the noise of a pianoforte from a neighbour's house, or the 
noise of a neighbour's children, which are noises we must reasonably expect, and must to a considerable extent 
put up with.
717
 
Extending the reasonable user test to a function beyond determining the degree of 
interference that people should reasonably be expected to bear in the circumstances betrays 
the test’s origins of finding reciprocity between neighbours. It logically follows to posit that 
viewing the test outside a means of determining actionability misconstrues the case law and 
‘extends unjustifiably’718 its long-established scope and role. Steele certainly avers to the 
reasonable user test being a ‘central element of establishing actionability’ but what is 
important to understand  is that the notion of reasonableness in nuisance is about a two-way 
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relationship where different land uses can be determined as interfering with the other; in 
contradiction the ‘one-way model of causation’ is an objective test of liability.719 
It is difficult to dispute that reasonable user and natural use of land have fundamental 
differences; in fact Lord Goff refers to the comparison that had developed as ‘striking’.720 
Lord Moulton comments in Rickards v Lothian
721
 brought to the surface an obvious 
difference, he held:  
It is not every use to which land is put that brings into play that principle [non-natural user]. It must be some 
special use bringing with it increased danger to others, and must not merely be the ordinary use of the land or 
such a use as is proper for the general benefit of the community. 
The difference between reasonable user and natural use is thus one of reciprocity of interests 
over hazardousness of activity. It is therefore not surprising that Lord Goff considered the 
comparison at the very least marked. Interpreting his judgment suggests any ‘similarity of 
function’ should be viewed narrowly and only tentatively extended beyond the fact that an 
action can be maintained either ‘notwithstanding that he has exercised all reasonable care 
and skill to prevent the escape from occurring’722 or ‘even though he may have used 
reasonable care and skill to avoid it’.723 The imposition of liability can then be conveyed by 
the courts, strictly one may argue, once unreasonable user or unreasonable use has been 
established, unless – of course – following Cambridge the harm is unforeseeable. That 
contention is strengthened by Lord Goff’s later discussion on the matter of non-natural use of 
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land in which he was emphatic that the concept of natural use should be controlled by the 
principle of foreseeability.
724
 
Apportioning nuisance liability has reputably not been straightforward owing to the 
multifarious nature of ‘reasonable user’ and the ‘complex balancing exercise’725 it demands. 
But any measure of clarity that may have been intended was not forthcoming from the 
leading judgments of last century: certainly, since the Privy Council first believed negligence 
was a relevant consideration in the context of nuisance liability in The Wagon Mound (No 
2).
726
 From the Wagon Mound began a slow induction of negligent conduct as a factor of 
fault-based liability (foreseeability) into the doctrine of reasonable user (and subsequently the 
entire realm of nuisance law), but without a convincing explanation vis-à-vis why in certain 
situations ‘negligence plays no part’ but in others it has a ‘decisive’ role.727 Indeed, following 
Cambridge Water, there is no longer a purely strict liability to private nuisance. That 
judgment is indicative that all injury, whether to amenity or to physical property, is now 
subject to the conduct requirement of reasonable foreseeability. 
4. The legacy of Lord Westbury’s Physical Damage Construct   
In the seminal case of St Helen’s v Tipping the House of Lords ‘drew the line’728 on 
industrial pollution that caused physical damage to land. On the face of things that line was 
drawn to protect merely the interests of the landed gentry and rural England from pollution 
but in practice the implication of the Tipping ruling put physical damage to land on a pedestal 
above amenity damages. Lord Westbury’s account is generally understood to divide 
nuisances that amount to physical damage of land from amenity nuisances; Murphy agrees 
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emphatically that Tipping ‘beyond question, treated cases of physical damage as a class 
apart’.729 In Hunter Lord Hoffmann read Lord Westbury’s judgment in a slightly different 
light stating ardently that whilst it did create a divide between physical and amenity damage, 
it did not produce two separate actions.
730
 In slight contrast, according to Lord Hoffmann 
nuisances that are ‘productive of sensible personal discomfort’ and ones causing ‘material 
injury to the property’731 are ‘part of a single tort causing injury to land’.732 Here Lord 
Hoffmann is ostensibly recognising that whilst they are both actionable heads under private 
nuisance, they remain different categories of interference. 
Irrespective of those slight differences of interpretation the consensus is that physical damage 
carries a much higher standard of liability than amenity damage. Lord Westbury makes it 
clear that the doctrine of locality, so pivotal to the reasonable user test, does not apply in 
cases of physical damage but interpretations of his speech advocate physical damage is 
exempt from much more than merely assessing the character of the neighbourhood.
733
 Jenny 
Steele professed in light of the ‘accepted interpretation’ of Tipping, the application of 
‘reasonable user’ in its entirety only applies to nuisances that fall short of physical 
damage.
734
 Palpably interferences causing physical damage to land go beyond the threshold 
of what is reasonable in any circumstances; as such it would appear futile to engage in the 
balancing exercise traditional to the reasonable user test. Furlong CJ’s evaluation in the 
Newfoundland Supreme Court case of Kent v Dominion Steel and Coal sums up this 
perception:  
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[I]t is fair to say that any material injury to property is a nuisance without reference to the circumstances; 
without enquiry as to the character of the activities carried out, or the neighbourhood or the reasonableness of 
use and so on.
735
 
Seemingly nuisances that cause physical damage to land were bequeathed, one could say, a 
higher status than amenity damage:
736
 almost certainly ‘material injury to property’ was 
distinguished from personal discomfort to stop activities being carried on with impunity to 
the destruction of neighbouring property.
737
 
It can be posited that the significance of Lord Westbury’s judgment is often viewed in all too 
narrow a manner, even possibly understated. In light of the remarkable fact that the House of 
Lords decided not to cite or discuss earlier cases in nuisance law it should be taken into 
consideration that his Lordship intended to put extra impetus on protecting the physical 
integrity of land over its use and enjoyment (and any related comfort or convenience). 
Arguably, in holding that in cases of physical damage to land - in an accepted tort to land – 
that the reasonable user test is immaterial he was in effect maintaining the traditional stricter 
liability associated with the tort, conceivably in order to put an emphasis on safeguarding the 
physical entity over any amenity value. This concept feasibly links to the Cresswell 
Cresswell theory of nuisance which separated the ‘appreciable’738 diminution of ‘comfort and 
value of the property’ from ‘comfort of existence on the property’ that, in line with physical 
damage to property, places personal physical integrity above amenity value.
739
 Arguably it is 
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logical that any unlawful interference severe enough to cause ‘material damage’ to land (or 
the person) would, as a consequence of its severity, extend to any consequential injury 
concerning the use and enjoyment of land. In that sense, once physical damage to land has 
been established, liability should be imposed without reference to reasonable user for 
resultant interference.  
The idea that physical damage is to be treated differently (more strictly) than ‘ordinary’ 
nuisance scenarios (involving impaired amenity) has opened up the theoretical possibility 
which is explored in more recent literature of it being treated so differently as to fall outside 
of the nuisance paradigm altogether. Conor Gearty provided a thought-provoking analyse of 
the role of physical damage in private nuisance in his seminal article ‘The Place of Private 
Nuisance in a Modern Law of Torts’. He came to the conclusion - in the midst of highlighting 
the tort’s potency in environmental protection - that cases involving physical damage should 
be removed from the scope of private nuisance and ‘returned to their proper home’ (in 
negligence).
740
 A justification for that conclusion relies on the premise that redress for 
physical damage to land originated in the tort of negligence. That analysis is not supported by 
the present one. When Lord Westbury in Tipping held that physical damage was actionable 
on the basis of strict liability, negligence as Gearty understands it did not exist. Tipping did 
not ‘take’ anything from negligence; it ‘simply’ created a bi-focal liability rule for private 
nuisance, in which physical damage to property was elevated to the status of being 
intrinsically wrong (and unlawful). It must also be recognised that the potency of private 
nuisance as environmental tort would be dramatically diluted if the tort did not protect the 
integrity of land. Maria Lee’s article ‘What is Private Nuisance’ is evocative in that it 
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advocates it is ‘nonsense’ to suggest private nuisance does not cover liability for physical 
damage, particularly as that type of harm attracts so much analysis.
741
 
The idea of all physical damage being intrinsically unlawful encountered problems of a 
different character concerning the justice and fairness of holding a proprietor strictly liable 
for injury occasioned by Acts of God or third parties. That is the Sedleigh-Denfield scenario 
alluded to at the outset. It is regrettable that Lord Wilberforce, in addressing this scenario, did 
not engage explicitly with Tipping and rule in the clearest terms that the court was 
introducing a modification to Lord Westbury’s dictum in relation to a limited category of 
cases where physical damage to a neighbouring property would not justly attract strict 
liability. Nonetheless, it is clear enough that this case is exceptional for the plaintiff’s lack of 
personal responsibility in creating the nuisance, ‘[T]he law must take account of the fact that 
the occupier on whom the duty is cast has, ex hypothesi, had this hazard thrust upon him 
through no seeking or fault of his own’.742 If Tipping were applied without modification, the 
defendant would have been strictly liable for damage (caused by flooding) notwithstanding 
that the problem arose from careless infrastructure repairs which resulted from local authority 
contractors (as trespassers). That is not what the court in Sedleigh decided; it was that 
injustice which Lord Wilberforce sought to avoid.  
In relation to physical damage it drew a distinction between the creation of a nuisance by the 
defendant and the continuation or adoption of a nuisance created by a third party or natural 
event.
743
 To be liable for a continuation of a nuisance started by a third party the defendant 
would have to have knowledge of the risk. That, in turn, involves reasonable foreseeability 
and the language of negligence associated with that, as made explicit by the statement of 
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Lord Wright that a defendant’s liability extends to a case where ‘with knowledge he leaves 
the nuisance on his land’.744 
We cannot infer from his judgment that liability between the torts is interchangeable in the 
sense that there is now a generalised rule of reasonable foreseeability which applies to all 
actionable nuisance (and all negligence).
745
 Lord Wilberforce’s observation in Goldman that 
‘[nuisance] may comprise a wide variety of situations, in some of which negligence plays no 
part, in others of which it is decisive’746 cannot support Lord Goff’s dictum in Cambridge 
Water. There is no evidence that the court in Sedleigh-Denfield sought to overrule Tipping 
and its strict liability approach to physical damage, which is the effect of Cambridge.  On the 
contrary, as Tipping is not overruled by Cambridge, it is arguable that Lord Goff’s opinion 
on reasonable foreseeability is pure obiter and should not be followed in future. 
We are not primarily interested in the further issue of how the ‘exceptional’ cases of third 
party intervention should be compartmentalised within the wider tort family. The crucial 
point is that they are an exception to the rule in Tipping and should not be generalised to 
produce the fault-based approach to all of nuisance that Lord Goff sought; yet, it is worth 
mentioning the possibility of taking third party ‘nuisance’ cases out of nuisance and housing 
them within negligence. For example, by comparing Goldman v Hargrave and Smith v 
Littlewoods
747
 it is not clear what is gained by treating them as one tort or the other. Whereas 
the case of Goldman is considered to be a nuisance case (the ‘headnote’ on ‘Westlaw’ is itself 
noteworthy as ‘nuisance’ is not mentioned748) Lord Wilberforce could not have been any 
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clearer to point out that, in his opinion, if liability existed it rested ‘upon negligence and 
nothing else’.749 The facts of House of Lords case of Smith v Littlewoods were similar to 
Goldman as fire damage was at issue (but by trespassers who set fire to the defendant’s 
derelict property) however the claim was brought and analysed on negligence grounds. This 
suggests that the cases of Sedleigh-Denfield, Goldman and Leakey could have also have been 
brought in the tort of negligence instead of nuisance. Certainly Goldman and Sedleigh-
Denfield were referred to in Smith to ascertain the ‘standard of care’ where fire is caused by 
‘an outside agency’.750  
An occupier of land’s duty to prevent the continuation of damage from a nuisance arises 
from their current and on-going position regarding the state of the property. Lord Goff’s 
judgment in Cambridge Water in effect changes that duty. In holding that the defendants 
were liable for the damage after the juncture when it became foreseeable (and thus became a 
continuing nuisance), as in Leakey,
751
 his lordship is justifying any future escape merely 
because the nuisance was unforeseeable many years in the past. As Wilkinson pointed out in 
his case review of Cambridge it is wrong to deny liability in circumstances simply because 
the damage was unforeseeable in the past – no matter how recently or how far into the 
past.
752
 In the interests of doctrinal integrity, it is argued that it is better to ‘give’ continuation 
of nuisance scenarios of this sort to negligence, in return for respect for the strict nature of 
liability for physical damage arising from the ruling in Tipping.  
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Applied to Cambridge Water, that ruling creates problems for the outcome of this case. The 
defendant leather tannery did not initially know that chemicals were leaking into the ground 
and passing, through groundwater, into the neighbouring land of the claimant, and 
contaminating the claimant’s underground aquifer. But as the damage is capable of being 
understood as ‘physical’, lack of knowledge or reasonable foresight is on the authority of 
Tipping irrelevant. Lord Goff suggested that it would be inequitable for the defendant to be 
strictly liable, but that is not self-evident. Besides, the strict liability aspect of Tipping is the 
case’s ratio and it is binding on the court. The result that Lord Goff sought to achieve in 
Cambridge required invoking of the relevant practice direction determining when and how 
House of Lords judgments are to be overruled. There is no reason why Tipping should be 
overruled, such that the law should be more generous to the ‘faultless’ defendant today than 
it was during the industrial revolution.
753
 
3. Conclusions 
Prior to the decision in Cambridge two common factors stood out in the category of cases 
where the assimilation of the language of negligence into nuisance developed: first, each case 
involved damage which had not been caused by the defendant (‘external agent’ cases) and, 
second, that damage was of a physical character. There have not in the author’s knowledge, 
prior to Cambridge, been any cases where ‘amenity’ nuisance was treated as actionable on 
negligence principles. This is not to deny that nuisance was subject to the language of 
reasonableness, but that had a special meaning in a nuisance context (that is historically 
different to its meaning in the context of negligence). That is to say, in the context of amenity 
nuisance reasonableness is relevant to the injury. And if Tipping is followed, reasonableness 
plays no part at all in the actionability of physical damage. The decision in Cambridge 
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changes this, if indeed it is rightly decided. Liability for physical damage is now debatably no 
longer strict but based on fault. Liability for amenity nuisance is now based on two aspects of 
reasonableness, one traditional to nuisance, the other imported from negligence: confusion is 
lingering.  
It may be objected that this is a largely academic concern. Does it matter how the Sedleigh-
Denfield scenario is classified within the tort family? The answer to this is that doctrinal 
boundaries matter. Negligence has grown up to deal with a modern risk society of great 
complexity, where potentially injurious activities are to be encouraged so long as they are 
approached with care. If the only justification for labelling external agent type actions as 
nuisance is the subjective nature of the enquiry regarding liability then the situation requires 
extra thought.
754
 Nuisance is about safeguarding ‘permanent’ matters of land and the quality 
of the neighbourhood in which land is located. It is not blind to the need to accommodate 
industrial risks, but it does so in a different way, and to a more succinct extent than nuisance 
based on protecting proprietary interests (and that is why is can be understood as a ‘green 
tort’).755 That is why Cambridge Water is to be considered a doubtful authority, and the third 
party cases are better fitted into the negligence paradigm - not nuisance - in order to avoid 
unwarranted doctrinal confusions.  
The discernible doctrinal problems caused by the assimilation of negligence language are 
unacceptable considering the issue of proportionality – the handful of actions where Acts of 
God and the conduct of third parties have unfairly thrust liability on occupiers of land do not 
justify the extensive doctrinal damage inflicted on the precariously balanced ancient tort of 
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nuisance in a modern world. In view of the problematic effects – so far – of the assimilation 
of the language of nuisance that seeks to conform to the fashionable dominance of negligence 
in the post-Donoghue era, Cambridge can be viewed as a quick fix. If the language of 
nuisance and negligence are incompatible then problems are sure to arise which has been 
demonstrated above. The extension by Lord Goff in Cambridge of continuing nuisance 
actions raises further questions and demands a measure of caution regarding the case’s status 
as ‘good law’. Considering the extent of the doctrinal cross-infection caused to nuisance by 
negligence, arguably, the most satisfactory outcome would be to remove Sedleigh-Denfield 
type actions from nuisance and place them in negligence with the emphasis that they are 
exceptions to the standard of care based on the reasonable man. This would allow individual 
characteristics of defendant’s to form part of a subjective enquiry regarding liability in 
nuisance.  
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Chapter 5  
                          Injunctions 
 
1. Introduction 
Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Coventry v Lawrence,756 there is some uncertainty 
as to the likelihood that a perpetrator of a nuisance will be injuncted at the discretion of the 
court. The Supreme Court expressed criticism of the Court of Appeal decision in Watson v 
Croft Promo-Sport Ltd,
757
 in which it was held that an application by the wrongdoer to pay 
damages in lieu of an injunction should only be granted in ‘very exceptional circumstances’, 
and never on the basis of the public interest (that the wrongdoer is a ‘public benefactor). It 
was critical of the root authority from the Court of Appeal, in the nineteenth century, of 
Shelfer v City of London Electric Company.
758
   
Although the thesis has largely so far been concerned with who has standing, the legal 
definition of an actionable nuisance and who is liable, the practical reason why private 
nuisance is invoked by plaintiffs is as a remedy, and that is the focus in this final substantive 
chapter.  In contrast to some other torts, notably negligence, the injunction is today the 
primary redress sought in private nuisance; it safeguards proprietary rights by prohibiting 
interference with them. Because of this it is rightly understood as representing the tort’s ‘best 
asset’ in environmental protection, for it does not ‘simply’ require the wrongdoer to pay to 
compensate the victim for the wrong; it requires a change of behaviour to right the wrong 
which can have far reaching benefits for not only the victim but the wider public in the 
locality who benefit from the cleaner environment arising from the nuisance’s abatement.  
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However, as is discussed in this chapter, the potent functionality of injunctions has ebbed and 
flowed over the centuries.  
The analysis begins in the fourteenth-century when societal mores were diluting the last 
bastions of feudalism and driving legal change. During this period of upheaval, nascent 
injunctions first emerged as an instrument of control or coercion. For a long time thereafter, 
there were various difficulties surrounding the procurement of an injunction, and thus 
coercing the defendant into compliance with their obligations. Indeed this meant that a 
defendant who, on the balance of things, profited from the nuisance could simply pay to 
inflict continuing injury on the plaintiff’s interests. This created a lacuna in nuisance law that 
took centuries to rectify (reducing nuisance law to what Calabresi and Melamed later 
describe - albeit in a different context - as a ‘liability rule’759). It is explained that this 
problem became acute in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, resulting in various 
statutory interventions aimed at making it easier for a plaintiff to establish not only liability 
but an entitlement to protection (a ‘property rule’ on Calabresi’s and Melamed’s scheme). 
The argument is that the nineteenth century developed in a manner that an injunction became 
available broadly as of right, with very limited exceptions.  
Moving into the more modern day, in a reverse evolutionary process, obstacles once again 
emerged in the twentieth century. In Miller v Jackson,
760
 Lord Denning introduced a public 
interest dimension that departed from Shelfer following a vision of village green utopia that 
largely benefited cricket fanatics (so critics argued). In Watson and a little earlier in Regan v 
Paul Properties Ltd
761
, the approach of Shelfer was re-affirmed, as indeed it had been in 
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Kennaway v Thompson.
762
 Regan, and to some extent Watson, were seen as applying very 
well settled principles and rules to the effect that the public interest is not a reason to grant 
damages in lieu of an injunction.
763
 Lord Neuberger in Coventry doubted that the law ever 
was settled along these lines and considered it wrong to fetter the judge’s discretion in this 
way. One Justice (Lord Sumption) advocated a presumption in favour of granting damages 
instead of an injunction. 
2. The Development of Injunctions: From Equity to Common Law 
In the scheme of the protracted evolution of private nuisance law, the discretionary remedy of 
injunctions is ostensively a relatively new development but their communal application 
across much of the common law and within equity was a long and drawn out process that 
spanned centuries. Chronologically the seeds of the injunction are to be found in the 
fourteenth-century. The Black Death had a massive impact on England’s population, 
irrevocably changing the social structure and legal systems. The decades following the Black 
Death were extraordinarily productive in innovative legal activity in all aspects of the law and 
the institutions that supported the legal system which started with the centralisation of justice 
under Henry II in the twelfth-century.
764
  
Those innovations were required to be coercive to preserve traditional society: control needed 
to be maintained over the ‘lower orders’ by coercive legal measures from within the ‘upper 
orders’.765 Land law changed decisively and part of that change saw the chancellor using 
newly formalised subpoenas and injunctions to coerce people to fulfil their obligations.
766
 
Thus injunctions started life as remedies that were effectively coercive measures when 
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Chancery ‘became more active in supplying remedies in the common law’ and instrumental 
in initiating the ‘great expansion’ in tort law.767 However circa 1350 the coercive ‘tone’ of 
injunctions was seemingly most visible in manorial courts against ‘unfree’ tenants imposing 
specific, often severe, penalties for non-compliance.
768
  
The Chancellor’s office is central to the development of the injunction: that development has 
multifarious factors. At the time of the Black Death the chancellor was a principal official of 
the common law with wide-ranging responsibilities concerning matters that affected it, 
including issuing writs to initiate litigation in the king’s courts (and orders to sheriffs). Thus 
the position was pivotal to the nascent development of nuisance law in many respects,
769
 
aspects that have been discussed at length in previous chapters.  The chancellor also – 
naturally - began to adjudicate matters in chancery where his jurisdiction included deciding 
upon problematic circumstances that needed to be solved on his conscience,  or in other 
words, at his discretion. This marked the dawn of the discretionary remedy. The chancellor’s 
jurisdiction in chancery expanded significantly during the fifteenth century, in latter centuries 
problems of judicial conscience formed a body of law separate from the common law and the 
law of equity was born.
770
 Despite the notion of separate bodies of law being centuries away 
the development of ‘chancery adjudication’ and the injunction can be ascribed as 
consequences of the Black Death.
771
 
The development of injunctions in eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries, in part, is an account 
of the final chapter of the procedural changes necessary to advance the English court systems 
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fully away from the Middle Ages in line with the advances of social policy.
772
 This is evident 
from the lack of conceptual uniformity in Case, as Palmer professed: ‘At no point was there a 
general redistribution of actions amongst the various classes to produce categories of action 
with logical precision’. The concept of nuisance was part of this illogicality driven by societal 
needs which contrived to leave behind the restrictions of feudalism when Case supplanted it: 
the piecemeal destruction of the forms of action was probably part of a larger ‘unwritten’ 
grand design - the dissolution of the medieval law. This could not happen in one fell swoop 
as was possible with Henry VIII’s dissolution of the monasteries; the remodelling of an entire 
legal system which took centuries to evolve needed to be far more subtle than a persecution 
of religious belief perpetrated by a tyrant king. Today the way in which we think about law, 
and categorise laws, remains deeply influenced by the old forms of action: despite the growth 
of statute, English law continues to be understood in common law – adversarial – terms.773 
The development of injunctions is the epitome of this in practice. Whilst the merging of the 
equitable remedy in justice and equity courts was finally provided by statute, the quirks of the 
common law paved the way for statutory amendments. 
We could argue that the dissolution of the medieval law had become inevitable; it would 
seem that its ending was eagerly anticipated considering the advent of actions on the case for 
trespass in the fourteenth-century and the subsequent development of Case thereafter, where 
it would seem social policy was more important than ‘legal thought’ thus fuelling its advance 
above matters of legal concept. But the old writ system was stubborn and the process in 
which the Chancery issued writs was formulated in the context of long-existing writs that it 
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struggled to abandon. The issue of apportioning liability, discussed in the previous chapter, 
would probably have been pivotal to chancery determinations; we cannot be certain.
774
  
In the end however the dissolution of the older, centrally feudal, medieval law was relatively 
fast. The process took a little over half a century and started with an attempt to abolish the old 
forms of action in order to bring uniformity to the personal actions. This first ‘assault’ on the 
older writs was made in 1832 by the aptly named Uniformity of Process Act,
775
 but further 
attacks were required. The next wave happened in 1852 by the Common Law Procedure 
Act
776
 and the consequent Common Law Procedure Acts; the final decisive strike came in 
1873 by the Judicature Act, an enactment to which we will return. Of course this only dealt 
with the personal actions: the real
777
 and mixed
778
 actions also needed to be removed, but 
their eradication was far less drawn-out: the Real Property Limitation Act in 1833 abolished 
sixty, only two remained until the Common Law Procedure Act of 1860
779
 abolished them.
780
  
As actions on the case for nuisance only provided remedy in the form of damages, unlike the 
assize of nuisance and other writs that addressed nuisance,
781
 they did not allow for the 
abatement of a nuisance.
782
 Without a remedy to stop or prevent nuisances continuing there 
could be a potentially infinite barrage of actions from an unlawful activity with each separate 
reoccurrence justifying a new claim; wealthy individuals, and the corporations that were 
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about to emerge, could clearly benefit from this ‘loophole’. Lord Halsbury reacted to this 
issue in Shelfer, where he commented: 
But there is nothing in this case which to my mind can justify the Court in refusing to aid the legal rights 
established, by an injunction preventing the continuance of the nuisance. On the contrary, the effect of such a 
refusal in a case like the present would necessarily operate to enable a company who could afford it to drive a 
neighbouring proprietor to sell, whether he would or no, by continuing a nuisance, and simply paying damages 
for its continuance.
 783
  
Blackstone’s ‘commentary’ regarding this ambiguity in nuisance law reveals the uncertainty 
of the law prior to the ‘loophole’ being closed in the nineteenth century, particularly as the 
injunction is extant from his text. He asserts categorically that only damages were available 
‘on the case’ then states: 
Indeed every continuance of a nuisance is held to be a fresh one;
784
 and therefore a fresh action will lie, and very 
exemplary damages will probably be given, if, after one verdict against him, the defendant has the hardiness to 
continue it…the founders of the law…have therefore provided two other actions; the assize of nuisance and the 
writ of quod permittat prosternere…but these actions are now out of use, and have given way to the action on 
the case…the process is therefore easier [because of the relaxed ambit on standing]: and the effect will therefore 
be much the same, unless a man has a very obstinate as well as ill-natured neighbour: who had rather continue to 
pay damages, than remove his nuisance. For in such a case recourse must at last be had to the old and sure 
remedies, which will eventually conquer the defendant’s perverseness, by sending the sheriff…to level it.785    
These observations were early recognition that the lacuna was set to become a central issue in 
the development of nuisance law. Clearly, after a period of time, someone with the requisite 
interest would be unlikely to be aware of effectively obsolete forms of actions and there also 
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came a point (1833
786
) that both actions Blackstone referred to were abolished thus a separate 
action had to be brought in the Court of Chancery to order the removal of or stop a nuisance; 
the common law outside equity was entirely ineffective at stopping nuisances in situations 
where there were ‘very obstinate’ neighbours – or rather neighbours that stood to gain from 
continuing a nuisance. 
If the essence of nuisance is interfering with the enjoyment of property then the plaintiff’s 
inconvenience and damage are increased by the duration of the nuisance; the true object of 
the older Assizes and writs that dealt with nuisance was the abatement of the interference. 
The usurpation of the older actions by actions on the case thus created a dilemma because the 
object of Case to seek compensation for damages was antithetical to its original remedy. 
Regardless it can be said that whether or not a nuisance was ‘spent or continuing’ was to a 
large degree irrelevant.
787
 The advent of Case, in the context of the theory of nuisance, 
created a predicament because whereas theoretically damages could be sought – and won – 
for each individual wrong the nuisance could continue regardless and ‘from the very nature of 
the acts causing the injury we can hardly imagine a case of nuisance in which an action for 
damages is an adequate remedy’.788 Therefore, in the majority of nuisance actions it is 
desirable to bring a nuisance to an end. However the aspirations of that plaintiff could be 
thwarted in a scenario where each time a noxious smell interferes with the plaintiff’s 
enjoyment of land a series of separate nuisances ensues, where damages would be 
recoverable on each occasion. Nonetheless in reality the nuisances would merge as one 
continuing nuisance in perpetuity until for some reason the nuisance stopped or the defendant 
ran out of money to pay the damages.  
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This offers an historical slant on the Coase-Calabresi and Melamed debate that nevertheless 
has contemporary connotations.
789
 Nuisance law, without injunctive relief, is a mere liability 
rule – it makes the defendant liable to the plaintiff to compensate them for injury. By 
contrast, where the plaintiff can secure the abatement of a nuisance by means of an 
injunction, nuisance becomes a ‘property rule’.790 They have a right not simply to 
compensation, but to have their property restored to the condition to which they are entitled 
or, and this may be a different thing (returned to at the end of the chapter), have the nuisance 
prohibited and thus prevented. 
It was the equitable injunction that was to become the answer for those affected plaintiffs 
who had to live without the use, comfort and/or amenity of land that nuisance law promised 
to protect. Injunctions visibly began to develop in the sixteenth-century in actions on the case 
for nuisance and were initially utilised by the Court of Chancery. According to Sir George 
Cary in his collected works ‘Reports or Causes in Chancery’791 there is an incipient 
perception that: ‘Where an action upon the case for nusans [sic] and damages only are to be 
recovered, the party may have help here [in the Court of Chancery] to remove or restore the 
thing itself’.792 In Osburne v Barter (1583),793 Osburne pleaded ‘to be relieved’ of a nuisance 
created by the erection of a mill.
794
 In Swayne v Rogers (1604)
795
 again a mill was the subject 
of an action in the Court of Chancery. This time a law professor (Swayne) brought an action 
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for an interference with his mill and the court took exception (sed contrarium adjudicatum
796
) 
to his plea.  
Whilst these precedents are glimmers of the process that eventually took the injunction – the 
most effective remedy in nuisance - away from the exclusive domain of equity and into the 
common law courts, it was not until the middle to late nineteenth-century that law courts 
could adequately grant injunctive relief for disgruntled plaintiffs. Injunctions were 
unavailable to would be claimants in the law courts until the second Common Law Procedure 
Act
797
 in 1854 (hereinafter the ‘SCLPA’) but it took time for its judges to become 
accustomed to their functionality; law court judges were simply unrehearsed in their 
operation.
798
  
Arguably, we may presume that plaintiffs in two seminal nineteenth-century cases used the 
dual system to their advantage. In Attorney-General v Birmingham
799
 Adderley brought his 
case in the Chancery Court, and when Tipping won his case in St Helen's Smelting Co v 
Tipping
800
 he also brought separate proceedings there; the litigants were utilising the courts’ 
dual system to better their chances of success during these crucial decades of transformation. 
The majority of law court judges were only accustomed to awarding damages to which a 
claimant was entitled by right; using their discretion on the facts was imported from equity.
801
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Discussions in the House of Lords prior to the enactment of the 1854 Act following a 
Commissioners Report
802
 illustrate that Lord Chancellor Cranworth
803
 recognised that the 
common law had no power to stop defendants repeating injuries to plaintiffs; accordingly, the 
continuation of what he described as ‘preventative justice’, following on from the 1852 Act, 
was a central consideration of the Bill that established the second 1854 Act. The traditional 
stance that injunctions were a remedy only sought in the Chancery Courts in equity was 
unconscionable to the theory of nuisance. The problem was that plaintiffs who wanted 
damages for injuries already sustained to their property and justifiably wished to prevent 
reoccurrences were forced to bring two actions in two separate courts. Cranworth LC opined 
in such situations nothing could be: ‘More utterly at variance with the object of all 
jurisprudence than unnecessarily to hand over a party from one tribunal to another’.804 He 
then questioned:  
Why should they [parliament] not therefore give the court which had adjudicated upon the right, and given 
damages in respect of its infringement, the power of issuing an injunction to prevent its further infringement?
805
 
Lord Cranworth
806
 played a part in the majority of the leading cases - both in equity and 
common law - which became authority in nuisance law during this important stage of 
development.
807
Notwithstanding injunctions being unavailable in the law courts until SCLPA 
(1854) it must be reiterated that previously equity nevertheless certainly had an influence on 
the law. Professor Pluncknett observed there was a ‘gradual introduction into the common 
law courts [in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries] of procedures and doctrines which 
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were originally a peculiar province of Chancery…This tendency was carried much further by 
the Common Law Procedure Act 1854’.808 
Although the disadvantage to plaintiffs needing to first establish a nuisance at law before 
bringing a second action to obtain an injunction was alleviated by the SCLPA, a balance 
between law and equity was not struck until four years later when the Court of Chancery 
Amendment Act (1858), more commonly known as Lord Cairns’ Act, was passed allowing 
damages to be sought in the Chancery Courts.
809
 Plunckett nevertheless describes the 
relationship between law and equity in the eighteenth century as harmonious and that both 
systems became ‘closely involved in the working of each other’.810 He noted that Chancery 
would get opinions from common law judges on points of common law and send issues that 
required a jury trial to the common law courts. It is visible that doctrines and principles of 
equity were slowly merging into the law courts prior to the SCLPA, which was the formal 
recognition of equitable doctrines penetrating the common law. However, Milton observed: 
‘The infiltration of the doctrines of equity was an almost imperceptible process [it was] more 
a matter of osmosis than formal recognition’.811 This discourse maintains the ebb and flow of 
nuisance’s development with social mores and law rather than a linear history of balanced 
development. The complex interplay of political and juridical decisions that developed the 
injunction at law to tackle the lacuna of a potential continuum of cases for damages is a 
succinct illustration of that process in practice.  
3. Injunctions in the Nineteenth Century 
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In Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co
812
 the plaintiff brought an action in private 
nuisance against an electricity company following vibrations from equipment in a power 
station in London that caused structural damage to the house and discomfort to the occupier. 
An injunction was sought. The power stations were a frequent source of complaint, whether 
from vibrations, noise, or fumes, so much so that the industry lobbied Parliament for a 
modification of the common law. It was extremely difficult for these works to operate so as 
not to cause a nuisance thus the defendant asked the courts to exercise their discretion to 
grant damages in lieu of injunction; the trial judge (Kekewich J) awarded damages but 
refused an injunction. 
The Court of Appeal overturned the decision and awarded the injunction. There was nothing 
in the Electric Lighting Act (1882) to exempt those governed by the Act, such as the 
defendant, from liability to an action at common law for nuisance to their neighbours caused 
by their activities. In Lord Cairns' Act the jurisdiction to award damages instead of an 
injunction conferred upon Courts of Equity did not alter the settled principles upon which 
those Courts would grant an injunction. What was important - according to Lord Cairns' Act 
– was in cases of continuing actionable nuisance the jurisdiction to award damages ought 
only to be exercised under very exceptional circumstances. The way the judges interpreted 
the Act in Shelfer was captured by Lindley LJ, he commented: 
Ever since Lord Cairns' Act was passed the Court of Chancery has repudiated the notion that the Legislature 
intended to turn that Court into a tribunal for legalising wrongful acts; or in other words, the Court has always 
protested against the notion that it ought to allow a wrong to continue simply because the wrongdoer is able and 
willing to pay for the injury he may inflict. Neither has the circumstance that the wrongdoer is in some sense a 
                                                 
812
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public benefactor (e.g. a gas or water company or a sewer authority) ever been considered a sufficient reason for 
refusing to protect by injunction an individual whose rights are being persistently infringed.
813
 
Later in the twentieth-century Millett LJ in Jaggard v Sawyer
814
 referred to those judicial 
concerns reaffirming the need to assert the developments in the nineteenth-century that 
culminated in the cessation of the nuisance law lacuna. He stated:  
It has always been recognised that the practical consequence of withholding injunctive relief is to authorise the 
continuance of an unlawful state of affairs…Jurisdiction to award damages instead of an injunction should not 
be exercised as a matter of course so as to legalise the commission of a tort by any defendant who is willing and 
able to pay compensation.
815 
Smith LJ expressed in Shelfer a century prior to Millett LJ, that: 
Many judges have stated, and I emphatically agree with them, that a person by committing a wrongful act 
(whether it be a public company for public purposes or a private individual) is not thereby entitled to ask the 
Court to sanction his doing so by purchasing his neighbour's rights, by assessing damages in that behalf, leaving 
his neighbour with the nuisance, or his lights dimmed, as the case may be. In such cases the well-known rule is 
not to accede to the application, but to grant the injunction sought, for the plaintiff's legal right has been 
invaded, and he is prima facie entitled to an injunction.
816
 
He then went on to set out ‘a good working rule’817 better known as the ‘Shelfer principles’ 
which judges are now, following their constant reaffirmation (more recently in Watson and 
Regan) compelled to consider when contemplating denying an injunction and awarding 
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damages in lieu.
818
 Assuming a case can be made out,
819
 or that a claimant has not disentitled 
himself to equitable relief,
820
 the appropriate remedy may be damages in lieu of an injunction 
when the injury to the plaintiff's legal rights is small; is capable of being estimated in money; 
can be adequately compensated by a small money payment; and that the granting of an 
injunction would be oppressive to the defendant. Awarding damages in addition to or 
substitution for an injunction is ‘a delicate matter’ of judicial discretion.821 Of course it is not 
possible to specify all the circumstances relevant to the exercise of the discretion or to lay 
down exact rules for its exercise. In Smith LJ’s words:  
It is impossible to lay down any rule as to what, under the differing circumstances of each case, constitutes 
either a small injury, or one that can be estimated in money, or what is a small money payment, or an adequate 
compensation, or what would be oppressive to the defendant.
822
 
Outside specific intolerable conduct by the claimant it would appear that only undue 
oppression of the defendant will be considered a justified reason unless the injury is minimal.  
Regardless, the discretion is of course to be decided on the good sense of the tribunal.
823
 
The principles are not required to be considered exhaustive; for instance, the fourth criterion 
regarding oppression was not discussed by Smith LJ when he decided to grant the injunction. 
Palpably the unending number of potential variables within individual cases dictates that it is 
only logical that judges’ discretion may vary; after all who can tell what ‘a very exceptional 
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circumstance’ may involve in each individual case?824 Certain conduct by the defendant that 
would amount to ‘reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s rights’825 might influence judges not to 
award damages in lieu, regardless of whether all four conditions were satisfied.
826
 Certainly 
Smith LJ’s ‘good working rule’ is not entirely rigid, nevertheless it has continually been 
perceived as binding.
827
 
Jenny Steele has posited that the Shelfer conditions focus more on the interest of the claimant 
rather than on superfluous grounds, for instance, public interest.
828
 If that truly is the case 
then – today - those who allow harmful activities to emanate from their property should find 
it futile to argue that their activities perform a social utility, unless in ‘a marginal case where 
the damage to the claimant is minimal’.829 Social utility (or public interest) has often been the 
antithesis of private interests despite the fact that private interests often serve them.  
Bramwell B in Bamford v Turnley
830
 looked at the possibility of achieving ‘a more productive 
compromise between private rights and public interests’. Outwardly, his judgment averred an 
element of economic efficiency: by allowing damages in lieu of an injunction more readily it 
would encourage ‘productive activities’ and enhance the economy. However his comments 
have nevertheless been perceived as an elaborate rouse to protect traditional property rights 
against profit seeking industrial development.
831
 Of course, a degree of caution would be 
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required by judges when awarding damages in lieu of an injunction considering the concerns 
their contemporaries had following the enactment of the Lord Cairn’s Act.832 
Watson, until Coventry, clarified the confines in which judges may operate to grant the 
discretionary remedy and the decision certainly appeared to have decisively addressed the 
issue of public interest over private proprietary right in favour of private interest. Previously, 
since Shelfer,
833
 according to R. A. Buckley, injunctions were awarded ‘virtually as of 
right.’834 That is to say, the social utility of the defendant’s enterprise is not a ground for them 
‘paying to pollute’. They must stop pollution, in one way or another. Nevertheless, for a time, 
the issue of public interest had become an obstacle to litigants’ clear and legitimate 
expectation that the equitable remedy would be granted.
835
 
It can be argued that, in light of the preceding (and later) analysis, private interests in private 
nuisance should continue to override public benefit. Seemingly it is the status quo of modern 
private nuisance, enshrined in the seventeenth-century cases, for instance Aldred’s Case836 
and Jones v Powell,
837
 to be insusceptible to societal need.
838
 This state of affairs is entirely 
logical in an action conceived to protect private proprietorial rights: private nuisance should 
naturally seek to safeguard private interests above all else. However, the private/public nexus 
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is more complicated in this setting. In fact it was submitted in Bamford that: ‘It is for the 
public advantage that no nuisance be committed… [W]orks which are injurious to their 
neighbours will find means of avoiding the creation of nuisance’.839 Considering that 
Birmingham Corporation was relatively fresh in mind, that statement supports that private 
nuisance forced industry to innovate cleaner industrial practices during the Industrial 
Revolution, as will be seen.  
Private nuisance’s perceived resilience to public benefit has generated a phenomenon where 
statutory protection needs to be sought to prevent the courts from awarding an injunction 
against corporate undertakings by expressly excluding the nuisance actions in the statutory 
provisions; this legislative tactic nonetheless is not entirely reliable.
840
 It is only occasionally 
that groups of polluters successfully organise a lobby of Parliament for curtailment of the 
common law of nuisance but,
841
 mostly, statutory authority is something the courts imply into 
a statute that is silent on the position of the common law in relation to the statutory 
scheme.
842
  
It is worth mentioning that an injunction rarely sets out to prohibit entirely an economic 
activity rather it is more likely to restrain a continuing nuisance; although, mandatory 
injunctions are equally subject to the Shelfer principles.
843
 Defendant’s concerns regarding 
the potential austerity of injunctions are arguably exaggerated in most instances and the 
requirement for statutory provisions to prohibit common law nuisance is largely unfounded. 
That is the point made above (in connection with Bamford), but it is worth amplifying and it 
should be recognised that nuisance has a natural ability to seek the equitable outcome.  
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In Broadbent,
844
 for example, the House of Lords laid the foundations for the decision in 
Shelfer. They addressed the concerns inherent in Lord Cairns’ Act regarding the possibility of 
judges legalising activities which have been deemed a nuisance at law. Indeed Lord 
Chancellor Campbell consulted with Lord Cairns whilst deliberating on this case;
845
 the 
careful but asserted emergence of the injunction, for the reasons discussed above, were 
clearly visible during this period. Tackling unwarranted concerns of defendant’s were 
presumably crucial to the reasoning behind the Shelfer principles becoming rules of 
discretion; the equitable remedy would need to take defendant’s rights to use their land 
seriously but not to the extent that the courts would be legalising a nuisance. Smith LJ 
perhaps saw commissioning a nuisance as pandering to the defendants’ rights in favour of the 
plaintiffs. He commented: 
Many judges have stated, and I emphatically agree with them, that a person by committing a wrongful act 
(whether it be a public company for public purposes or a private individual) is not thereby entitled to ask the 
Court to sanction his doing so by purchasing his neighbour's rights, by assessing damages in that behalf, leaving 
his neighbour with the nuisance, or his lights dimmed, as the case may be. In such cases the well-known rule is 
not to accede to the application, but to grant the injunction sought, for the plaintiff's legal right has been 
invaded, and he is primâ facie [sic] entitled to an injunction.
846
  
The defendant’s objection in Broadbent that they would have to cease providing gas under 
the terms of the injunction (or in other words cease trading) - because they knew of no way of 
not producing acid gas emissions - was dismissed by the Lord Chancellor.  He stated that as 
they were able to adequately provide the district with gas prior to installing the new retort
847
 
that was the focus of the action; they could therefore adequately provide that district again 
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without it. Curtailing their activities would not be oppressive neither for the company nor for 
the public it served.
848
  
The Lord Chancellor was not saying that the defendant company could not utilise the new 
retort they were solely required under the conditions of the injunction to cease injuring the 
plaintiff. If they were unable to operate it without causing injury then it was quite possible 
that they could invent new technology to do so. It would be inequitable to provide statutory 
authority to allow an undertaking to pollute indiscriminately and whilst the amalgamation of 
the injunction in the law and equity courts must have presented a real threat to many 
economic activities, a balance could always be struck in the courts using the doctrines of 
nuisance law without the need for parliamentary intervention.   
Three important aspects can be taken from the nineteenth-century case law in the context of 
injunctive relief. First, the judges’ equitable discretion to grant an injunction is such that it 
should be the norm rather than the exception to the rule; after all, damages are a remedy 
awarded as of right when a nuisance is proven at law. That means that private interests are – 
naturally – to take precedence over public interest when injunctive relief is considered. 
Second, a simple judicial test (the Shelfer principles), as ‘a good working rule’849, determined 
whether judges might exercise their discretion not to grant an injunction and choose to limit 
redress to compensation in monetary terms. Third, judges did not have the right to 
commission a nuisance; they nonetheless balanced conditions contained within injunctions 
where possible so that only the injury caused to the plaintiff was curtailed and thus was not 
oppressive to the defendant.  
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It has been argued that oppression was essentially the test,
850
 or better expressed, after 
balancing the circumstances of the case an injunction would generally be awarded unless the 
injunction would be oppressive on the defendant. Conversely, if an activity continued to 
injure then that activity needed to cease otherwise, not only would judges be legalising a 
nuisance, the plaintiff’s rights would in effect be for sale, purchasable by repeated awards for 
damages at a price dictated not by the market but at the discretion of judges. Subjugation of 
either defendant’s or plaintiff’s proprietary rights would be ‘unduly oppressive’; and to 
borrow Mummery LJ’s words, such an exploit would not be ‘in accordance with the 
principles on which equitable relief has usually been granted’.851 
An eventuality of the discretionary injunction on these terms was that judges of the 
nineteenth-century encouraged innovative technology, both impliedly and expressly. 
Seemingly, in many circumstances and as a consequence of injunctive relief, in order for 
publically or financially beneficial activities to continue, new technology needed to be 
developed.
852
 This is a much disregarded reality of private nuisance actions during the period; 
instead the prevailing stance is that the tort was on the whole ineffective at tackling pollution 
from industrial activities.
853
 There is much evidence to refute such claims. 
4. Technological Innovation Through Discretionary Judicial Intervention 
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Past triumphs
854
 in the courts have heralded environmental protection measures. Nuisance 
actions have prevented pollution by acid smuts
855
 and oil,
856
 protected against noxious 
fumes,
857
 offensive smells from animals
858
 and foul-smelling privies.
859
 Nuisances regarding 
stinky privies intensified over the epochs as the problems of disposing of effluent 
transformed into nuisance of a much grander scale – sewage pollution. The story of sewage 
pollution in private nuisance illustrates private nuisance’s capabilities for environmental 
protection (and safeguarding human health). The problem of disposing of increasing amounts 
of sewage snowballed exponentially as population increased creating towns and cities with 
the onset of industrialisation. The unimaginable situation to the modern audience culminated 
in, arguably, private nuisance law’s finest hour and revealed its ability to function as a true 
environmental tort. 
Attorney-General v Birmingham Corporation
860
 secured investment and consequent advances 
in sewage treatment that protected public health on a national scale. Adderley’s action to 
thwart the entire city of Birmingham (approximately a quarter of a million people at the time) 
from damaging his land whilst it disposed of its sewage into the river Tame is a succinct 
example of private nuisance’s capability to prevent large public interests and corporations 
from polluting on an industrial scale; it also demonstrates the power of judges to force 
polluters to find alternate methods of operating. Over a period of thirty seven years of court 
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room drama concerning injunctions and a subsequent half a million pounds (equivalent to 
£20m today
861
) of clean infrastructure investment from the corporation
862
 the plaintiff was 
finally satisfied that the defendant had achieved an adequate means of purifying urban 
effluent and ceased injunctive relief from the courts. According to Pontin, the key subtlety 
here lies in granting the wrongdoer a suspension to the injunction, to allow for the necessary 
technological innovation.
863
 
Government archives provide irrefutable evidence that private nuisance restricted the effects 
of pollution in the Industrial Revolution:
864
 sure enough, particularly during the nineteenth 
century, the archives show that Birmingham was just the beginning of a broader common law 
driven campaign to clean up sewage through the instigation of technological innovation (on a 
massive scale) to stamp out sewage pollution. Such findings refute Joel Brenner’s contentions 
that private nuisance was ineffectual in dealing with industrialisation.
865
 Brenner emasculated 
nuisance law as a potential curb on environmental pollution; however it is evident the tort 
played a crucial role in preventing unbridled environmental damage. Historical black letter 
and empirical analysis during the Industrial Revolution by Pontin has introduced a differing 
stance about case law during the course of industrialisation and his work is testament to the 
success of the tort in environmental protection. It is suggested here the key to that success 
rested in the injunction.  
5. Miller v Jackson: anyone for cricket? 
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In Miller v Jackson
866
 Lord Denning found himself in - what was for him - the difficult 
position of potentially halting activities of a village cricket club (Lintz Cricket Club). 
Developers were granted planning permission to build houses adjoining a long-established 
cricket ground. Mrs Miller was one of the new residents that quickly became annoyed by the 
showering of cricket balls – despite the boundary fence - and complained to the club. She 
refused an offer by it to pay for any damage that might be caused.  Following damage to the 
property and interference with her and her husband’s use and enjoyment of their garden 
during cricket matches she sought an injunction that would prohibit cricket being played on 
the ground without first taking adequate steps to prevent balls being struck out of it on to 
their house or garden. The trial judge granted the injunction and Lintz Cricket Club appealed. 
On appeal it was held (Lord Denning dissenting) that every time a cricket ball went onto the 
Millers’ property the cricket club was liable for both nuisance and negligence. However Lord 
Denning and Cumming-Bruce LJ refused the injunction (Lane LJ dissenting) on the premise 
that:  
The special circumstances were such that the greater interest of the public should prevail over the hardship to 
the individual householders by being deprived of their enjoyment of their house and garden while cricket was 
being played; and for that reason the injunction should be discharged and damages…substituted for past and 
future inconvenience.
867
 
Lord Denning’s highly criticised judgment that fails to consider the Shelfer case or its 
principles has recently been described as ‘a work of literature first and law a somewhat 
distant second’.868 Wilson wrote, ‘no summary or extract can properly do justice to Denning's 
literary craftsmanship:
869
  the judgment is indeed a literary work of art but that is out of place 
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for a law report.
870
 Resolutely allowing the appeal, Denning blamed both the developer (for 
building the houses too close to the ground) and the local authority for granting planning 
permission for the developer to build the houses in such close proximity; he even rendered 
the Millers culpable for buying one of the houses. It would seem that anyone could be at fault 
except the cricketers for, as Denning viewed it, continuing to play as they had done for more 
than seventy years.
871
  He decided the reasonable use of the ground did not suddenly become 
a nuisance because a neighbour chooses to come to a house in a position where it might 
occasionally be hit by a cricket ball.
872
 It would seem his judgment was clouded in this case. 
Whereas, as we have seen, Millett LJ ascertained in Jaggard
873
  that it had always been 
recognised that withholding injunctive relief – where a nuisance has been found at law - is to 
authorise the continuance of an unlawful state of affairs, the appeal majority in Miller 
deviated from what was essentially a judicial safeguard to protect against the illegal 
commissioning of a tort. Accordingly the activity in Miller had for all intents and purposes 
been legalised owing to it being a social utility, despite already having been found to be 
unlawful in those circumstances. Be that as it may, Lord Denning’s overzealous attempt to 
defend cricket and village life is seemingly the only case that emphatically states that - 
counter to and ignoring the Shelfer principles
874
 - the public interest outweighed the private 
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interest.
875
  The decision in Kennaway quickly restored the status quo to a place before the 
temporary disruption caused by Miller.   
6. Kennaway v Thompson: the Shelfer Principles Restored 
The cases of Kennaway and Watson
876
 are related for a number of reasons thus it is judicious 
to examine them jointly to expound the erosion of the Shelfer principles in Miller concerning 
the standpoint on public interest. They both involved noise nuisance from motor sports and in 
both cases the Court of Appeal decided to reverse the trial judge’s decisions and award an 
injunction. The conditions contained within the injunctions to restrain the defendants’ 
activities were similar in composition.
877
 Both cases reaffirmed the Shelfer principles as the 
proper test to assess whether damages should be awarded in lieu of an injunction;
878
 that such 
damages should only be awarded under ‘very exceptional circumstances’;879 and again both 
reaffirmed that, in accord with Shelfer, private interests should prevail over public interests 
when considering injunctive relief.
880
  
There are some differences however and, while they do not affect the basis of Smith LJ’s 
working rule, they do help build a more holistic account regarding guidance for granting 
injunctions today. One distinguishing fact that must be mentioned is that in Watson the 
claimants sought an injunction for noise that already existed when they purchased the 
property that was considered a public benefit. Mrs Kennaway on the other hand built her 
house (next to a lake she owned); she could not, and did not, complain of racing activity at 
the levels which were experienced when she built the house. It was the later intolerable noise 
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after the club expanded, generated by large boats, commonly at national and international 
meets, which attracted the interest of the aggrieved parties who then brought proceedings.
881
 
The significance of Kennaway, particularly in the twenty-first-century, has often been 
overlooked but it stands out as a seminal case regarding remedies in private nuisance; this 
was recognised by Coulson J in Barr and others v Biffa Waste Services Ltd.
882
 He pointed out 
that Lawton LJ began his judgment by expressing the appeal focused on remedies. In that 
respect, and in the context of this chapter, Kennaway represents the ideal platform to work 
from on the issue of private rights prevailing over public benefit, particularly as it directly 
disputes the decision in Miller reaffirming the Shelfer principles.
883
 In fact Lawton LJ went a 
little further stating that ‘we are of the opinion that there is nothing in Miller binding on us 
[the Court of Appeal], which qualifies what was decided in Shelfer's case’ despite being 
heard in the same court.
884
  
In Watson the use of the Croft Motor Circuit by the defendants gave rise to excessive noise 
that constituted a nuisance. The Watsons sought an injunction to restrain the continuation of 
the nuisance (by restricting the number of days that exceeded the noise threshold established 
by a previous agreement
885
) and damages as compensation for its commission in the past. The 
trial judge, Simon J, awarded damages
886
 but refused to grant an injunction on the grounds 
that there was considerable delay in bringing the proceedings and that the claimant could be 
adequately compensated by the award of damages. Although not considered by Simon J as 
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part of his conclusion he mentioned the relevance of the beneficial public utility that the track 
provided as no other track of that sort existed in northern England.
887
 The Court of Appeal
888
 
disagreed with Simon J and granted the injunction restricting events classified as N1 to N4 to 
forty days per annum.
889
  
Mary Kennaway owned a house adjacent to a manmade lake in Gloucestershire called 
Mallam Water. She brought an action in nuisance against the Cotswold Motor Boat Racing 
Club owing to often intolerable noise from practice sessions and races at meets on most 
weekends during the months of April to October. Again, Mrs Kennaway sought an injunction 
to restrain further nuisances (by reducing the number of race meets
890
) and damages 
including special damages for diminution in the market value of her house by reason of the 
activities of the club. The trial judge, Mais J, awarded the plaintiff damages
891
 but this time 
refused to grant an injunction on the ground that there was considerable public interest in the 
club thus an injunction would be oppressive.  
In reversing the decision, for the reasons set out above, it was clear that the Court of Appeal 
in Kennaway were focused on refuting the decision in Miller regarding a public interest 
prevailing over private interests when seeking an injunction. Whereas the judges in Watson 
held that private interests prevailed over public utility Lawton LJ was emphatic and went a 
little further, he stated:  
Any decisions before Shelfer's case…which give support for the proposition that the public interest should 
prevail over the private interest must be read subject to the decision in Shelfer's case.
892
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Lawton LJ is therefore suggesting that all cases where the balance had been struck in favour 
of the public interest should be reassessed and not used to support notions that the public 
interest should prevail. In a manner of speaking this matter was resolved in Regan. It would 
seem, in line with Shelfer, that while the public interests or any private individuals interests 
may be taken into account when the injury to the claimant is minimal the requirement for 
exceptional circumstances or oppression to the defendant (before the injunction can be 
denied) is not removed.
893
 Of course, it is highly unlikely that any form of environmental 
pollution would be considered minimal, or a ‘small injury’ for the purposes of Smith LJ’s 
first principle.
894
 It should be noted that Regan was concerned with mandatory injunctions 
that are traditionally far more onerous on a defendant forcing a positive act, for instance, to 
demolish a building for obstructing ancient light.
895
  
To Lawton LJ intervention by injunction can only be justified when an activity ‘causes 
inconvenience beyond what other occupiers in the neighbourhood can be expected to bear’.896 
He clearly conveyed that the noise levels had become unbearable on occasions, particularly 
during national and international meets when they exceeded 100 decibels.
897
 The point at 
issue in Lawton LJ’s mind concerning granting an injunction was that of reasonableness of 
user. He stated, ‘The question is whether the neighbour is using his property reasonably; 
having regard to the fact that he has a neighbour’.898 He sought to find equilibrium where the 
claimant no longer had to put up with an inconvenience beyond what she should be expected 
to bear and the right for the plaintiffs to reasonably use the lake. The conditions laid out by 
the court in the injunction found that equilibrium by restraining the intensity of the continuing 
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nuisance; the tradition of balancing of interests vital to actionability had become central to 
awarding an injunction and its conditions.  
Lawton LJ’s reasoning behind granting the injunction – and its conditions – somewhat echoes 
Lord Wright’s judgment in Sedleigh-Denfield where he stated: 
A balance has to be maintained between the right of the occupier to do what he likes with his own and that right 
of his neighbour not to be interfered with. It is impossible to give any precise or universal formula, but it may 
broadly be said that a useful test is perhaps what is reasonable according to the ordinary usages of mankind 
living in a particular society.
899
  
Lawton’s handling of Kennaway suggests a link exists between the judicial reasoning behind 
the discretion for granting injunctions, the interests balancing exercise that is synonymous 
with private nuisance, and the reasonableness of user (see chapter 4).
900
 He was not the first 
judge to think in those terms. Previously in Sanders-Clark v Grosvenor Mansions Co Ltd 
Buckley J stated that the court must question whether the defendant is using his or her 
property reasonably or not: ‘If he is using it reasonably, there is nothing which at law can be 
considered a nuisance, but if he is not using it reasonably … then the plaintiff is entitled to 
relief’.901 Evidence of this link between reasonable user and injunctive relief was seen a little 
earlier in Gaunt v Finney, a case again concerning noise but on that occasion from the 
defendants' mill, Lord Selborne LC held: 
A nuisance by noise … is emphatically a question of degree… Such things to offend against the law must be 
done in a manner which, beyond fair controversy, ought to be regarded as excessive and unreasonable.
 902
 
In fact the ratio referred to in this chapter that span the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first-
centuries only really affirmed the principles of the eighteenth-century judges, such as Lord 
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Mansfield, which in turn were only a ‘restatement and stabilisation of principles forged 
earlier’ in Case during the seventeenth-century.903  
Judges at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution approached nuisance cases with a rule of 
reasonableness to take into account the effects of snowballing urbanisation and 
industrialisation; although, of course, that was before the consolidation of the remedies in 
nuisance law in the mid-nineteenth-century seen above.
904
 While Mansfield showed an 
increasing willingness to strike a balance in favour of commercial activity he nonetheless 
made attempts to actively persuade parties to arbitrate a resolution.
905
 With the notion of 
equity ever more present in nuisance cases his other option, as nuisance could not be abated 
in Case, was to direct the plaintiff to bring an action to obtain an injunction in the Court of 
Chancery, where they had been available since the early 1700s.
906
 
The Shelfer principles were forged in consideration of ‘preventative justice’. We have seen 
that preventative justice was central to Cranworth LC’s motivations surrounding the Bill that 
established the SCLPA 1854. It was geared at creating statutory authority to stop the lacuna 
effect created by the continuation of nuisances and repeated injuries to plaintiffs discussed 
earlier. Lord Cairns’ Act balanced the remedial power of the law and equity courts thus the 
Shelfer principles and much judicial reasoning thereafter were the indirect result of the 
perceived problems of rights being purchased if the over-awarding of damages in lieu of an 
injunction was not controlled. Despite this fundamental element of ‘justice’ the nature of 
injunctions must be recognised: they are inherently coercive – they force action and prevent 
persons from undertaking often lawful activities. 
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The coercive element intrinsic to injunctions is probably inescapable as its origins following 
the Black Death suggest. Palpably a remedy that forces someone to act or not act in a 
particular manner or to do something undesirable – sometimes generating pecuniary loss - is 
anything but passive, despite its function to create a just state of affairs. The safeguard within 
Shelfer’s principles that is aimed at preventing injunctive relief from being oppressive to 
defendants nevertheless is at the discretion of judges even with the added possibility of 
exceptional circumstances denying the injunction. Bingham MR and Millett LJ in Jaggard 
equated oppression of the defendant to the exceptional circumstances required by the Shelfer 
principles to justify withholding an injunction.
907
 Regardless of these possible grounds to 
deny an injunction both are highly dependent on judicial discretion. That discretion was 
tested to the limit in Dennis v Ministry of Defence.
908
 
7. National Security, the Ultimate Public Interest? 
The erosion of Shelfer concerning public interest (as seen in Miller) was revisited in Dennis. 
The public interest that was the point in issue was national security, arguably the extremity of 
all public interests. The Ministry of Defence infringed the Dennis’ use and enjoyment of their 
home, Walcot Hall Estate. ‘Extreme noise’ was created during the training of Harrier pilots 
from neighbouring RAF Wittering which was construed to constitute a nuisance. 
Nevertheless, unusually, the court gave damages in lieu of an injunction. Buckley J made his 
decision in the belief that his conclusion was not prohibited by authority
909
 in fact he does not 
choose to put forward that previous case law either compelled or justified that conclusion.
910
 
The facts of the case were ‘exceptional’, to say the least, and they were not analogous to the 
cases that were cited by Buckley - in actual fact they were not analogous to any other case of 
which I am aware. It can be argued that his unconventional, albeit careful, approach was 
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consequential to questions regarding the defence of the realm demanding a solution. The fact 
that the circumstances of the case were burdened with the cumbersome element that national 
security is, perhaps, the greatest of public interests the long-established supremacy of private 
right over public interest also demanded resolution; it was nonetheless unresolved.  
Importantly this case ultimately affirmed that public utility is incapable of removing the 
existence of a nuisance, or in other words, it does not make something that would otherwise 
be considered a nuisance cease to be one. Ostensibly, the defence of the realm is an exception 
to that rule. To date, barring cricket in Miller (which justifiably received negative judicial 
treatment), the defence of the realm seems to be the only deviation from the general 
perception that a public interest in a continuing activity ordinarily constitutes a nuisance. It 
would appear the matter will depend on all the circumstances, not least the strength of the 
public interest in question.
911
 What must be taken from the decision in Dennis is that even 
national security does not entirely deny the granting of an injunction. 
Using the guidelines of Smith LJ in Shelfer to award damages in lieu of an injunction
912
 
(including oppression of the defendant, the ability to financially compensate for the 
diminution in the market value of the Estate,
913
 and considerable delay in bringing the 
proceedings
914
) Buckley J nonetheless, for all intents and purposes, merely suspended an 
injunction rather than denying one.
915
 The possibility of granting the injunction, but 
suspending it ‘to give the MoD time to find an alternative site’, was in fact suggested by the 
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claimant’s representative, Mr Wood QC.916 The difficulty in proving that a more suitable site 
existed was ubiquitous; in reality all that would be achieved was a relocation of the nuisance, 
which is an unfortunate consequence of injunctive relief, as was the case in Esso v Halsey.
917
 
The case revolved around whether this extraordinary use of land could be considered a public 
interest capable of withholding an injunction when the case law - and most commentators - 
concludes that public interest in itself cannot prevail over private rights and is not a defence 
in private nuisance.
918
 Buckley J stated: 
It seems to me that the nettle must be grasped. Either these Harriers constitute a nuisance or public interest, as 
represented by the MoD maintaining a state of the art air strike force and training pilots, provides immunity. If 
there is immunity, it is obviously not unlimited. The MoD must do all it reasonably can to avoid damaging the 
interests of others. In my view that would include choosing an appropriate location and operating it 
reasonably.
919
 
The defence of the realm clearly gave rise to extraordinary circumstances that could arguably 
be justified as ‘exceptional’ for the purposes of deviating from the Shelfer principles, but this 
was not expressed by Buckley J. In effect, the defence of the realm as a public interest was 
treated as if it had been authorised by statute rather on long-established - seemingly binding - 
principles.
920
  
But then again, Buckley J choose not to dismiss the possibility of an injunction in the future 
when he awarded damages in lieu. The Harrier was due to be replaced in 2012. Evidentially 
Mr Dennis was given the scope to bring a fresh claim at that time and Buckley J strongly 
advised the RAF to relocate by then.
921
 The Harrier was retired in 2011 but the demise of 
Joint Force Harrier in December 2010 and the subsequent departure of Number 4 Squadron 
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following its disbandment in January 2011 means we will never know if Mr Dennis would 
have sought another injunction, if the RAF had not taken Buckley J’s advice to train its pilots 
elsewhere when the Harrier was replaced.
922
   
If we imagine that the training of Typhoon pilots had replaced the role of Joint Force Harrier 
and Mr Dennis decided to bring an action in nuisance seeking an injunction to restrain 
activities, what could we expect to be the outcome? The decisions in Regan and Watson do 
suggest that Mr Dennis would have been successful in a subsequent claim if the proper test 
was used (in the absence of statutory authority or planning permission that was capable of 
changing the character of the neighbour
923
); Buckley J did not consider the Shelfer principles, 
in fact he only really referred to Shelfer itself to affirm the rule that the public benefit of a 
wrong doer ‘has never been considered a sufficient reason to refuse an injunction.924 It can 
therefore be asserted that, according to the Chancellor of the High Court in Watson, Buckley 
J ‘failed to apply the proper test’ to award damages in lieu of an injunction.925 Certainly the 
injury to the plaintiff’s legal rights was not small and, although the injury may be viewed as 
capable of being estimated in money, the compensation was by no means small (£950,000). If 
the test was oppression to the defendant, in reality, the resources of the RAF and Her 
Majesty’s government that funds it are – even in this time of austerity - arguably too 
substantial to suggest relocating the activities to another of the numerous RAF bases as 
oppressive to the defendant. 
Owing to Mr Dennis’ option to seek an injunction from the Ministry of Defence in future, the 
delay in proceedings that Buckley J referred to would be unlikely to be relevant in a further 
action to seek an injunction. If Watson and Regan are to be understood correctly then public 
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interests are only relevant in ‘marginal cases’. Essentially, as the noise levels would not be 
‘minimal’ and thus the injury not small, the public interest would be by definition 
irrelevant.
926
 Of course the facts in Dennis probably represent the most extreme 
circumstances in which the private right/public interest paradigm could be tested, thus the 
true question is would the circumstances be construed as exceptional for the purposes of 
withholding an injunction as per the Shelfer principles? Perhaps, but this was not examined 
by Buckley.  
Bearing in mind the hierarchy of the courts, Dennis was decided at a relatively low level and 
there is room for its extraordinary facts to be reconsidered if any similar case was to reach the 
courtroom in the future. One further point requires reflection here regarding the potential real 
outcome of the decision to allow a further action to seek injunctive relief. Although the 
replacement for the Harrier is not due to around 2020
927
 the RAF still need to train pilots; that 
had not continued at RAF Wittering. It cannot be readily dismissed that, considering the 
strong advice given to the Ministry of Defence to relocate, the threat of an injunction in 2012 
was enough to reassess the situation and train pilot elsewhere. Whatever the case may be it 
appears that private interest remains the ‘irresistible force’ it has exemplified since the early 
seventeenth-century.
928
 
8. Coventry v Lawrence – affirmation of a judge’s discretion to award or withhold an 
injunction 
 
Stephen Tromans comments in 1982 arguably pre-empt the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Coventry. If this is the case, the decision vindicates his criticism of Shelfer that it could 
produce ‘drastic’ results – Adderley’s sewage case is considered an example of that – and 
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that the courts ought to be more willing to remedy nuisance through compensation to avoid 
this eventuality; this is the prevention/payment dichotomy.
929
 Pontin, however, has argued 
that there is nothing per se drastic about the award of an injunction. Everything hinges on the 
terms on which it is awarded. Adderley’s injunction in Birmingham was suspended so as to 
enable the essential public utility to continue to operate (on pain of compensation for the 
wrong) while it worked out what to do about the nuisance, in the sense of mitigating it. 
Pontin has also questioned the extent to which Coventry has indeed departed from Shelfer. 
There appear to be two broad aspects to this argument. The first is that there are too many 
differences of opinion in the speeches of the Justices of the Supreme Court to conclude that 
the law has changed. These comprise the extreme opinion of Lord Sumption, that injunctions 
should not be awarded where third parties rely on the wrongdoers activity; the opinion of 
Lord Neuberger that the court ought not to fetter its discretion to consider all factors, 
including the needs of the wrongdoer’s workforce and the defendant having planning 
permission, which will usually be relevant as evidence of the public interest in the 
wrongdoer’s land use; Lord Carnwath’s agreement with Lord Neuberger with the caveat that 
planning permission was to be understood as a relevant factor, but not necessarily a weighty 
one; and Lord Mance’s concern that victims of a nuisance affecting their home ought not be 
required to accept payment for the wrong rather than prevention of it.  
Pontin’s second argument is that the Supreme Court has not mentioned leading authority to 
the effect that the proper way of ‘factoring in’ the public interest is in the terms on which the 
injunction is granted. Pontin cites Pride of Derby v British Celanese
930
 as the most recent 
authority in that respect. There it is was stated by Lord Romer that public interest arguments 
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‘are strong reason for suspending the injunction, but no reason for not granting it’.931 As 
noted above, that approach dates back to the mid-nineteenth century, in cases such as 
Broadbent (House of Lords) and Adderley’s Case (Birmingham).  
One possible response to Pontin’s first argument is that the Supreme Court appears to have 
united – the reasons for the reconciliation are not explicit - around Lord Neuberger’s 
approach.
932
 ‘We are changing the practice of the courts’, opined Lord Neuberger in 
Coventry.
933
 The effect of Lord Neuberger’s contribution, as approved by Court as a whole, is 
that a trial judge cannot decline damages in lieu of an injunction on the basis that the public 
interest etc is irrelevant. There is no disguising that this is a change. However, it is not clear 
whether this will make much if any difference in practice, partly because the change involves 
affirming a court’s discretion (and that each case will turn on the facts), but mainly because 
of the likelihood that the public interest concerns that exerted influence on the Supreme Court 
are pre-empted by the case law on injunctions being awarded on terms that are suspended.  If 
the injunction can be granted on terms which safeguard the public interest, why should it be 
withheld on public interest grounds? 
A possible criticism of Pontin’s ‘suspension’ argument is that it is better, in the sense of more 
certain, to address the public interest in the grant or withholding of an injunction rather than 
through some finely tailored, case specific terms. For example, thirty seven years is a long 
time for an injunction to be ‘overhanging’ through a suspension, as in Adderley’s Case. 
Something which Pontin does not mention is Buckley J in Dennis (see previous section), 
whose approach was to decline an injunction and award damages in lieu, but with an 
invitation for the victim to return to court should the defendant continue to cause a nuisance. 
However, as I have already commented, Buckley J’s approach is tantamount to a suspended 
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injunction. This would support the argument that the court in Coventry has not fundamentally 
shifted the onus from prevention to payment. 
At the time of writing, it is unclear whether or how the wrongdoer in Coventry will respond 
to the invitation to apply for damages instead of an injunction, or indeed whether the victims 
will continue to seek an injunction. ‘Fenland’, the victims’ home, remains unoccupied 
because of a fire rendering it uninhabitable. One theoretical option is that the parties agree on 
compensation for the future devaluation of Fenland as a residence, as a result of noise from 
the weekend racing, and that the wrongdoer acquires an easement to emit weekend noise 
which protects them against future nuisance proceedings on this point.  
Whether the parties agree on this, or bargain leading to a settlement of another way forward 
(concerning the permissible amount of weekend noise, for example), it is important to 
reiterate that negotiation of compliance with the common law of nuisance is a well-
established facet of the practice and, crucially, the courts often play a quite conscious and 
deliberate part in framing negotiation. The court’s traditional role is that of laying down a 
broad goal of being a ‘good neighbour’ which can be fleshed out in a ex post negotiated 
settlement of behavioural change rather than ‘impose’ the details of a remedy. 934  This is 
illustrated by Coventry itself, where after judgment on liability at first instance the parties had 
agreed on the injunction and its terms. Thus it was a surprise that the defendant’s sought to 
depart from this at the Supreme Court stage. It would be deeply regrettable were this role of 
the courts to change to that of putting a price on nuisance, as Lord Sumption advocates (or 
rather advocated). 
 
9. Beyond Prohibitory Injunctions – Preventing Nuisance Risks 
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In a mirror to the case law, the focus of this chapter has been on the award or withholding of 
injunctions prohibiting a proven nuisance; that is the form of injunction most claimants in 
reported nuisance actions seek. The argument so far is that the courts, with some exceptions, 
have closely followed nineteenth century jurisprudence regarding injunctions and that the 
injunction as a consequence is the victim’s primary remedy. A further argument is that this 
remedy reflects the concern of Lord Cranworth with ‘preventative justice’,935 which is of 
interest from the perspective of the concern in this thesis with the environmental dimension to 
nuisance law. Prevention of harm is highly valued as a ‘principle’ of environmental law. 
However, the courts exercise greater caution when it comes to managing the risk of an 
unproved and potential nuisance from occurring in future. This is apparent from the case law 
on the subject of the quia timet injunction. An injunction of this nature can be obtained in the 
face of impending harm, though no actual damage has as yet occurred. According to Pearson 
J in order to maintain a quia timet action to restrain an apprehended injury two ingredients are 
required, first ‘there must, if no actual damage is proved, be proof of imminent danger and, 
second, ‘there must also be proof that the apprehended damage will, if it comes, be very 
substantial’.936  
Hence if the potential damage is not imminent or at least very likely to occur in the near 
future, the court will not usually exercise its discretion in the issue of this type of 
injunction.
937
 But what is interesting in ecocide theory terms about this two tier test to grant a 
quia timet injunction is the nature of the apprehended damage. Pearson J continued: 
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I should almost say it must be proved that [the damage] will be irreparable, because, if the danger is not proved 
to be so imminent that no one can doubt that, if the remedy is delayed, the damage will be suffered, I think it 
must be shewn [sic] that, if the damage does occur at any time, it will come in such a way and under such 
circumstances that it will be impossible for the Plaintiff to protect himself against it if relief is denied to him in a 
quia timet action’.938  
It is difficult to truly determine what Pearson J meant by ‘almost irreparable’ even in light of 
the rest of his judgment but we can be confident that he was attempting to assert the 
difficulties of ascertaining what represents an imminent threat in nuisance law terms. Thus 
we may argue that he intended to communicate the difficulty of establishing proof that a 
threat was imminent; in such a position setting a high benchmark would be logical. We can 
apprehend a threat although it may never materialise.  
However if the nuisance in question is capable of inflicting irreversible damage then the 
plaintiff’s rights will be diluted by the courts if the injunction is denied then the injury occurs; 
it would be too late. The judges would be culpable of severe misjudgement for not 
appreciating the severity of the environmental threat. This may explain Pearson J’s caution 
and the express use of the word ‘almost’ in his ratio. Considering his choice of words it 
would be difficult to argue he was proposing that a potential injury would need to be 
irreversible in order for a quia timet injunction to be granted. There are various 
environmental threats today that would cause irreparable environmental damage if a threat 
became a reality. The potential for this category of injunction is thought-provoking as 
arguably there are numerous examples of persons with the sufficient interest in private 
nuisance where an action can be brought today; it is a question of whether the ingredients for 
a quia timet injunction can be found for judges to grant them at their discretion.  
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The quia timet injunction is perhaps the best illustration of the coercive nature of injunctive 
relief.  In environmental protection terms it is in all probability the option that needs 
exploring the most; if substantial environmental harm can be prevented before it happens 
then the environment and human health could be rigorously safeguarded. Another aspect of 
the judgment in Fletcher v Bealey
939
 which is important for the environment rests in the fact 
that, despite the action being denied, the dismissal was expressly declared to be without 
prejudice thus the plaintiff had the right to bring another action in case of actual injury or any 
future apprehended imminent danger. It would seem the courts are unable to justify 
preventing would be litigants from exercising their private rights. Accordingly private 
litigants – through private nuisance – can take a participatory role in the environmental 
debate.
940
 
10. Conclusions 
 
In comparison with the foregoing chapters, the current law on injunctions is based on the 
nineteenth-century position; this is explicable in terms of the chronology of injunction’s late 
development, even though they have far more ancient origins than is commonly understood.  
This chapter also varies from the others as there has been a clear shift in inclination that leans 
in favour of the plaintiff and away from the defendant or polluter. The case law confirms that 
if a nuisance at law has been established then prima facie an injunction will be granted. It has 
been clearly established by the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Shelfer, Regan and 
Watson – and even to probably to a lesser extent Coventry - that damages in lieu of an 
injunction should only be awarded under ‘very exceptional circumstances’.  
Whilst the decision in Dennis is exceptional the decision in Miller is clearly viewed as an 
isolated blip in an otherwise constant judicial fiat that public interests must acquiesce to 
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private proprietary rights: consideration of public benefit is of no (or very little) significance 
in nuisance law.
941
 In light of the preceding analysis, suggesting as it does, the injunction is a 
powerful tool in the armoury of environmental protection. It has the potential to stop 
nuisances, to restore desired environmental conditions (allowing, for example, scorched 
vegetation to regenerate in a favourable environment) and to prevent substantial 
environmental damage from happening in the first place.  
It is perhaps often overlooked that judicious litigants may use nuisance law to effect 
environmental protection by attaining an injunction from the outset of their action. As such, it 
is suggested that nuisance law’s nature imparts a pedigree for environmental protection. 
Further, there is something much more fundamental than a fortunate externality of the action 
when nuisance provides that protection, especially when – if only in part – that is the 
claimant’s objective. It goes without saying that claims can be maintained regarding 
injunctions having an indirect effect on environmental protection when litigants assert their 
rights in nuisance. However that is irrelevant if any degree of intent to effect environmental 
protection was a factor when a claimant decides to begin litigation. The direct or indirect 
effect concerning environmental protection in nuisance law is, on the whole, merely 
academic. Regardless of the resultant influence of an injunction, the outcome is desirable, in 
environmental terms, if an action is successful and the injunction stops the environmental 
harm. The injunction – when seen in terms of the concluding comments in this chapter – 
strongly supports the notion that nuisance is an environmental tort. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
       
At the outset of this research, I chose to follow Lord Goff’s lead in Hunter by looking to 
incipient nuisance law to research the ‘essence’ of private nuisance and to determine whether 
there was a linear explanation for the tort’s development over the centuries, with the main 
broad research objective to contribute to a deeper understanding of common law private 
nuisance and its potential to protect the natural environment. Palpably any linear explanation 
would be problematic without a comprehensive historical analysis of its evolution. In 
searching for the true ‘essence’ of private nuisance and evidence of a linear evolution I 
started (as Lords Goff did) in the medieval epoch. A fairly quick realisation was that, 
fundamentally, what I was searching for was there, but in a different form than was expected. 
Lord Goff’s interpretation of the ‘essence’ of private nuisance being ‘a tort directed against 
the plaintiff's enjoyment of rights over land’942 is seemingly not an accurate depiction of the 
true essence.  In fact, as was explained in Chapter 2, considering that the plea rolls leave little 
evidence of ‘what created a nuisance…or even what rights a landholder had in his own 
tenement’;943 that nuisance law did not protect rights in land until the assize of nuisance, in 
name, existed; and that ‘[p]roperty was antithetical to twelfth-century feudal relationships’,944 
we are placed in little doubt that the essence, in line with Lord Goff’s proprietary 
interpretation, is not the true essence of nuisance, at least originally.  
However, it was established, arguably, that an alternative ‘essence’ than that offered by Lord 
Goff, did emanate from its medieval form. Whilst that meant that the foundations for 
determining a linear explanation for the tort’s evolution existed, it also meant that there was a 
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flaw in his Lordship’s hypothesis regarding the ‘essence’ of nuisance. If that is indeed the 
case his reasoning about his interpretation of the strict proprietary element to modern private 
nuisance needed revision – after all his judgment in Hunter has received much criticism. 
Palpably, if a revision is needed, Lord Goff’s interpretation of the essence of nuisance is 
problematic because, almost certainly, as evidenced in the preceding chapters, it has 
influenced other decisions, which are essential to the continuing evolution of modern 
nuisance, particularly in its traditional role of effecting environmental protection.   
It was during the process of researching the proprietary element of private nuisance, in 
regards to standing (discussed in Chapter 2), that the torts ‘true essence’ came to the fore. The 
‘simple form’ argument put forward in this thesis (from which a linear explanation derives), 
that developed as the research advanced, showed that an essential aspect of nuisance over the 
centuries is an inherent evolutionary character of the law. It is argued in preceding chapters 
that the ‘true essence’ of private nuisance lies in the notion that it has evolved according to 
the varying contemporary societal needs across the epochs to protect various interests in land. 
The question throughout was whether that evolutionary character, in light of recent 
developments, is continuing in a manner consistent with its ancestry in effecting 
environmental protection? Which begs another question: do recent developments in the tort 
reflect environmental protection as a societal need?  
As it is contended in the introduction, formative junctures across the epochs have been often 
overlooked by commentators and the judiciary, arguably generating confusion about the 
law’s purpose and scope in a modern setting. It has been demonstrated that, the doctrinal 
issues, like remedies, have all evolved according to societal needs but it has been argued that 
modern developments in nuisance have broadly weakened the capacity of the law to 
adequately remedy pollution of the natural environment, as it affects individuals in 
occupation of land. Of course, despite a measure of historical claims pervading adjudication 
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and scholarly commentary in this field, they rarely venture beyond the nineteenth-century, 
and therefore many jurists have based their observations without the benefit of its ancestry. 
Much modern commentary, one could say, lacks a holistic historical overview of the issues 
(despite the ancient origins of the law), thus, arguably, the evolutionary character, in light of 
recent developments, is failing to continue in a manner consistent with its ancestry and does 
not reflect today’s societal needs to effect adequate environmental protection (as it affects 
individuals in occupation of land) through common law private rights.  
The objective throughout this thesis has been to contribute to a deeper historical 
understanding of common law private nuisance in order to assess its potential to protect the 
natural environment. The reality is, owing to the vast increase in population over time and 
ever increasing environmental threats, that private nuisance is needed, today, more than ever, 
to protect private interests in land. The traditional (historical) protection afforded by nuisance 
(and its remedies) has been demonstrably adulterated through non-traditional (unhistorical) 
doctrinal changes that, perhaps, ignore environmental protection as a contemporary societal 
need. Because environmental protection remains a societal need today, palpably, it makes 
sense to expound its environmental credentials as they developed; this thesis has sought to do 
that.  
Indeed, it has been demonstrated here, that a number of the developmental steps taken during 
the evolution of nuisance have reacted to environmental challenges arising from societal 
developments across the ages (for instance the Black Death and the Industrial Revolution) 
and, accordingly, have consistently remedied environmental harms during that evolution. It is 
not trite to say that private nuisance has become decidedly underutilised in its logical (and 
historical) role in protecting individual environmental rights (and public health) in more 
recent times. Whilst it has been argued that common law nuisance is the precursor to the 
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emergence of what is termed today as ‘environmental law’,945 the modern developments in 
the law, discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, have challenged its very existence.
946
 This has had 
a profound effect on its doctrines and proven derisive to nuisance’s ‘green’ credentials in a 
modern setting.  
The simple form of private nuisance that afforded nuisance law the tools to effect 
environmental protection can be identified within the substantive chapters of the thesis. The 
topics discussed in those chapters have been the concern of nuisance actions across the 
epochs: today they remain the core architecture of the tort. The issues for any would be 
litigant over the last eight centuries have been whether they have the right to sue (Chapter 2), 
which harms are actionable (Chapter 3), the nature of liability incurred in the circumstances 
(Chapter 4), and what remedy they may expect, if successful (Chapter 5). The simplicity 
represented by the continuing core architecture of the tort ties in neatly with the essence that 
the law develops in response to societal needs.  
Fundamentally, the doctrines that are required by each litigant to be successful in remedying 
environmental harm have largely remained constant. In truth, considering the vast ancestry of 
the tort, any doctrinal changes over its evolution have been incremental variations that have 
reacted to social, economic and political nuances of the time. Whilst judges, lawyers and 
litigants turned their backs on the nascent nuisance mechanisms as nuisance law evolved, 
particularly with the advent of Case, regardless of any variations across the epochs, each 
litigant has been faced with the same doctrinal issues discussed within the substantive 
chapters above. Indeed the heart of the core doctrinal issues and the enduring role and 
importance of the injunction, historically, fits the simplicity hypothesis. 
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As time passed, the concept of property (that only appeared around 1200) evolved and the 
feudal relationship concerned with ‘profound mutual obligations’ based on a seigniorial 
relationship relinquished. During that period, proprietary rights developed and the notion of 
‘use and enjoyment of that land’ developed alongside them. The modern descriptions of 
private nuisance reflect that socio-political change that influenced the law. It is apparent that 
there must have been a juncture in the tort’s history that represents the beginnings modern 
nuisance law. It has been argued in this thesis that Case represents the ‘point zero’ of the 
modern tort. 
Similar to the discussion in chapter 4 which expresses that the proper conditions were needed 
to exist in order for negligence to become a separate tort, the correct conditions were needed 
before what we consider to be modern private nuisance could begin. The medieval constraints 
of feudal England did not allow this and it can thus be contended that the advent of modern 
nuisance law was unable to come to the fore until the case law functioned in a manner that 
was detached from manorial limitations. Indeed, it is probable that it is only after the decision 
of Cantrell v Church (which enabled litigants to abandon the assize of nuisance and quod 
permittat prosternere) that it is possible to speak of early modern nuisance law. The ancient 
writs prior to that point bear almost no resemblance to the ‘modern’ action with which the 
thesis is concerned. That was a reality that needed to be developed but it was 
methodologically unsound without first explaining the unsatisfactory nature of looking to the 
medieval law – as a model to structure the modern law - as Lord Goff had done in Hunter.   
Developments and nuances of the legal system over the epochs driven, in part, by fluctuations 
of a societal evolution have almost certainly altered most aspects of incipient nuisance law, 
including the issues addressed in this thesis. The law of private nuisance has been notoriously 
- but nonetheless deservedly - labelled as being immersed in legal uncertainty. It is indeed 
convoluted and arguably even unfit for purpose. Nevertheless an overabundance of negativity 
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has overwhelmed the tort owing to various elaborate reinterpretations of the law of nuisance 
which, over the years, have accordingly confused the issues making the tort more complex at 
each passing attempt. In truth, the ‘unruly’ use of historic material by judges has caused 
added difficulties to those issues identified by the academic community, particularly in the 
recent past. The problem is twofold in that the past is neither used nor understood in any 
consistent way and the judiciary have manipulated snippets of historical material to suit the 
‘policy’ of today’s courts, rather than contemporary or impending societal needs. It is entirely 
conceivable that that policy aspires to limit private nuisance and to leave space for 
established regulatory laws and further establish the hegemonic tort of negligence, both of 
which are arguably unsatisfactory as a means of effecting environmental protection. 
Palpably there is a need for a private law mechanism which can initiate private (thus 
unofficial) challenges to official decisions made in what can be termed the ‘public interest’. 
Traditional regulation does indeed leave gaps for private law to fill and the inadequacy of 
much environmental regulation, that sometimes exacerbates environmental harms, highlights 
there are situations where public bodies must be kept in check by private responses to either 
unjust or unacceptable decisions. The natural modern function conflicts with the present 
prevailing judicial policy. For centuries now private nuisance has been a potential avenue for 
private individuals to challenge decisions authorised in some manner by a public body. That 
potential, however, is at the behest of the judiciary. Donald McGillivray and John Wightman 
were in a fortunate position in 1996 to comment upon the state of private nuisance following 
the Court of Appeal decision in Hunter. It was a unique moment when academics could 
pause, anticipate, and even speculate about the implications of private nuisance law in the 
face of modern environmental challenges and modern environmentalism, when standing, for 
a brief time, reflected contemporary societal needs. 
251 
 
The Court of Appeal was continuing the popular recognition (which developed in the 
twentieth-century across the courts of the Commonwealth) that a substantial link to property - 
such as occupation as a home – was the proper test for standing in private nuisance. But, the 
research in this thesis reveals that the Court of Appeal essentially emulated their medieval 
counterparts after an error at law had sent the issue of standing on the wrong course following 
the much maligned decision of Malone v Laskey. By relaxing the nexus between person and 
land to something other than a proprietary interest they had inadvertently repeated the same 
process as the late sixteenth and early seventeenth-century judges. The feudal requirement for 
a connection with land that denoted a recognised acceptance (by their lord
947
) - that was good 
against the world - had been long transcended by the turn of the seventeenth-century. The 
significance of the seigniorial relationship that offered security under the law, protecting the 
physical and economic survival of a tenant in return for a service was obsolete, and the 
decision in Cantrell v Church ensured that was recognised by the common law.  
An interesting effect (direct or indirect) of individuals being able to adequately safeguard 
their proprietary rights, using private nuisance, is that litigation can often influence adequate 
environmental protection for the entire local environs concerned within each case, not merely 
the land in question. McGillivray and Wightman were faced with the reality of the true 
potential of private nuisance as a modern environmental tort. They envisioned a role that was 
neither ‘dominated by regulation’ nor ‘as a means of implementing a market based approach 
of environmental decision making’.948 In that sense they envisioned that private nuisance 
would be in a position to promote public participation in environmental decisions after the 
event, when environmental harmful activities had been recognised in actuality rather than 
anticipated in theory. Accordingly, increased accountability would be imposed on those in the 
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decision making process – this would certainly be desirable in light of the UK’s obligations 
of the Århus Convention, which today it is outwardly flouting. 
Since the House of Lords decisions in Cambridge Water and Hunter private nuisance has 
been placed into an indeterminate state. The so called ‘conventional wisdom’ sees 
environmental protection as a public matter and contends that only through the diminution of 
private rights by ‘regulation in the public interest’ can the environment be adequately 
protected.
949
 The more ‘collective rights’ in property are accepted as qualifying private rights, 
the more the law is willing to dilute the traditional ‘individualistic’ comprehension of 
property rights. This, of course, is problematic for private nuisance and raises further 
questions regarding their Lordships’ decisions in these cases. The attempt to take private 
nuisance back to its origins, albeit a misapprehended version, forces individual proprietary 
interests in land dominated by economic considerations to the heart of the tort. As such it is 
vulnerable to being further diluted by unsatisfactory ‘environmental’ regulations and 
planning decisions that will have an impact on varying localities as the monetary value of 
land becomes the overriding interest.  
Arguably, if standing is based on the nexus between human beings and land as a home, rather 
than a proprietary interest, the economic impetus behind landholding will be attenuated in 
favour of deeper environmental concerns. Human health and the willingness to live in a 
healthy environment overshadow economic considerations. Private nuisance would be in the 
unique position to bypass the inherent limitations of much environmental law which is 
implemented with clear provisions to safeguard the growth-economy. By ‘safeguarding the 
growth economy’ has meant legislation geared to prevent pollution only insofar as it does not 
curtail the economic viability of polluters, and this will only serve to exacerbate 
environmental damage by way of those activities being given legislative consent.  
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If a polluter is strictly liable for causing physical environmental damage to protected property 
interests – as ratio in Tipping still requires – then those with standing have the right to seek an 
injunction to force the polluter to cease that activity. The research in this thesis maintains that 
– owing to the ratio in Shelfer and the Supreme Court decision in Coventry – only in 
exceptional circumstances (subject to strict, unambiguous criteria) will damages be awarded 
in lieu of an injunction. The reality of such common law rights being available to everyone 
with a substantial link to a property would certainly have been recognised by their Lordships 
when they were deliberating about their decisions in Hunter. Arguably, Lord Cooke’s 
intimation that Hunter was decided on policy grounds should not be limited to the desire of 
crafting symmetry and tidiness in the tort: we should consider wider policy implications, such 
as the controversial policy of promoting economic growth. Lord Mansfield’s decisions and 
his trial notes from the eighteenth-century are indicative that the higher House of the courts 
has in the past been prejudicial towards promoting economic interests in favour of private 
common law (environmental) rights. It is somewhat sardonic that the decision in Tipping was 
to ‘draw the line’ under the damaging effect of industrialisation on rural and landed England 
and Wales. Is it telling that Lord Goff, in essence, ignored the binding authority of Tipping in 
Cambridge before – just a few years later in Hunter - seeking justification to support the 
position of excluding the vast proportion of the population from having standing in private 
nuisance using extremely weak historical evidence?  
Private nuisance is truly on the edge; it has never been in such a poor state than it finds itself 
today. The concept of nuisance grew around controlling the manner in which people used and 
exploited their land and environmental regulation is arguably a direct result of legislative 
attempts to control pollution as industrialisation became too widespread for the common law 
to cope with; nuisance was not unfit for the purposes of environmental protection, it was 
simply overwhelmed by the unprecedented rate of industrial growth, despite the Lords 
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attempts to stop the effects of pollution on the environment in decisions such as Tipping. As 
environmental regulations and planning decisions continue to increase whilst private nuisance 
becomes increasingly dormant waiting for the occasional case where it acts as an unofficial 
process when regulation is ineffective, where amenity nuisances have a prolonged financial 
effect or where an authority is unwilling to bring an action in statutory nuisance, the tort is 
fading deeper into oblivion. 
The modern ‘description’ of private nuisance is vague and academics are far from unanimous 
on the subject of actionability. The difficulties associated with the assimilation of negligence 
principles are ubiquitous across, practically, the entire law of nuisance. Palpably that 
assimilation process was aided outside its original remit - created by Lord Wright (in 
Sedleigh-Denfield) as an exception to give added protection to those defendants that had an 
action thrust upon them - by the decision in Cambridge Water. Lord Goff’s judgment in 
Cambridge is clearly at odds with Lord Westbury’s judgment in Tipping and is clear evidence 
that the indoctrination of historically unfamiliar concepts (such as reasonable foreseeability 
based on the conduct of the hypothetical reasonable man) have damaged private nuisance’s 
identity and integrity allowing the influences to spread deeper into the tort and effect other 
issues such as actionability.  
Lord Goff’s decisions in Hunter and Cambridge are visibly prejudicial against using private 
nuisance to protect interests in land, especially those that may be construed as environmental 
rights. His bias is evidenced fully in Cambridge by his expressed preference for Legislature 
generated regulation to ensure environmental protection (essentially preventing any further 
modern developments in the tort of private nuisance)
950
 and his clear attempts to allow 
negligence principles to subjugate nuisance doctrine by blatantly ignoring the effects of the 
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binding precedent laid down in Tipping. It is difficult to dispute that by denying modern 
private nuisance the room to develop further Lord Goff felt it justifiable to sacrifice long-
established private common law methods of environmental protection – the type his 
contemporary (Lord Hoffmann) recognised in Hunter was the purpose of the decision in 
Tipping.
951
 Lord Goff’s bias is further evidenced by his previous decision in Smith952 in 
which he treated physical damage to property (caused by fire owing to the acts of a third 
party – similar to facts in Goldman953) as a case of negligence. We must question why one set 
of facts were treated as nuisance whilst the other as negligence, other than in manner that it 
was just a matter of different pleadings?   
The examples discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 concerning specific matters of actionability and 
liability are clearly evocative that the merging of nuisance and negligence principles only 
serve unsatisfactory outcomes. Akin to oil and water they cannot properly mix – we may try 
but a natural separation will always be observable. Arguably the most individual 
characteristic of nuisance law from its medieval origins until the assimilation of negligence 
has been the evolution of the reasonable user test. From its genesis to deal with what Bracton 
coined as natural rights of landholding through the rule of reasonableness; the rule of 
reciprocity; and finally the reasonable user test itself, the manner in which human’s use and 
exploit land by balancing their interests as between neighbours has been consistent. But, as 
Chapters 3 and 4 testify, the reasonable user test has been distorted by the language of 
nuisance which has grown ever more virile since the decision in Cambridge despite, it is 
argued here, questions regarding its status as good law considering the House of Lords 
decision in Tipping.  
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The language of negligence distorted an eight-hundred year evolutionary process which 
created more doctrinal and definitional problems than any sense of principled symmetry or 
policy could justify. Further to nuisance’s conceptual independence is the lack of scholarly 
and judicial consensus on a number of issues from its disputed historical origins to current 
day dilemmas that extend far beyond the contents of this thesis. The explanation for why it is 
hard to find consensus is nonetheless surprisingly straightforward: the protracted existence of 
nuisance law, from its accepted origins in the assize of novel disseisin to its modern form, is 
ultimately too long a period for profound deviations not to have occurred at a number of 
different points in history. Developments and nuances of the legal system driven by the 
inevitable fluctuations during societal evolution were bound to have moved the goal posts for 
all aspects of nuisance law; including particularly (but not restricted to) the issues of 
standing; ‘actionability’; liability and remedies that have been addressed here. We should not 
be surprised that we cannot find certainty in many aspects of private nuisance when 
essentially we are looking at an eight hundred and fifty piece jigsaw puzzle - each piece 
representing a year - where pieces have been both lost and malformed, by both academic 
conjecture and judicial reasoning.
954
 
It is marked that whilst this research began to discover a linear evolutionary path to provide 
the basis for welcome doctrinal clarity and legal certainty within the realms of private 
nuisance, in reality that is a difficult task. A number of uncomfortable truths have been 
unravelled in this thesis, for instance, the merging of the entire law of nuisance during the 
development of actions on the case for nuisance (which essentially means there is an 
inexorable formative link between private and public nuisance that has often been disputed). 
Notwithstanding that, the research has shown that nuisance law, seen from a deeper historical 
perspective, is probably more intricate than could have been envisioned at the outset of this 
                                                 
954
 PH Winfield, ‘Nuisance as a Tort’ (1931) CLJ 189. 
257 
 
project. It is for that reason, and that reason alone, that my conclusion is private nuisance will 
work best when kept in its simple form.  
It is possible to provide a simple form of the tort which can be emulate today. Its interactions 
with the other members of the nuisance law family are ubiquitous, but, what is interesting 
about that, is that those interactions have transpired in a manner where they have gone 
practically unnoticed. That cannot be said about the modern assimilation process of the 
language of negligence. There is something insightful about that observation: in order to 
maintain private nuisance in its simple form only nuisance doctrine should be considered. A 
plethora of academic commentary and actual case law exists to vouch for private nuisance’s 
environmental credentials. One could say, in light of such commentary and this research, that 
the law is inherently environmental. The thesis thus offers some support, of a historical 
character, for those who treat nuisance law as ‘environmental law’.955 The question regarding 
its future in that role depends largely on the resolution of various issues discussed in this 
thesis. Owing to the longevity of nuisance law it is unthinkable that it will be abandoned by 
the courts. The criminal and statutory variations make that as unlikely as past predictions that 
the tort was going to be fully assimilated by negligence. 
It is essential in a tort driven by precedent that there is a repeat of the type of judicial 
reasoning that existed during the latter half of the nineteenth-century. The decisions in 
Bamford, Tipping and Shelfer are examples of how the judiciary can encourage 
environmental protection through robust private proprietary common law rights. There is 
certainly scope for the issues raised by this research to be resolved. As Maria Lee and Conor 
Gearty have recognised, the tort of negligence can change and produce some surprising 
results without controversy; after all, its assimilation into private nuisance has gone largely 
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unchallenged, despite blurring the historical nature of liability. The history of private 
nuisance is testament to its ability to change; its protean nature is practically legendary. It is 
realistic that private nuisance can take a step back and look at its doctrines in terms of the 
simple form advocated in this thesis. The issues isolated in this research were of course by 
design. If those issues are addressed in the simplest terms possible with a well-grounded 
historical understanding, and with an added acceptance that the protean nature of the tort 
represents its true essence (as a derivative of societal responses to peoples’ demands on and 
for the environment) then private nuisance can best safeguard the nexus between humans and 
land as it is understood in any given period.  
Whichever ‘description’ the academic or judge professes to be the most accurate 
exemplification of modern private nuisance there is a common theme between them. The two 
descriptions that are under the most scrutiny in this thesis, Percy Winfield’s, ‘an unlawful 
interference with a person’s use or enjoyment of land, or some right over, or in connection 
with it’;956 and John Murphy’s, ‘any on-going or recurrent activity or state of affairs that 
causes substantial and unreasonable interference with a claimant’s land with his use and 
enjoyment of that land’,957  both refer to interferences (with varying degrees) to the use and 
enjoyment of land. Whether environmental interferences physically damage land or adversely 
affect its amenity value, each description affords those who are capable of bringing an action 
the right to protect against environmental injury.  
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